Leija v. Canutillo Independent School Dist.

• Decision Date: 09 June 1995
• Docket Number: No. EP-93-CA-478-F.,EP-93-CA-478-F.
• Citation: 887 F. Supp. 947
• Parties: Martha LEIJA and Jerry Leija, as Next Friends of Rosemarie Leija, a Minor, v. The CANUTILLO INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Texas

887 F. Supp. 947

Martha LEIJA and Jerry Leija, as Next Friends of Rosemarie Leija, a Minor, v. The CANUTILLO INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT.

No. EP-93-CA-478-F.

United States District Court, W.D. Texas, El Paso Division.

June 9, 1995.

Mark Berry, Christie, Berry & Dunbar, Thomas E. Stanton, El Paso, TX, for plaintiff.

Henry C. Hosford, Baskind, Samaniego & Hosford, El Paso, TX, for defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

FURGESON, District Judge.

Introduction

Rosemarie Leija brought this case under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. ?? 1681-88. She claimed that, while she was a second grade student in the Canutillo Independent School District, her physical education teacher Tony Perales sexually abused her. At the end of the testimony, this court determined as a matter of law that Miss Leija proved the abuse occurred. The jury was then asked agency questions to determine whether the acts of Coach Perales were to be imputed to the School District, because only an educational institution can be liable under Title IX for acts of intentional discrimination based on sex. In light of the court's view of Title IX, which has evolved since the trial ended three months ago, the court believes that the agency questions were unnecessary. Instead, in cases such as this one, the court believes that the actions of a teacher should be strictly imputed to an educational institution. Concurrently, the court believes that limitations should be placed on damages.

Although other courts have declined to interpret Title IX as a strict liability statute, see Howard v. Board of Educ. of Sycamore Community Unit School Dist., 876 F.Supp. 959, 974 (N.D.Ill.1995), this court was finally convinced of the correctness of its approach after reflecting on the jury's verdict awarding damages of $1,400,000 on the basis of the standard definitions of mental anguish, pain and suffering. The damages were excessive and unjustified, but not because the jury was inflamed or beset by passion. On the contrary, the jury was conscientious and deliberate. The problem it faced was that it had no clear guidance from the court about how to measure damages, which is certainly needed in cases where little girls are sexually abused by their teachers. With proper instructions, which admittedly go beyond the present general ones, the court firmly believes that juries will do their duty and will render verdicts within proper limits in this category of cases under Title IX. This opinion will suggest those limits, with the ultimate hope that a remedy legislated by the Congress will not be lost because damages cannot be given some rational parameters.

Litigation under Title IX has been a continuing challenge for federal courts, to some extent because of the elegant brevity of the statute. For example, a private cause of action with a damage remedy is not stated in the statute but instead has been implied to exist through court interpretation. See Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 112 S.Ct. 1028, 117 L.Ed.2d 208 (1992); Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 99 S.Ct. 1946, 60 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). Since the text of and legislative intent behind Title IX are silent on both the issues of private rights and available remedies, it is "hardly surprising" that the usual sources for guidance on these questions "yield no explicit answer." Franklin, 503 U.S. at 76, 112 S.Ct. at 1038 (Scalia, J., concurring). Courts have thus been required to fill the gaps, and the results have not necessarily been uniform. See, e.g., Chance v. Rice Univ., 984 F.2d 151 (5th Cir.1993); Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881 (1st Cir.1988); Mabry v. State Bd. of Community Colleges & Occupational Educ., 813 F.2d 311 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 849, 108 S.Ct. 148, 98 L.Ed.2d 104 (1987); Floyd v. Waiters, 831 F.Supp. 867 (M.D.Ga.1993); Patricia H. v. Berkeley Unified Sch. Dist., 830 F.Supp. 1288 (N.D.Cal. 1993). In keeping with the trend, this opinion takes yet another view of Title IX, especially by suggesting an analytical framework which divides Title IX cases into categories.

