Lee v. State of Or.

• Decision Date: 03 August 1995
• Docket Number: Civ. No. 94-6467-HO.
• Citation: 891 F. Supp. 1429
• Parties: Gary LEE, et. al., Plaintiffs, v. STATE OF OREGON, et. al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Oregon

891 F. Supp. 1429

Gary LEE, et. al., Plaintiffs, v. STATE OF OREGON, et. al., Defendants.

Civ. No. 94-6467-HO.

United States District Court, D. Oregon.

August 3, 1995.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

OPINION

(Equal Protection)

HOGAN, Chief Judge.

In November 1994, Oregon voters narrowly approved a ballot initiative that allows a terminally ill adult to obtain a doctor's prescription for a fatal drug dosage for the express purpose of ending their life. The Oregon Death With Dignity Act ("Measure 16")¹ is the first of its kind in this country, and it is an understatement to say that the Act invokes profound questions of constitutional dimension. Plaintiffs claim that Measure 16 violates the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution (Counts One, Two, and Four), statutory and First Amendment rights of freedom to exercise religion and to associate (Count Five), and the American with Disabilities Act ("ADA") (Count Three). (Third Amended Complaint, # 170).

Under the United States Constitution and the system it establishes, the resolution of an issue such as the legality of physician assisted suicide is, in the first instance, left to the democratic processes of a state. Although the complexity of life and death decisions may call for legislative participation, the judiciary cannot simply defer to state legislative processes when presented with a law which may not provide adequate constitutional guidance and protection to citizens. A state-sanctioned option designed to hasten death induces hesitation and reflection. It is the court's duty to carefully and conscientiously address any constitutional issues. Compassion, justice, prudence, and fortitude are all ingredients in the law, but the guiding "compass is the Constitution of the United States." Compassion in Dying v. State of Washington, 49 F.3d 586, 594 (9th Cir.1995).

Requiring that issues relating to physician assisted suicide be addressed within constitutional limits does not frustrate the authority of citizens to govern themselves. To the contrary, it ensures the integrity of the voting process by recognizing the deeply imbedded constitutional principle that certain fundamental rights may not be dispensed with by a majority vote.

I. EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE

Plaintiffs allege that the provisions of Measure 16 violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. They argue that Measure 16's classification or coverage to the "terminally ill" is not rationally related to a legitimate state interest.²

The Fourteenth Amendment commands, in part, that no state shall "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. The Equal Protection Clause does not forbid differentiating between classes of persons. Rather, it simply prohibits the states from treating persons differently who are, in all relevant respects, alike. Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 10, 112 S.Ct. 2326, 2331, 120 L.Ed.2d 1 (1992) (citation omitted).

Legislation is presumed valid if a classification drawn by a statute is rationally related to a legitimate state interest. Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 101 S.Ct. 1074, 67 L.Ed.2d 186 (1981). The Equal Protection Clause allows wide latitude in social legislation. United States Railroad Retirement Board v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 174, 101 S.Ct. 453, 459, 66 L.Ed.2d 368 (1980). A legitimate state interest must encompass the interests of the members of the community at large, as well as disadvantaged and favored classes. Legislative decisionmakers are not required to articulate the rationale supporting a classification, and the state is not required to produce evidence or empirical data to support it. Heller v. Doe by Doe, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 113 S.Ct. 2637, 125 L.Ed.2d 257 (1993). It is irrelevant that the voters rather than a legislative body enacted the statute for purposes of this constitutional review. Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 293, 295, 102 S.Ct. 434, 436, 437, 70 L.Ed.2d 492 (1981). Plaintiffs have the burden of proving any violation of the Equal Protection Clause. Burlington Northern Railroad Co. v. Department of Public Service Regulation, 763 F.2d 1106, 1113 (9th Cir.1985).

A classification "must be upheld against an equal protection challenge if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification." F.C.C. v. Beach Communications, Inc., ___ U.S. ___, ___, 113 S.Ct. 2096, 2100, 124 L.Ed.2d 211 (1993). A classification rationally furthers a state interest when there is some fit between the disparate treatment and the legislative purpose. See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 657, 86 S.Ct. 1717, 1727, 16 L.Ed.2d 828 (1966). When faced with doubts as to the constitutionality of a statute, the court must first determine whether it is fairly possible to interpret the statute in a manner that renders it valid. Communications Workers of America v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735, 762, 108 S.Ct. 2641, 2657, 101 L.Ed.2d 634 (1988). However, "statutory construction may not be pressed to the point of disingenuous evasion." Id. at 762, 108 S.Ct. at 2657 (quotation omitted).

