Legacy Health Systems v. Noble
Decision Date | 18 November 2009 |
Docket Number | 0702423.,A138671. |
Citation | 232 Or. App. 93,221 P.3d 180 |
Parties | In the Matter of the Compensation of Theresa A. Noble, Claimant. LEGACY HEALTH SYSTEMS & Legacy Health System, Petitioners, v. Theresa A. NOBLE, Respondent. |
Court | Oregon Court of Appeals |
Deborah L. Sather, Portland, argued the cause for petitioners. With her on the briefs were Rebecca A. Watkins and Sather, Byerly & Holloway.
James O. Marsh, Portland, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was Carney, Buckley, Hays, Marsh & Gibson.
Before LANDAU, Presiding Judge, and SCHUMAN, Judge, and ORTEGA, Judge.
While walking to a credit union to deposit a personal check during a paid break from work, claimant slipped on ice and fractured her right ankle. The Workers' Compensation Board (the board) determined that, because claimant's errand was not a recreational or social activity performed primarily for her personal pleasure, and because claimant's employer controlled the parking lot where the fall occurred, the injury was sufficiently work-related to be compensable. Legacy Health Systems, the self-insured employer, seeks judicial review. We agree that claimant's injury did not occur during a social or recreational activity and that it occurred "in the course of" employment, but, because the board failed to determine whether the injury arose "out of" claimant's employment, we reverse and remand.
The following facts are undisputed. During a paid morning break from her work as a patient care coordinator at employer's hospital in northwest Portland, claimant decided to deposit a personal check at a credit union located at a different part of employer's campus. She left the hospital, crossed a street, and started to cut across a parking lot. While in the lot, she slipped on ice and fell, fracturing her right ankle. Another hospital employee, entering the lot to park her car, found claimant and came to her assistance. A hospital security guard arrived and filled out an incident report, and an ambulance took claimant to the emergency room.
Claimant filed a workers' compensation claim with employer, and employer denied it on the ground that the injury did not arise out of and in the course of employment. ORS 656.005(7)(a). Claimant requested a hearing. The administrative law judge (ALJ) determined that the injury was compensable and reversed the denial. The ALJ concluded, in part, as follows:
(Citations omitted.) The ALJ noted, "Based on her demeanor at the hearing, I had no reason to question claimant's credibility."
The board affirmed the ALJ's order with supplemental findings. In particular, the board noted that the "parking lot" rule applied and that "there is sufficient evidence that claimant was injured on the employer's premises." Employer seeks judicial review.
To be compensable, an injury must "aris[e] out of and in the course of employment," ORS 656.005(7)(a), a two-part requirement often referred to as the "unitary work-connection inquiry." An injury must satisfy both requirements, although "the work-connection test may be satisfied if the factors supporting one prong are minimal while the factors supporting the other prong are many." Krushwitz v. McDonald's Restaurants, 323 Or. 520, 531, 919 P.2d 465 (1996) (citing Phil A. Livesley Co. v. Russ, 296 Or. 25, 28, 672 P.2d 337 (1983)). To occur "in the course of" employment, "the time, place, and circumstances of the injury [must] justify connecting the injury to the employment." Robinson v. Nabisco, Inc., 331 Or. 178, 186, 11 P.3d 1286 (2000). To satisfy the "arising out of" employment prong, there must be "some causal link" between the injury and the employment. Krushwitz, 323 Or. at 525-26, 919 P.2d 465. That link exists if employment exposes the worker to some risk from which the injury originates. Fred Meyer, Inc. v. Hayes, 325 Or. 592, 601, 943 P.2d 197 (1997).
Before determining whether an injury meets the primary requirement for compensability that is captured in the "arising out of and in the course of employment" test, however, we must address a prior question. ORS 656.005(7)(b)(B) categorically excludes from coverage any injury resulting from a social or recreational activity that a worker was engaged in primarily for the worker's personal pleasure. "[O]nly after we have concluded that an injury was not suffered while engaging in a recreational or social activity primarily for the worker's personal pleasure do we consider whether the injury arose out of and in the course of the employment." Roberts v. SAIF, 196 Or.App. 414, 417, 102 P.3d 752 (2004), aff'd, 341 Or. 48, 136 P.3d 1105 (2006) (citing Liberty Northwest Ins. Corp. v. Nichols, 186 Or.App. 664, 667, 64 P.3d 1152 (2003)).
We therefore begin with that prior inquiry. In Roberts v. SAIF, 341 Or. 48, 52, 136 P.3d 1105 (2006), the Supreme Court explained that the inquiry involves a three-step analysis:
The phrase "recreational or social activities" is not defined by statute or rule. Employer concedes that claimant was not engaged in a "social" activity, and we agree; she was walking alone, from a workstation, to her credit union. For purposes of ORS 656.005(7)(b)(B), we previously adopted the dictionary definition of "recreation": "'the act of recreating or state of being recreated: refreshment of the strength and spirits after toil: DIVERSION, PLAY * * * a means of getting diversion or entertainment * * *[.]'" Roberts, 196 Or.App. at 418, 102 P.3d 752 (quoting Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary 1899 (unabridged ed. 1993)). Here, as noted, the board confirmed the ALJ's conclusion that walking to a credit union to deposit a check is not the type of activity contemplated by ORS 656.005(7)(b)(B). We agree. As the Supreme Court has explained, the exclusion for "recreational or social activities" was a legislative reaction to Beneficiaries of McBroom v. Chamber of Commerce, 77 Or. App. 700, 713 P.2d 1095, rev. den., 301 Or. 240, 720 P.2d 1279 (1986), a case in which this court found compensable the death of a travelling salesman who, on a business trip to Los Angeles, became extremely inebriated and drowned in his hotel's hot tub. Roberts, 341 Or. at 53, 136 P.3d 1105. Further, we have noted that the typical "recreational activity" case involves "off-the-job group recreational or social activities such as...
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