Facts

While in the second grade at Canutillo Elementary School in Canutillo, Texas, throughout the 1989-1990 school year, Rosemarie Leija was taught health and physical education by Tony Perales. During that year, Coach Perales sexually molested her while she was in his classroom. For the most part, the abuse occurred while he was showing movies to Miss Leija's class in a darkened classroom. Coach Perales would instruct her to come to the back of the room and sit on his lap. He would then place his hands beneath her undergarments and rub her chest, her buttocks, and between her legs. There was no testimony suggesting penetration. At the minimum, this happened eight times; at the maximum, twenty times. Testimony also indicated that Miss Leija was not the only target of the coach's attentions. He molested her classmate Lizette Soto as well.

Eventually, the two girls reported this matter to their primary teacher, Pam Mendoza, who discounted the girls' story and took no action of any kind to address the matter. She did not, for example, tell any other teacher or administrator about the matter. After the abuse continued, Miss Leija reported the matter to her parents in March 1990, and they then talked to Ms. Mendoza, who advised against stirring up trouble and convinced the parents that nothing was happening anyway. Miss Leija left the school in the third grade and encountered no further problems from Coach Perales.

Later, in the next school year, Coach Perales continued to abuse young girls in his class, to an even greater degree. The parents of the girls initiated complaints to teachers and administrators, who adopted Ms. Mendoza's approach to the problem. Finally, around Christmas of 1990, when a complaint was filed with law enforcement officers against Coach Perales, the District's superintendent was notified and he relieved Coach Perales of his duties. Miss Leija eventually sued the Canutillo Independent School District and Coach Perales, under both Title IX and 18 U.S.C. ? 1983. The court entered summary judgment for the defendant School District under section 1983, a default judgment against Coach Perales under section 1983, and a judgment of dismissal in favor of Coach Perales under Title IX because only educational institutions can be sued under the statute. As to suits against institutions only, see Doe v. Petaluma City Sch. Dist., 830 F.Supp. 1560, 1576-77 (N.D.Cal.1993). The School District went to trial before a jury under Title IX.

The Trial

During trial, the court excluded from presentation to the jury evidence of Coach Perales' abuse against other girls, based in part on its prejudicial impact under Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. The jury, however, heard the testimony of Coach Perales and Ms. Mendoza, which consisted mostly of their invocation of the Fifth Amendment. It also heard testimony from Miss Leija, her parents, some school personnel and psychological experts for both sides. Since the court found that Miss Leija proved the existence of sexual abuse as a matter of law, it instructed the jury that she had been the subject of intentional discrimination. The jury was then asked questions on agency to determine if the School District itself could be held liable under Title IX.

After quickly resolving the agency issues in favor of the plaintiff, the jury took over a day to consider damages. Early on, the jury sent a question to the court about damages, based on the fact that, in final argument, plaintiff's counsel had requested relief for $7,000,000. The court's response, although traditional in wording, was clearly less than helpful. The question was:

Judge, we feel a compensation should be awarded, but we feel that $7 million is too much. Some help in determining an amount would be helpful.

The answer was:

You must determine the amount of damages you, the jury, believe is appropriate based on the instructions and the evidence. You are not bound in any way by the arguments of the lawyers as to what they might believe to be appropriate.

The referenced instructions to the jury were the traditional instructions given in federal cases where damages are properly sought for mental anguish.

After agonizing deliberation, the jury found that Miss Leija's past damages were $900,000 and future damages were $500,000. The jury did its best. It needed better instructions; it deserved better instructions. The court firmly believes, with better instructions, the jury would have reached a proper verdict. The next jury to hear the damage proof in this case will receive better instructions.

Title IX and Strict Liability

Plaintiff argued from the beginning of this case that the court should apply the principles of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. ?? 2000e-2000e-17, to Title IX analysis. In particular, plaintiff sought to incorporate the agency rules of Title VII into Title IX to impute the acts of Coach Perales to the School District. Although there is some support outside the Fifth Circuit for the application of Title VII principles to Title IX, Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881 (1st Cir.1988), the Fifth Circuit has held in clear language that Title IX is to be analyzed under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. ?? 2000d-2000d-7, not under Title VII. Chance v. Rice Univ., 984 F.2d 151 (5th Cir.1993).

The Fifth Circuit decision in Chance does not, however, address the issue of imputed liability under Title IX. In the instant case, it must be addressed, because the plaintiff must establish some form of imputed liability or else lose her suit. The court has already granted summary judgment on Miss Leija's section 1983 claim because the School District's board had no knowledge of the abuse she suffered and therefore could not have been deliberately indifferent to her rights. The...