A state is free to create a classification scheme so long as it does not invidiously discriminate. City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 105 S.Ct. 3249, 87 L.Ed.2d 313 (1985) (labeled "irrational prejudice"); Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356, 93 S.Ct. 1001, 35 L.Ed.2d 351 (1973); Jackson Water Works v. Public Utilities Com'n, 793 F.2d 1090, 1093 (9th Cir.1986). The state may not rely on a classification whose relationship to an asserted goal is so attenuated as to render the distinction arbitrary or irrational. Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 102 S.Ct. 2309, 72 L.Ed.2d 672 (1982); United States Dept. of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 93 S.Ct. 2821, 37 L.Ed.2d 782 (1973); Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. at 18, 112 S.Ct. at 2336. However, the underinclusiveness or overinclusiveness of a classification may be so severe that it cannot be said that the legislative distinction "rationally furthers" the state interest. Burlington Northern Railroad Co. v. Ford, 504 U.S. 648, 653-54, 112 S.Ct. 2184, 2188, 119 L.Ed.2d 432 (1992).

Equal protection analysis is used to determine whether a classification is properly drawn. Plaintiffs argue that there is no legitimate state interest underlying Measure 16, because statistics show that only 2-4% of the terminally ill actually commit suicide. However, as noted, a classification is valid for equal protection purposes as long as there is some "fit" between the disparate treatment and the legislative purpose. On the other hand, intervenor defendants argue that Measure 16 is only the first step toward legalizing physician assisted suicide for others who consent.³ The Ninth Circuit in discussing whether a terminally ill patient had a liberty interest in a "right to die" reasoned:

If at the heart of liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment is the uncurtailable ability to believe and to act on one's deepest beliefs about life, the right to suicide and the right to assistance in suicide are the prerogative of at least every sane adult. The attempt to restrict such rights to the terminally ill is illusory. If such liberty exists in this context, ... every man and woman in the United States must enjoy it.... The conclusion is a reductio ad absurdum....

Compassion in Dying, 49 F.3d at 591. While the practical effect of a state law may be to create some inequality between particular classes of persons on the ground that the legislature has taken only one step, it cannot create an illusory classification where the reasons for the law apply equally to all members of the public.

Defendants argue that Measure 16 cannot violate plaintiffs' right to equal protection of the laws, because it does not require any action, rather it merely provides an optional procedure. In theory, the consent embodied in Measure 16 equally protects the right of a terminally ill person to go on living and the right to choose to die. This consent is purportedly based on a person's own rational assessment of the quality and value of their life.

As Measure 16 itself recognizes, however, there may be terminally ill persons who are suffering from impaired judgment and yet express a wish to die. Their status is incompatible with autonomy and personal decisionmaking. Where terminally ill persons are provided the means of hastening death, there is a potential for exposing members of society to life-threatening mistakes and abuses. Therefore, a crucial inquiry under an equal protection analysis is whether the safeguards provided in Measure 16 are sufficient to justify treating terminally ill patients differently than others.

Plaintiffs argue that the "terminally ill" classification denies them equal protection of the laws, because non-terminally ill persons are entitled to certain statutory "protections" under Oregon law which are arbitrarily and irrationally abrogated by Measure 16. Specifically, they point to ORS 163.125, ORS 161.205, ORS 426.070, ORS 677.095, and ORS 677.190.⁴ These laws serve to protect vulnerable people who might otherwise seek suicide in response to treatable depression, mental illness, or coercion. After noting that a majority of states have laws imposing criminal penalties on one who assists a suicide, the Supreme Court has stated: "We do not think a State is required to remain neutral in the face of an informed and voluntary decision by a physically able adult to starve to death." Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 280, 110 S.Ct. 2841, 2852, 111 L.Ed.2d 224 (1990). The state interests underlying these statutes include preservation of life and protection against suicide.

The state defendants claim the following interests in creating an exception for terminally ill...