Leidholt v. District Court In and For City and County of Denver
Citation | 619 P.2d 768 |
Decision Date | 24 November 1980 |
Docket Number | No. 80SA330,80SA330 |
Parties | John D. LEIDHOLT, Petitioner, v. The DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR the CITY AND COUNTY OF DENVER and the Honorable James C. Flanigan, Respondents. |
Court | Colorado Supreme Court |
Johnson & Mahoney, P. C., Roger F. Johnson, Denver, for petitioner.
Plaut & Lipstein, Professional Corporation, Frank Plaut, John D. Beckman, Lakewood, for respondents.
In this original proceeding, the defendant seeks to prohibit the district court from enforcing an order that he disclose his assets, income, and net worth in a medical malpractice action where the plaintiff has asserted a claim for punitive damages. We issued a rule to show cause. We now make that rule absolute and remand to the district court with directions.
Pursuant to C.R.C.P. 33, the plaintiff addressed the following interrogatories to the defendant:
The defendant filed a motion for a protective order which was denied, and the trial court ordered the defendant to answer the interrogatories. The interrogatories are predicated on the complaint which asserts a claim for punitive damages. The complaint charged that the defendant, in performing a laminectomy on the plaintiff, failed to remove a surgical sponge from the surgery site. The claim for punitive damages centers on the alleged failure of the defendant to notify the plaintiff of the presence of the sponge after the surgery was completed and the presence of the sponge was discovered in post-operative x-rays.
It is too plain for cavil that the interrogatories in issue would not be relevant if punitive damages were not in issue. It has long been established as a principle of tort law that in suits involving the assessment of compensatory damages, evidence of a defendant's financial status is inadmissible. See Barnes v. Sand Mountain Electric Co-op, 40 Ala.App. 88, 108 So.2d 378 (1958); Packard v. Moore, 9 Cal.2d 571, 71 P.2d 922 (1937); Baggett v. Davis, 124 Fla. 701, 169 So. 372 (1936); Laidlaw v. Sage, 158 N.Y. 73, 52 N.E. 679 (1899); 1 Jones on Evidence, §§ 4.48, 49 (6th ed. 1972). However, in determining whether punitive damages should be awarded to a plaintiff, the financial condition of the defendant is a proper factor to be considered. Miller v. Carnation Company, 39 Colo.App. 1, 564 P.2d 127 (1977); McAllister v. McAllister, 72 Colo. 28, 209 P. 788 (1922); Courvoisier v. Raymond, 23 Colo. 113, 47 P. 284 (1896). The purpose of punitive damages is not to compensate an injured plaintiff, but to punish the defendant and to deter others from similar conduct in the future. 1 See Beebe v. Pierce, 185 Colo. 34, 521 P.2d 1263 (1974). Therefore, in determining the amount which should be awarded as punitive damages, the severity of the defendant's wrong, as well as the extent of the defendant's assets, must be considered to ensure that the award will punish the defendant. See Note, The Use of Evidence of Wealth in Assessing Punitive Damages in New York; Rupert v. Sellers, 44 Albany L.Rev. 422 (1980).
C.R.C.P. 26(b)(1) permits broad discovery and provides:
See also, Lucas v. District Court, 140 Colo. 510, 345 P.2d 1064 (1959).
