Lee v. U.S. Taekwondo Union

• Decision Date: 13 August 2004
• Docket Number: Civil No. 04-00461 SOM-LEK.
• Citation: 331 F.Supp.2d 1252
• Parties: Dae Sung LEE, Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES TAEKWONDO UNION, a Colorado nonprofit Corporation; United States Olympic Committee, a federally chartered nonprofit corporation, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Hawaii

331 F.Supp.2d 1252 Dae Sung LEE, Plaintiff,
v.
UNITED STATES TAEKWONDO UNION, a Colorado nonprofit Corporation; United States Olympic Committee, a federally chartered nonprofit corporation, Defendants. Civil No. 04-00461 SOM-LEK. United States District Court, D. Hawai'i. August 13, 2004.

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Ward D. Jones, Bervar & Jones, Honolulu, HI, for Plaintiff.

David M. Louie, April Luria, Roeca Louie & Hiraoka, Honolulu, HI, Mark S. Levinstein, Williams & Connolly, Washington, DC, for Defendants.

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS; ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

MOLLWAY, District Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION.

This action concerns the former coach of the 2004 United States Olympic Taekwondo

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Team, Plaintiff Dae Sung Lee. Lee, a very successful taekwondo athlete and coach of previous national taekwondo teams, says that he was removed as coach of the 2004 United States Olympic Taekwondo Team because he is of Korean ancestry. Just two weeks before the opening ceremonies for the 2004 Summer Olympics in Athens, Greece, Lee moved for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction, claiming that Defendants United States Olympic Committee ("USOC") and United States Taekwondo Union ("USTU") (collectively, "Defendants") have discriminated against him on the basis of his race in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and have breached his contract for employment as coach of the 2004 United States Olympic Taekwondo Team. Lee asks this court to order Defendants "to reinstate PLAINTIFF either as sole head coach or as one of two credentialed coaches of the United States 2004 Olympic Taekwondo Team and to fulfill the normal duties of financial support and cooperation through to the time of the completion of the 2004 Olympic Games." Memorandum in Support of Motion at 30; see also Complaint (July 28, 2004) ¶ 38.

Defendants have moved to dismiss Lee's Complaint, arguing that all of Lee's claims are preempted by the Ted Stevens Olympic and Amateur Sports Act, 36 U.S.C. §§ 220501-220529 (2001) ("Amateur Sports Act"), formerly 36 U.S.C. §§ 371-396 (1988).

The parties, in discussion with the court, agreed to expedited briefing and to a schedule for an evidentiary hearing, noting that the taekwondo events would be held between August 26 and August 29, 2004. In accordance with that schedule, this court held an evidentiary hearing on the motions yesterday. The court now hastens to issue its ruling.

Defendants' motion to dismiss is denied in part and granted in part. To the extent Lee challenges eligibility requirements under the Amateur Sports Act, the motion is granted because that Act preempts those claims. However, to the extent Lee separately claims racial or national origin discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, the motion is denied.

Lee's motion for injunctive relief under § 1981 is denied. Even assuming Lee states a prima facie race discrimination claim, Defendants have demonstrated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for their actions, and Lee has failed to demonstrate that those reasons are really a pretext for racial or national origin discrimination.

II. THE MOTION TO DISMISS IS GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART.

A. Standard for Dismissal.

Defendants argue that this court lacks jurisdiction over all of the claims in the Complaint because the Amateur Sports Act grants the USOC exclusive jurisdiction over those claims. The court treats this motion as a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1).

A motion brought under Rule 12(b)(1) may either attack the allegations of the complaint as insufficient to confer upon the court subject matter jurisdiction, or attack the existence of subject matter jurisdiction in fact. Thornhill Publ'g Co. v. Gen. Tel. & Elecs. Corp., 594 F.2d 730, 733 (9th Cir.1979). When a motion to dismiss attacks the allegations of a complaint as insufficient to confer subject matter jurisdiction, all allegations of material fact are taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Fed'n of African Am. Contractors v. City of Oakland, 96 F.3d 1204, 1207 (9th Cir.1996). When the motion to dismiss is

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a factual attack on subject matter jurisdiction, however, no presumptive truthfulness attaches to the plaintiff's allegations, and the existence of disputed material facts will not preclude the trial court from evaluating for itself the existence of subject matter jurisdiction in fact. Thornhill, 594 F.2d at 733; accord McCarthy v. United States, 850 F.2d 558, 560 (9th Cir.1988) ("when considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) the district court is not restricted to the face of the pleadings, but may review any evidence, such as affidavits and testimony, to resolve factual disputes concerning the existence of jurisdiction"). Defendants' motion to dismiss based on the Amateur Sports Act's preemption of other laws is a facial attack on this court's subject matter jurisdiction.

