Lehman v. Williamson, 74--232
Decision Date | 11 March 1975 |
Docket Number | No. 74--232,74--232 |
Parties | Frederick M. LEHMAN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Richard C. WILLIAMSON, Defendant-Appellee. . II |
Court | Colorado Court of Appeals |
Eric Pierson, Thomas C. Singer, Denver, for plaintiff-appellant.
Ireland, Stapleton, Pryor & Holmes, P.C., Kenneth L. Starr, Richard C. Linquanti, Denver, for defendant-appellee.
Plaintiff Frederick M. Lehman appeals from a judgment dismissing his claim for specific performance of a contract to purchase real estate. We affirm.
Defendant Richard C. Williamson owns a parcel of land (parcel #1) located in Douglas County which adjoins a parcel owned by the Public Service Company of Colorado (parcel #2). On December 17, 1970, plaintiff and defendant signed an agreement providing for sale of defendant's parcel to plaintiff for a purchase price of $80,000, with defendant carrying back part of the purchase price. Included in the agreement were certain provisions pertaining to obtaining the right to drill a well on parcel #2 and convey the water to parcel #1 for irrigation purposes. The sale was never closed and plaintiff brought this action to enforce specific performance of the agreement. At the close of plaintiff's case in chief in a trial to the court, the court granted defendant's motion to dismiss.
The portion of the contract which is pertinent to our inquiry reads as follows:
The trial court determined that plaintiff had failed to obtain the easement required by section (1) above and therefore defendant was relieved of his obligation to convey parcel #1 to plaintiff.
Plaintiff introduced a document entitled 'LICENSE' which purported to convey to plaintiff from the Public Service Company the right to drill a well on parcel #2 and convey the water to parcel #1. Plaintiff contends that this document satisfies the condition precedent requiring the obtaining of an easement. Alternately plaintiff argues that even if the condition is not met, the condition is unambiguous and was clearly intended to protect only the purchaser and may be waived by him without releasing the seller.
The threshold question is whether the document entitled 'LICENSE' can be construed to be an easement, thereby fulfilling condition #1 quoted above.
There is a clear distinction in the legal interest conveyed by a license and an easement. An easement, while distinct from ownership of land itself, is an interest in land. DeReus v. Peck, 114 Colo. 107, 162 P.2d 404. A license is, however, merely a personal privilege to do some particular act or series of acts and land without possessing any estate or interest therein. Condry v. Laurie, 184 Md. 317, 41 A.2d 66. See Eastman v. Piper, 68 Cal.App. 554, 229 P. 1002. See also American Coin Meter v. Poole, 31 Colo.App. 316, 503 P.2d 626. Also, a license is, ordinarily, revocable at the will of the licensor and is not assignable. Radke v. Union Pacific R.R., 138 Colo. 189, 334 P.2d 1077.
The document entitled 'LICENSE' uses the word, license, consistently throughout to describe the right conveyed, and refers to the parties to the agreement as 'Licensor' and 'Licensee.' The right conveyed by the Public Service Company runs for a primary term of five years, renewable thereafter on a year to year basis, but is then revocable upon demand by the 'Licensor;' an annual 'license fee' must be paid or the right will be revoked; the right may not be assigned without the written consent of the 'Licensor.' The document gives plaintiff little more than a limited personal privilege to drill a well and transport the water from parcel #2 for an annual fee. This falls short of conveying an easement or other interest in the land. The evidence supports the court's conclusion that this document does not fulfill the condition.
Since the condition was not met, the next question is whether plaintiff may unilaterally waive that condition on the grounds that it is intended solely for his benefit. Absent a contractual provision to the contrary,...
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