Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc. v. Wilson

• Decision Date: 01 April 1980
• Docket Number: No. 53354,53354
• Citation: 609 P.2d 777,1980 OK 48
• Parties: LEE WAY MOTOR FREIGHT, INC., Petitioner, v. Floyd C. WILSON, Respondent.
• Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court

Page 777

609 P.2d 777

1980 OK 48

LEE WAY MOTOR FREIGHT, INC., Petitioner, v. Floyd C. WILSON, Respondent.

No. 53354.

Supreme Court of Oklahoma.

April 1, 1980.

Rehearing Denied May 5, 1980.

ORDER SUSTAINED.

Ben A. Goff, Oklahoma City, for petitioner.

C. W. Schwoerke, Oklahoma City, for respondent.

IRWIN, Vice Chief Justice.

In July, 1977, claimant Wilson sustained a compensable injury. In September, 1978, he was awarded seventy percent (70%) permanent partial disability to the body as a whole. In January, 1979, upon claimants application, and testimony demonstrating that he was unable to exist on the weekly benefit and had incurred considerable indebtedness while unable to work, the trial court commuted the balance of his award to a lump-sum and ordered the payment of approximately $10,000.00.

Petitioner first contends that there was insufficient evidence upon which the trial court could base its determination to commute the award to a lump sum. We have held that the State Industrial Court (Worker's Compensation Court) has wide discretion in commuting an award to a lump sum, and where it does not affirmatively appear that the court abused its discetion and such commutation tends to promote substantial justice to all parties involved, such commutation will not be disturbed by this court on review. Kerr's Inc. v. Smith, Okl., 359 P.2d 330 (1961). No such abuse appears in this case, and the order will not be disturbed for lack of evidence.

Petitioner next contends that the order is in error because it is in excess of the amount that is authorized under 85 O.S.1977 Supp., § 41. The 1977 amendatory language, which became effective on July 1, 1978, provides in part:

"Whenever an injured person receives an award for permanent partial disability, the injured employee, for good cause shown, may have the award commuted to a lump-sum payment by permission of the Court. The lump-sum payment shall not exceed Four Thousand Dollars ($4,000.00) or twenty-five percent (25%) of the total award, whichever is the larger sum." (Emphasis added)

Prior to the 1977 amendment there was no limitation on the amount of an award which could be commuted. As noted, the 1977 limitation did not become effective until July 1, 1978. Wilson's injury occurred prior to that date, and his compensation award was based upon the law in existence at that time. However, petitioner insists that the language of the 1977 amendment is applicable, while respondent contends that his rights are governed by the prior law. If the 1977 amendment is applicable, the commutation order must be reversed. If it is not, the order will be sustained.

Petitioner's rationale for applying the limitation which became effective on July 1, 1978 to injuries prior to that date is that the amendment is "procedural" rather than "substantive" in nature. It is argued that it affects only the method of payment and must be given retroactive application. Petitioner supports this argument by reference to Special Indemnity Fund v. Dailey, Okl., 272 P.2d 395 (1954) where this court held that 85 O.S.1953 Supp., § 172, which authorized lump-sum payments from the Special Indemnity Fund, should be applied retroactively. In that case the Special Indemnity Fund challenged the retroactive operation of the statute, and the reasons for the holding appear to be that to give the Act only prospective operation would create two classes of claimants without a rational basis, and such provision authorizing the granting of lump-sums goes only to the method of payment. The Court said it was the intention of the legislature that the amendments should have a retrospective as well as a prospective application. We note the amendments in Dailey granted the injured employee the right to receive a lump-sum...