B. The Amateur Sports Act Preempts Lee's Challenge to the Requirements For the Coach of the 2004 United States Olympic Taekwondo Team.

The International Olympic Committee ("IOC") owns the rights to the Olympic Games. Michels v. United States Olympic Comm., 741 F.2d 155, 156 (7th Cir.1984). Each nation participating in the Olympic Games has an IOC-recognized committee, which, in turn, recognizes a national governing body for each sport. Thus, in the present case, the IOC has recognized the USOC as this country's committee, and the USOC has recognized the USTU as the national governing body for taekwondo. See id.; see also 36 U.S.C. § 220521(a) (2001) (formerly 36 U.S.C. § 391(a) (1988)).¹

In part, the Amateur Sports Act created the USOC "to exercise exclusive jurisdiction ... over ... all matters pertaining to United States participation in the Olympic Games." 36 U.S.C. § 220503(3)(A) (2001) (formerly 36 U.S.C. § 374(3) (1988)); Slaney v. Int'l Amateur Athletic Fed'n, 244 F.3d 580, 594 (7th Cir.2001) (interpreting § 220503(3)). The Amateur Sports Act also created and required the USOC "to provide swift resolution of conflicts and disputes involving amateur athletics, national governing bodies, and amateur sports organizations, and protect the opportunity of any amateur athlete, coach, trainer, manager, administrator, or official to participate in amateur athletic competition." 36 U.S.C. § 220503(8) (2001) (formerly 36 U.S.C. § 374(8) (1988)) (emphasis added); 36 U.S.C. § 220509(a) (2001) (formerly 36 U.S.C. § 382b (1988)); Slaney, 244 F.3d at 594 (interpreting § 220503(8)); Oldfield v. Athletic Congress, 779 F.2d 505, 506-507 (9th Cir.1985) (interpreting § 374(8)).

The USOC was therefore granted the power to "facilitate, through orderly and effective administrative procedures, the resolution of conflicts or disputes that involve any of its members and any amateur athlete, coach ..., or amateur sports organization and that arise in connection with their eligibility for and participation in the Olympic Games." 36 U.S.C. § 22505(c)(5) (2001) (formerly 36 U.S.C. § 375(a)(5) (1988)). In pertinent part, the Amateur Sports Act requires national governing bodies to provide equal opportunities to athletes and coaches to participate in amateur athletic competitions without discrimination on the basis of race or national origin. See 36 U.S.C. § 220522(a)(8) (2001) (formerly 36 U.S.C. § 391(b)(6) (1988)).

In an athlete's challenge to a national governing body's decision that he was ineligible to compete in the Olympic shot put

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trials, the Ninth Circuit held that the Amateur Sports Act contained no express private right of action. Oldfield, 779 F.2d at 507. Oldfield involved a shot putter's challenge to the suspension of his amateur status. The athlete had signed a professional performance contract with the International Track Association and competed with that organization for four years. He then sought to reestablish his standing as an amateur, but The Athletic Congress (the national governing body for track and field events) and the USOC deemed him ineligible to participate in the 1984 Olympic tryouts on the ground that he would not be allowed to compete in the Olympic Games under IOC rules.

Oldfield then sued in federal court, alleging violations of the Amateur Sports Act. The district court denied injunctive relief, then granted summary judgment to the defendants. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the summary judgment, holding that the Amateur Sports Act contained no express private right of action allowing an athlete to challenge his eligibility determination. The Ninth Circuit then examined the four factors set forth in Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 95 S.Ct. 2080, 45 L.Ed.2d 26 (1975), for determining the existence of an implied private right of action:

(1) whether the plaintiff is a member of a class for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted; (2) whether there is an indication of Congress's intent to create or deny a private remedy; (3) whether a private remedy would be consistent with the statute's underlying purposes; and (4) whether the cause of action traditionally is relegated to state law. As more recent Supreme Court cases have made clear, however, the factors enunciated in Cort are not entitled to equal weight. The central inquiry remains whether Congress intended to create, either expressly or by implication, a private cause of action.

Oldfield, 779 F.2d at 507. The Ninth Circuit examined the legislative history of the Amateur Sports Act and concluded that Congress had not intended to allow athletes to sue in federal court to enforce rights created by the Amateur Sports Act. Id.

Oldfield is consistent with the Seventh Circuit's decision in Michels, which involved a weightlifter's challenge to his disqualification from competition in the 1984 Olympic Games after a drug test showed a higher testosterone level...