LeGalley v. Bronson Community Schools

• Decision Date: 19 October 1983
• Docket Number: Docket No. 66539
• Citation: 339 N.W.2d 223,127 Mich.App. 482
• Parties: Robert M. LeGALLEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BRONSON COMMUNITY SCHOOLS, Defendant-Appellee. 127 Mich.App. 482, 339 N.W.2d 223, 14 Ed. Law Rep. 152
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Page 223

339 N.W.2d 223

Robert M. LeGALLEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BRONSON COMMUNITY SCHOOLS, Defendant-Appellee.

Docket No. 66539.

127 Mich.App. 482, 339 N.W.2d 223, 14 Ed. Law Rep. 152

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted April 20, 1983.

Decided July 20, 1983.

Released for Publication Oct. 19, 1983.

[127 MICHAPP 483] Gregory, Van Lopik, Moore & Jeakle by Gordon A. Gregory, Detroit, for plaintiff-appellant.

Thrun, Maatsch & Nordberg, P.C. by Michael A. Eschelbach, Lansing, for defendant-appellee.

[127 MICHAPP 484] Before V.J. BRENNAN, P.J., and KELLY and KAUFMAN ^*, JJ.

KAUFMAN, Judge.

Plaintiff appeals as of right from a circuit court judgment reversing an order of the State Tenure Commission. The Commission had found that the defendant school board "constructively discharged or demoted" plaintiff without according him the procedural protection afforded by the teachers' tenure act, M.C.L. Sec. 38.71 et seq.; M.S.A. Sec. 15.1971 et seq.

Plaintiff, an elementary school principal, was denied salary increases for two successive years. Plaintiff alleged that the denial of the salary increases was part of a concerted effort to force him to resign or to accept a demotion. Plaintiff presented substantial evidence that the school board was dissatisfied with his performance and would not give him a salary increase in his position as principal.

The school board showed that it had been dissatisfied with plaintiff's performance. The board president testified that the board had considered discharging plaintiff, but that the members felt that the proof that just cause existed for the discharge was inadequate. Another board member and the school superintendent were directed to meet with plaintiff in March of 1979. The superintendent told plaintiff that the board wanted his resignation as principal but would consider him for a teaching job. The board member testified that the superintendent also told plaintiff that he would be given no further increases in salary if he refused to step down. Plaintiff was denied a salary increase for both the 1978-1979 and 1979-1980 school years. [127 MICHAPP 485] The other five administrators in the district were given raises of from 8.6 to 9.5 percent in 1978-1979 and 8.9 to 9.1 percent in 1979-1980. The district's administrators were not covered by any collective bargaining agreement and made individual contracts with the board.

The tenure commission found in plaintiff's favor. It found that, by its actions, the board had "constructively discharged or demoted" plaintiff. It is conceded that plaintiff had administrative tenure at the time. The commission awarded plaintiff back pay which was computed by assigning him a salary increase equal to the average percentage increases for all of the district's administrators for the two years in question. The school board sought review of the commission's decision in circuit court. The circuit court reversed, finding that the commission's decision was not supported by competent, material and substantial evidence.

On appeal, plaintiff argues that the commission's finding that he was constructively demoted or discharged was supported by competent, material and substantial evidence. We begin by considering the claim of "constructive demotion". M.C.L. Sec. 38.74; M.S.A. Sec. 15.1974 defines "demote" to mean "to reduce compensation or to transfer to a position carrying a lower salary". The school board clearly did not reduce the compensation received by plaintiff. The board also did not transfer plaintiff to a position carrying a lower salary or any other position.

The tenure commission committed an error of law by finding a "constructive demotion" in this case. A common rule of statutory construction is that a statutory definition supersedes a commonly-accepted dictionary or judicial definition; where a statute contains a definition of a term, that definition[127 MICHAPP 486] is binding on the courts. Erlandson v. Genesee County Employees' Retirement Comm., 337 Mich. 195, 204, 59 N.W.2d 389 (1953). Express, unambiguous statutory language may not be disregarded by the interpreter in deference to what he invokes as the spirit of the teachers' tenure act. Street v. Ferndale Bd. of Ed., 361 Mich. 82, 86-87, 104 N.W.2d 748 (1960). In Street, the Supreme Court indicated its belief that the coverage of the tenure act was not determined by the administrative or judicial perception of the spirit of the act but by the language of the act itself. Street, supra, p. 87, 104 N.W.2d 748. The Court stated that it was not ready to join a chorus whose theme was that allowing control over schools by local officials amounted to abandoning them to whim and caprice. Street, supra, p. 87, 104 N.W.2d 748. Because no "demotion" occurred according to the express definition used in the act, the circuit court correctly held that the tenure commission exceeded its authority by finding a "constructive demotion".

The trial judge was also correct in rejecting plaintiff's claim that a "constructive discharge" had occurred. Although "discharge" is not specifically defined in the statute, it can only mean an involuntary termination of employment in the context of the act. The term "constructive discharge" has been used to describe a facially voluntary termination which should legally be considered an involuntary one. A constructive discharge occurs "when the employer deliberately makes an employee's working conditions so intolerable that the employee is forced into an involuntary resignation". Pittman v. Hattiesburg Mun. Separate School Dist., 644 F.2d 1071, 1077 (CA 5, 1981). See also English v. Powell, 592 F.2d 727 (CA 4, 1979); Muller v....