Jones v. State
Decision Date | 29 November 1966 |
Docket Number | No. 66--194,66--194 |
Citation | 192 So.2d 285 |
Parties | Esaw JONES, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee. |
Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Robert L. Koeppel, Public Defender, and George E. Bunnell, Sp. Asst. Public Defender, for appellant.
Earl Faircloth, Atty. Gen., and Barry N. Semet, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.
Before PEARSON and SWANN, JJ., and EATON, JOE, Associate Judge.
Appellant, defendant below, was charged with attempted breaking and entering a dwelling house with intent to commit grand larceny. He waived trial by jury, was tried, and was convicted of attempted breaking and entering a dwelling house with the intent to commit petit larceny, a lesser included offense. 1 This appeal is from the judgment and sentence rendered by the trial court.
The appellant urges that the state presented no evidence upon which the trial judge could properly have found him guilty of attempted breaking and entering a dwelling house with intent to commit petit larceny.
The record contains sufficient evidence to warrant the trial judge's finding that the defendant attempted to break and enter a dwelling house. The proof as to the remaining element of the charge calls for further discussion. The specific intent to commit petit larceny is the gist of the offense of which he was convicted and that intent is not necessarily implied from the fact that there was an attempt to break and enter a dwelling house. McNair v. State, 1911, 61 Fla. 35, 55 So. 401; See Jenkins v. State, 1909, 58 Fla. 62, 50 So. 582. Intent, being a state of mind, is often not subject to direct proof and can only be inferred from circumstances. See Scott v. State, Fla.App.1962, 137 So.2d 625. It may be inferred that one had the specific intent to commit petit larceny if sufficient facts are proved from which such inference can be drawn. Simpson v. State, 1921, 81 Fla. 292, 87 So. 920.
In Green v. State, 1933, 113 Fla. 237, 151 So. 898, the Supreme Court dealt with a situation similar to this one insofar as the facts bear upon intent. In that case, the testimony disclosed that the accused broke and entered a building used as a dwelling and a cafe and that a gun was kept in the cafe. The Supreme Court held that there was sufficient evidence to support the conviction. The court wrote as follows:
In Turnnett v. State, 1934, 116 Fla. 562, 156 So. 538, the Supreme Court reversed a conviction of attempted breaking and entering with intent to commit grand larceny. There was sufficient evidence to show that the defendant attempted to break and enter the building, but the record was silent as to what property, if any, was in the building. Therefore, there was no evidence from which the trial court or the jury could have determined what property, if any, the accused had the intent to steal. The court stated: (Comment added.)
In Williams v. State, Fla.App.1958, 101 So.2d 877, the evidence was found to be sufficient to support a conviction of attempted breaking and entering with intent to commit petit larceny. The attempted breaking and entering occurred during the hours of darkness and the defendant was discovered crouching beneath a truck near the rear entrance of the building. He had in his possession a crowbar and a loaded pistol. The building contained The court referred to the above quoted language (a portion of which was dictum) from the Turnnett case and adopted it as the law applicable to the circumstances of the Williams case.
In the final analysis, the question whether a defendant had the criminal intent to commit the crime with which he is charged is a question of fact to be decided by the trier of fact from all the...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Knight v. State, 5D11–2875.
...2010) (noting that “[i]n a criminal prosecution, knowledge is rarely proven by direct evidence”) (citations omitted); Jones v. State, 192 So.2d 285, 286 (Fla. 3d DCA 1966) (“Intent, being a state of mind, is often not subject to direct proof and can only be inferred from circumstances.”). I......
-
State v. Waters
...So.2d 603 (Fla. 3d DCA 1968); Groneau v. State, 201 So.2d 599 (Fla. 4th DCA), cert. denied, 207 So.2d 452 (Fla.1967); Jones v. State, 192 So.2d 285 (Fla. 3d DCA 1966). The question of the defendant's intent to steal is a question of fact to be determined by the trier of fact based upon all ......
-
Jones v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corr., Case No. 8:10-cv-2803-T-17TBM
...to prove his intent to sell the cocaine in his possession. However, questions of intent are for the jury to determine. Jones v. State, 192 So.2d 285 (Fla. 3d DCA 1966). Determinations of credibility and the probative value of "conflicting" testimony should not be determined upon a motion fo......
-
Luscomb v. State
...Statutes (1993). Proof of intent for this crime is often not shown directly but instead can only be inferred. See Jones v. State, 192 So.2d 285 (Fla. 3d DCA 1966). See also Coester v. State, 573 So.2d 391 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991). In this case, appellee's proof of appellant's intent to steal was......