LeFever v. Castellanos

• Decision Date: 14 November 2022
• Docket Number: 4:20CV3066
• Parties: LUKE LEFEVER, Plaintiff, v. IVAN CASTELLANOS, Dawson County Deputy, in his individual capacity; COUNTY OF DAWSON, NEBRASKA; JEROME KRAMER, Lincoln County Sheriff, in his official and individual capacities; DEPUTY ROLAND KRAMER, Chief Deputy, in his individual capacity; BRETT SCHMIDT, Deputy, in his individual capacity; COUNTY OF LINCOLN, NEBRASKA; CARLOS TREVINO, Nebraska State Patrol Trooper, in his individual capacity; and EL WOOD, Nebraska State Patrol Trooper Sgt, in his individual capacity, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Nebraska

LUKE LEFEVER, Plaintiff, v. IVAN CASTELLANOS, Dawson County Deputy, in his individual capacity; COUNTY OF DAWSON, NEBRASKA; JEROME KRAMER, Lincoln County Sheriff, in his official and individual capacities; DEPUTY ROLAND KRAMER, Chief Deputy, in his individual capacity; BRETT SCHMIDT, Deputy, in his individual capacity; COUNTY OF LINCOLN, NEBRASKA; CARLOS TREVINO, Nebraska State Patrol Trooper, in his individual capacity; and EL WOOD, Nebraska State Patrol Trooper Sgt, in his individual capacity, Defendants.

No. 4:20CV3066

United States District Court, D. Nebraska

November 14, 2022

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

RICHARD G. KOPF SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

This matter is before the court on Defendants' motions for summary judgment (Filings 101, 104, 107) and on four related motions filed by Plaintiff (Filings 127, 133, 138, 139).

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Luke LeFever ("LeFever"), a state prisoner who appears pro se, filed three separate actions on June 11, 2020, which were then consolidated on the court's own motion, as involving common questions of law or fact. An initial review of LeFever's original Complaints (Filing 1 in Case Nos. 4:20CV3066,4:20CV3067, and 4:20CV3068) resulted in a determination by the court that they were subject to dismissal under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A; however, LeFever was given leave to amend.

The court later conducted an initial review of LeFever's Amended Complaint (Filing 10), which was not filed until November 23, 2020. The court summarized that pleading as follows:

LeFever alleges that on June 4, 2018, he had a roadside encounter with Deputy Ivan Castellanos of the Dawson County Sheriff's Office, and was searched with his consent. After being told he was not under arrest, LeFever began to walk away but was tased in the back by Deputy Castellanos. LeFever fell to the ground and was given repeated shocks, but was able to regain his feet, pull out the taser wires, and run away. Deputy Castellanos discharged his sidearm at the fleeing LeFever, but missed. [LeFever] alleges Deputy Castellanos then made radio reports in which he falsely claimed LeFever had weapons and there had been “shots fired.” As a result of these allegedly false radio reports, LeFever claims other law enforcement officers pursued and apprehended him using deadly force. Those officers fired 68 rounds of ammunition into a vehicle LeFever was driving, and he was struck with 9 of these rounds.

LeFever alleges he wound up in a pasture, where the vehicle he was driving was intentionally T-boned by Trooper Carlos Trevino of the Nebraska State Patrol (“NSP”), who drove through a fence with his patrol truck. When LeFever's vehicle began moving again, Trooper Trevino and three officers from the Lincoln County Sheriff's Office, including Sheriff Jerome Kramer, Chief Deputy Roland Kramer, and Deputy Brett Schmidt, began firing their weapons at the vehicle.

Memorandum and Order entered February 4, 2021 (Filing 14), p. 2.

The court determined that seven plausible claims for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 were stated in the Amended Complaint:

(1) a Fourth Amendment “excessive force” claim against Deputy Castellanos, in his individual capacity, for tasing LeFever; (2) a Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process claim against Deputy Castellanos, in his individual capacity, for firing his service weapon at LeFever; (3) a Fourth Amendment “false arrest” claim against Deputy Castellanos, in his individual capacity, for radioing there were “shots fired” and LeFever was armed; (4) a Fourth Amendment “excessive force” claim against Sheriff Kramer, in his individual and official capacities, for firing rounds of ammunition into the vehicle LeFever was driving, and for condoning his deputies' use of deadly force against LeFever; (5) a Fourth Amendment “excessive force” claim against Chief Deputy Kramer, in his individual capacity, for firing rounds of ammunition into the vehicle LeFever was driving; (6) a Fourth Amendment “excessive force” claim against Deputy Schmidt, in his individual capacity, for firing rounds of ammunition into the vehicle LeFever was driving; and (7) a Fourth Amendment “excessive force” claim against Trooper Trevino, in his individual capacity, for crashing into the vehicle LeFever was driving and then firing rounds of ammunition into the vehicle.

