Lemieux v. Robbins
| Decision Date | 30 December 1968 |
| Docket Number | Civ. No. 10-97. |
| Parties | Francis T. LEMIEUX, Petitioner, v. Allan L. ROBBINS, Warden Maine State Prison, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Maine |
Jeremiah D. Newbury, S. Mason Pratt, Portland, for petitioner.
John W. Benoit, Jr., Garth K. Chandler, Asst. Attys. Gen., Augusta, for respondent.
This is a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1964), et seq. The question presented is whether the State of Maine deprived petitioner of any federal constitutional right when, following his appeal from a District Court conviction and his trial de novo in the Superior Court, he received a greater sentence of imprisonment in the Superior Court than had been imposed in the District Court.
Petitioner was charged with the crime of assault in violation of 17 M.R.S.A. § 201 (1964) by complaint, dated May 3, 1966, issued out of the Maine District Court, District 11. The Maine statute under which petitioner was charged provides:
Whoever unlawfully attempts to strike, hit, touch or do any violence to another however small, in a wanton, willful, angry or insulting manner, having an intention and existing ability to do some violence to such person, is guilty of an assault. If such attempt is carried into effect, he is guilty of an assault and battery. Any person convicted of either offense, when it is not of a high and aggravated nature, shall be punished by a fine of not more than $100 or by imprisonment for not more than 6 months, or by both. When the offense is of a high and aggravated nature, the person convicted of either offense shall be punished by a fine of not more than $1,000 or by imprisonment for not more than 5 years, when no other punishment is prescribed.
In the District Court, petitioner, who was represented by court-appointed counsel, pleaded not guilty. After hearing, he was found guilty and sentenced to pay a fine of $100 or, in the alternative, to serve 30 days in the county jail. There is evidence to suggest that petitioner was thereupon advised by his counsel that, if he were to take an appeal to the Superior Court, which would entitle him to a trial de novo by a jury, the maximum sentence that could be imposed if he were again convicted would be six months in the county jail, the maximum sentence for an assault of a less than "high and aggravated nature." Petitioner seasonably appealed to the Oxford County Superior Court. After the appeal had been docketed in the Superior Court and before trial began, the county attorney obtained a grand jury indictment against petitioner charging the same offense and arising out of the same set of facts as alleged in the complaint. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the indictment, apparently on the ground that proceeding upon both the indictment and the pending complaint would constitute a double jeopardy in violation of Article I, § 8 of the Constitution of the State of Maine. While this motion was pending, the county attorney moved to dismiss the complaint "Because the same set of facts are incorporated in indictment No. 1000." Without notice to petitioner or his counsel, this motion was granted, petitioner's motion was denied, and the matter proceeded to trial by jury upon the indictment. At the trial, petitioner was again convicted of assault. The Superior Court justice then made a determination that the assault was of a "high and aggravated nature," and sentenced petitioner to serve a term of not less than one and one-half and not more than five years in the State Prison. He is presently in respondent's custody serving that sentence.
Petitioner sought post-conviction relief in the courts of the State of Maine under 14 M.R.S.A. § 5501 (1964), et seq. His petition was denied by the single justice, and the denial was affirmed by the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine. Lemieux v. State, 240 A.2d 206 (Me.1968). Petitioner thereupon filed his present petition in this Court. He has been permitted to proceed in forma pauperis and has been represented by court-appointed counsel throughout these proceedings. In his present petition, petitioner contends that the imposition of the harsher sentence following his trial de novo in the Superior Court violated his federal constitutional rights to due process and equal protection of the laws and to be secure from being twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. Since the same grounds were also asserted by petitioner in support of his petition for post-conviction relief in the Maine courts, it is conceded that he has exhausted his available state remedies with respect to the federal constitutional questions which he now raises, as required by 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Supp. II 1964).