Because this rule permits broad discovery, it has often been interpreted to mean that more is better. However, disproportionate discovery may increase the cost of litigation, harass the opponent, and tend to delay a fair and just determination of the legal issues. We have utilized a balancing test to resolve other discovery issues, and believe that such a test is appropriate in this case. Curtis, Inc. v. District Court, 186 Colo. 226, 526 P.2d 1335 (1974). The need for discovery must be balanced by weighing the defendant's right to privacy and protection from harassment by an intrusion into his financial affairs, against the plaintiff's right to discover information which is relevant to a claim for punitive damages. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 85 S.Ct. 1678, 14 L.Ed.2d 510 (1965); Davidson v. Dill, 180 Colo. 123, 503 P.2d 157 (1972); Rugg v. McCarty, 173 Colo. 170, 476 P.2d 753 (1970); Cobb v. Superior Court, 99 Cal.App.3d 543, 160 Cal.Rptr. 561 (1979). Compare United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 73 S.Ct. 528, 97 L.Ed. 727 (1953), dealing with disclosure of privileged material. Consequently, the mere allegation that a plaintiff is entitled to punitive damages will not support an order for discovery of a defendant's financial condition. 2
Procedurally, the question is in what manner and at what stage of the proceedings should evidence of a defendant's financial worth be discoverable? We hold that prima facie proof of a triable issue on liability for punitive damages is necessary to discover information relating to the defendant's financial status. 3 The trial judge should grant the plaintiff some leeway in establishing his prima facie case. The existence of a triable issue on punitive damages may be established through discovery, by evidentiary means, or by an offer of proof. This procedure protects the defendant from an unwarranted invasion of privacy and harassment where the plaintiff has merely asserted a claim for punitive damages. It also comports with the broad right of discovery granted by C.R.C.P. 26(b)(1), and adequately promotes the goals of deterrence and punishment that an award of punitive damages seeks to accomplish. Cobb v. Superior Court, supra; Gierman v. Toman, 77 N.J.Super. 18, 185 A.2d 241 (1962). See also, Stern v. Abramson, 150 N.J.Super. 571, 376 A.2d 221 (1977); Belinski v. Goodman, 139 N.J.Super. 351, 354 A.2d 92 (1976).
The discovery issue may be presented to the court, as it was in this case, when interrogatories are submitted by the plaintiff pursuant to C.R.C.P. 33 and the defendant responds with a motion for a protective order. C.R.C.P. 26(c)(1). Alternatively, the issue may be raised at a discovery hearing, or at a pretrial conference. C.R.C.P. 16. Generally, the burden is cast upon the party who seeks a protective order to show annoyance, embarrassment or oppression. However, we hold that the nature of discovery of financial information of a litigant requires a broader basis for protection. Thus, when punitive damages are in issue and information is sought by the plaintiff relating to the defendant's financial condition, justice requires no less than the imposition on the plaintiff of the burden of establishing a prima facie right to punitive damages.
Rules 26 to 37, C.R.C.P., must be construed together along with the requirement which we now impose as a condition precedent to the plaintiff's right to discovery of financial information. Following discovery of the facts relating to the liability issues and the claim for punitive damages, the trial judge can determine whether the plaintiff has developed a factual foundation and has established a prima facie case of liability for punitive damages.
The extent of discovery, however, even after a prima facie case is made, is not unlimited. Specific questions requesting detailed information regarding the defendant's financial status may constitute unnecessary harassment. Cobb v. Superior Court, supra; Gierman v. Toman, supra. Consequently, the permissible scope of discovery should include only material evidence of the defendant's financial worth, and should be framed in such a manner that the questions proposed are not unduly burdensome.
Accordingly, the rule to show cause is made absolute, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with the directions contained in this opinion.
The majority holds that, where punitive damages are sought to be recovered from a defendant, discovery with respect to that defendant's financial worth must be deferred until the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of entitlement to such damages. I respectfully dissent.
I share the concerns expressed by the majority that discovery is sometimes unnecessarily burdensome and costly and can be used as an instrument for harassment. On the other hand, the procedure mandated by the majority will slow the progress of the case, require two sets of interrogatories or depositions instead of one in some cases, and defer the discovery of financial information which may be relevant to settlement. The determination of whether the plaintiff has established a prima facie case will introduce a mini-trial into the pretrial procedure. A determination that no prima facie case has been established would preclude discovery of financial information. In the event that a prima facie case were later established at trial, the plaintiff would be irreparably disadvantaged in presentation of her case for punitive damages.
In the past we have rejected the argument that a prima facie case must be established before allowing extensive discovery of business and financial information by production of documents under Rule 34, C.R.C.P., in an action for wrongful appropriation of a trade secret. We said ...
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