Ibid., pp. 18-19.

The court dismissed without prejudice all state-law claims alleged against Trooper Trevino, because of Eleventh Amendment immunity. Ibid., pp. 15, 19. In addition, the court dismissed without prejudice all claims (state and federal) alleged against another state patrolman, Sergeant Elwood, for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.^[1] Ibid. pp. 15-17, 19. The court did not address whether state-law claims alleged against other Defendants (county law enforcement officers) were well-pleaded, but all official-capacity claims alleged against them were dismissed without prejudice. Ibid., pp. 17-19. The court had previously dismissed with prejudice all federal constitutional claims alleged against Trooper Trevino in his official capacity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Memorandum and Order entered August 3, 2020 (Filing 7), pp. 19-20, 25.^[2]

On April 27, 2021, Deputy Castellanos filed an Answer to the Amended Complaint in his individual capacity (Filing 27), and Dawson County filed a motion to dismiss with prejudice all state-law claims alleged against Deputy Castellanos in his official capacity (Filing 28). On May 28, 2021, Sheriff Jerome Kramer, Chief Deputy Roland Kramer, and Deputy Schmidt jointly filed an Answer to the Amended Complaint (Filing 30), and Lincoln County filed a motion to dismiss with prejudice all state-law claims alleged against these three Defendants in their official capacities (Filing 31). Subsequently, the court gave Dawson County and Lincoln County leave to intervene and granted their motions to dismiss the state-law clams as barred by the intentional torts exception to Nebraska's Political Subdivisions Tort Claims Act; consequently, all state-law claims alleged against the counties and their employees were dismissed with prejudice.^[3] See Memoranda and Orders entered September 13, 2021 (Filings 54, 55).^[4] After a default judgment entered against Trooper Trevino in his individual capacity was set aside upon a showing of excusable neglect, he filed an Answer on August 8, 2021 (Filing 48). Defendants' Answers all include claims of qualified immunity.^[5]

II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

“A party may move for summary judgment, identifying each claim or defense-or the part of each claim or defense-on which summary judgment is sought. The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The court should state on the record the reasons for granting or denying the motion.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a).

In reviewing a motion for summary judgment, the court views the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and gives that party “the benefit of all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the record.” State Nat'l Ins. Co., Inc. v. Washington Int'l Ins. Co., 304 F.Supp.3d 827, 831-32 (D. Neb. 2018) (quoting Minnesota ex rel. N. Pac Ctr., Inc. v. BNSF Ry. Co., 686 F.3d 567, 571 (8th Cir. 2012)). It is not the court's function to weigh evidence in the summary judgment record to determine the truth of any factual issue; the court merely determines whether there is evidence creating a genuine issue for trial. See Bell v. Conopco, Inc., 186 F.3d 1099, 1101 (8th Cir. 1999).

“There is a genuine dispute when the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party.” Dick v. Dickinson State Univ., 826 F.3d 1054, 1061 (8th Cir. 2016) (internal quotations and citations omitted). “A fact is material if it ‘might affect the outcome of the suit.'” Id. (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)).

The moving party bears the initial responsibility of informing the court of the basis for the motion, and must identify those portions of the record which the moving party believes show the lack of a genuine issue of material fact. Torgerson v. City of Rochester, 643 F.3d 1031, 1042 (8th Cir. 2011) (en banc). If the moving party does so, the burden then shifts to the nonmoving party, who “may not rest upon mere allegation or denials of his pleading, but must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256. If the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, summary judgment should be granted. Smith-Bunge v. Wisconsin Cent., Ltd., 946 F.3d 420, 424 (8th Cir. 2019).

The initial burden on a moving party “may be discharged by ‘showing'-that is, pointing out to the district court-that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986); see also Bedford v. Doe, 880 F.3d 993, 996 (8th Cir. 2018) (“The moving party can satisfy its burden in either of two ways: it can produce evidence negating an essential element of the nonmoving party's case, or it can show that the nonmoving party does not have enough evidence of an essential element of its claim to carry its ultimate burden of persuasion at trial.”); Johnson v. Wheeling Mach. Prods., 779 F.3d 514, 517 (8th Cir. 2015) (moving party need not produce evidence showing “the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.”).

In response to the moving party's showing, the nonmoving party's burden is to produce “specific facts sufficient to raise a genuine issue for trial.” Haggenmiller v. ABM Parking Servs., Inc., 837 F.3d 879, 884 (8th Cir. 201...