Leffler v. Jp Morgan Chase Bank, N.A.

• Decision Date: 13 May 2009
• Docket Number: No. 08-07-00320-CV.,08-07-00320-CV.
• Citation: 290 S.W.3d 384
• Parties: Glenn L. LEFFLER, Appellant, v. JP MORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A., f/k/a Bank One, f/k/a First USA Bank, a/k/a Chase Bank U.S.A., N.A., Appellee.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

290 S.W.3d 384 Glenn L. LEFFLER, Appellant,
v.
JP MORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A., f/k/a Bank One, f/k/a First USA Bank, a/k/a Chase Bank U.S.A., N.A., Appellee. No. 08-07-00320-CV. Court of Appeals of Texas, El Paso. May 13, 2009. Rehearing Overruled July 9, 2009.

Tony R. Conde, Jr., El Paso, TX, for Appellant.

West W. Winter, San Antonio, TX, for Appellee.

Before CHEW, C.J., McCLURE, and RIVERA, JJ.

OPINION

GUADALUPE RIVERA, Justice.

This is an appeal from the granting of a traditional and no-evidence motion for

290 S.W.3d 385

summary judgment in favor of JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. (Chase or Appellee) in a suit alleging conversion, negligence, breach of contract, fraud, and usury. Glenn L. Leffler (Leffler or Appellant) argues that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Chase. We affirm.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Appellant sued Appellee on February 24, 2006 for conversion, negligence, breach of contract, fraud, and usury. Appellant alleged he was double billed by the Appellee in 1996 in the amount of $3,994.74 plus interest, late fees, and other amounts. Appellant had two credit card accounts with Appellee; the first ended in 4425 and the second account in 8972. On or about June 6, 1996 Appellant requested that the balance on the 4425 account be transferred to the 8972 account. The July 1996 statements for both accounts reflect the $3,994.74 transfer and reference the same transaction number, F336600HC000C2156. The September 1996 statement for account 4425 shows a subsequent charge for a balance transfer of $3,761.57 and has a reference number of F336600JY000C4206. Although account 4425 was closed in June of 1996 after the balance transfer, it could be charged on for a period of three months.

Appellant alleged that the original balance transferred from account 4425 to account 8972 of $3,994.74 was charged back to account 4425 in the amount of $3,761.57 and that he repeatedly requested that Chase remove the charge from account 4425. Appellant paid account 4425 in full in December of 2003. On January 5, 2005, over a year later, Appellant sent a written request to Appellee for the return of the double-billed funds; this request was denied in writing by the Appellee on February 19, 2005. On February 24, 2006, Appellant filed suit. On December 14, 2006, Appellee filed a Traditional and No-Evidence Motion for Summary Judgment. On July 31, 2007, the trial court granted the summary judgment, without stating the grounds, and a take-nothing judgment was entered. On appeal Appellant challenges the trial court's granting of the Traditional Motion for Summary Judgment but does not challenge the granting of the No-Evidence Motion for Summary Judgment.

II. DISCUSSION

We review the granting of a summary judgment de novo. Valence Operating Co. v. Dorsett, 164 S.W.3d 656, 661 (Tex.2005); Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Knott, 128 S.W.3d 211, 215 (Tex.2003). Summary judgments must stand on their own merits. Rhone-Poulenc, Inc. v. Steel, 997 S.W.2d 217, 223 (Tex.1999). When reviewing a summary judgment, we take as true all evidence favorable to the nonmovant. See Science Spectrum, Inc. v. Martinez, 941 S.W.2d 910, 911 (Tex.1997); Friendswood Dev. Co. v. McDade & Co., 926 S.W.2d 280, 282 (Tex.1996); Wornick Co. v. Casas, 856 S.W.2d 732, 733 (Tex. 1993). We indulge every reasonable inference and resolve any doubts in the nonmovant's favor. See Science Spectrum, Inc., 941 S.W.2d at 911; Friendswood Dev. Co., 926 S.W.2d at 282; Wornick Co., 856 S.W.2d at 733; Nixon v. Mr. Property Management Co., Inc., 690 S.W.2d 546, 548-49 (Tex.1985). On appeal, the movant still bears the burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact, and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Nixon, 690 S.W.2d at 548.

Traditional Summary Judgment

Tex.R.Civ.P. 166a provides a method of summarily terminating a case when it clearly appears that only a question of law is involved and that there is no genuine

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fact issue. See Swilley v. Hughes, 488 S.W.2d 64, 68 (Tex.1972). The party moving for summary judgment carries the burden of establishing that no material fact issue exists and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Tex.R.Civ.P. 166a; Wornick Co., 856 S.W.2d at 733. The movant must establish its right to summary judgment on the...