Leggett v. State

• Citation: 237 So.3d 1144
• Decision Date: 24 January 2018
• Docket Number: No. 3D16–2872,3D16–2872
• Parties: Carl LEGGETT, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Florida (US)

237 So.3d 1144

Carl LEGGETT, Appellant,
v.
The STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 3D16–2872

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

Opinion filed January 24, 2018

Carlos J. Martinez, Public Defender, and Susan S. Lerner, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Sandra Lipman, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.

Before SUAREZ, LAGOA, and SALTER, JJ.

SUAREZ, J.

Carl Leggett appeals from the denial of his motion for judgment of acquittal of the charge of grand theft. Based on the lack of any evidence at trial to prove the necessary element of felonious intent, we find the motion for judgment of acquittal should have been granted. Therefore, we reverse and remand to vacate the conviction and for discharge of the defendant.¹

In July 2016, the homeowner Jones hired Leggett, a carpenter, to remodel her kitchen. Jones hired Leggett on the recommendation of her nephew after having obtained estimates for the work from other contractors. Leggett took Jones to see some of his other cabinetry work, which she liked. They discussed the scope of the project, the materials to be used, the necessary demolition, and he provided Jones with material samples and colors that she approved. Leggett and Jones entered into a contract that called for the work to be completed in two weeks (contingent on

237 So.3d 1146

delays outside of either's control). Jones gave Leggett a check for $2,250.00 representing a fifty percent deposit to enable him to purchase necessary materials. After two weeks without hearing from Leggett, Jones called him and he told her that he was experiencing delays, but would finish her custom work. From August to October, Jones left voicemails, and at some point Leggett stopped taking her calls. Jones ultimately hired another carpenter to finish the work. The State charged Leggett with third degree grand theft and contracting without a license. Leggett went to trial. The trial court denied Leggett's motion at trial for judgment of acquittal and Leggett was subsequently convicted of grand theft and sentenced to sixty (60) months in prison.² Leggett now appeals the trial court's denial of his motion for judgment of acquittal.

Our standard of review on denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal is de novo. Pagan v. State, 830 So.2d 792, 803 (Fla. 2002). Grand theft requires proof of felonious intent to deprive the owner of property of its use or benefit, the critical element sought to be proven in this case. See § 812.014(1), Fla. Stat. (2002).³ To prove the crime of grand theft, the State must establish that the defendant had the requisite criminal intent at the time of the taking . Segal v. State, 98 So.3d 739 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012) ("Even though a promise to perform in the future may serve as the basis of a theft, a necessary element of theft under Florida law is that the defendant must have the specific intent to commit the theft at the time of, or prior to , the commission of the act of taking." (quoting Stramaglia v. State, 603 So.2d 536, 537–38 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992) ). "Intent, being a state of mind, is often not subject to direct proof and can only be inferred from circumstances." Jones v. State, 192 So.2d 285, 286 (Fla. 3d DCA 1966). A motion for judgment of acquittal should be granted in a circumstantial evidence case such as this if the State fails to present evidence from which the jury can exclude every reasonable hypothesis except that of guilt. McNarrin v....