For a proper understanding of the problems presented by the present case, it is necessary at the outset to review briefly the relevant Maine statutory and case law and rules of criminal procedure. Since the statutory revision of 1841, Maine law has observed the traditional bifurcation between petty crimes, or misdemeanors, and major crimes, or felonies. Ex parte Gosselin, 141 Me. 412, 44 A.2d 882 (1945). Then, as now, the basis of distinction was whether the crime was punishable by imprisonment in the State Prison. R.S.1841, c. 167, § 2; 15 M.R.S.A. § 451 (1964). 15 M.R.S.A. § 1703 (1964) provides that: "Unless otherwise specially provided, all imprisonments for one year or more shall be in the State Prison; and all for a less term, in the county jail or house of correction. * * *" Accordingly, any crime that carries a maximum punishment of one year or more imprisonment is a felony under Maine law.1
In Maine, original jurisdiction for the trial of all crimes is divided between the District Courts and the Superior Courts. The District Courts have trial jurisdiction only of misdemeanors. 4 M.R.S.A. §§ 152, 165 (1964). The Superior Courts have jurisdiction concurrent with the District Courts of the trial of misdemeanors and also have exclusive original jurisdiction of the trial of felonies. 15 M.R.S.A. § 1 (1964).
All criminal proceedings originally brought in the Superior Court and all felony proceedings must be prosecuted by indictment found by a grand jury, unless the matter is one in which prosecution by information is authorized by statute, and the defendant waives indictment. 15 M.R.S.A. § 701 (1964); M.R.Crim.P. 7(a).2 All other criminal proceedings are commenced by complaint, usually before a magistrate.3 M.Dist.Ct.Crim.R. 3; M.R.Crim.P. 3. When it appears to a District Court judge, on preliminary examination, that there is probable cause that a defendant has committed an offense over which the District Court has no jurisdiction, he is required to bind the defendant over to the grand jury for further proceedings by indictment in the Superior Court. 4 M.R.S.A. § 171 (1964); M.R.Crim.P. 5(c); State v. Jones, 73 Me. 280 (1882).
Trial by jury has never been available to a criminal defendant in the Maine District Courts. 3 Glassman, Maine Practice, Rules of Criminal Procedure, § 23.2. However, an aggrieved defendant may, as of right, appeal a conviction in the District Court to the Superior Court, where he is entitled to a trial de novo by jury. M.Dist.Ct.Crim.R. 37, 39(b).4 Under this procedure, trials de novo for misdemeanors usually proceed on the original complaint. The State may, however, move, prior to trial, to dismiss the complaint. M.R.Crim.P. 48(a), and proceed by indictment as was done in the present case.
The statute under which petitioner was convicted, 17 M.R.S.A. § 201 (1964), took substantially its present form in 1872. Acts of 1872, c. 82. Over the years, the Maine court has settled several questions which have arisen regarding the construction of the statute. It has been held that the Act does not create a separate offense of "aggravated assault"; but, rather, whether or not the offense is of a "high and aggravated nature" goes only to the measure of punishment. State v. Bey, 161 Me. 23, 206 A.2d 413 (1965); State v. McKrackern, 141 Me. 194, 41 A.2d 817 (1945); Rell v. State, 136 Me. 322, 9 A.2d 129, 125 A.L.R. 602 (1939). Since sentencing is a matter for the court, the issue of aggravation is for the court's determination, and the jury has no role in making this finding. State v. McKrackern, supra.5
This Court recognizes that it should not lightly interfere with state criminal process. However, after a careful review of the relevant authorities, it is persuaded that the harsher sentence petitioner received following the trial de novo constituted a violation of his rights to due process and equal protection of the laws, as protected against state infringement by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. In view of this conclusion, it is unnecessary to decide, and the Court expresses no view, as to whether the procedures employed caused petitioner to be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense,6 or whether the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment is applicable to the states.7
It has become a constitutional commonplace that a state may not condition the availability of even a gratuitous benefit upon the waiver of a constitutional right. See, e. g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 83 S.Ct. 1790, 10 L.Ed. 2d 965 (1963); Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad Comm'n. of State of California, 271 U.S. 583, 46 S.Ct. 605, 70 L.Ed. 1101, 47 A.L.R. 457 (1926); Note, Unconstitutional Conditions, 73 Harv.L. Rev. 1595 (1960). In the present context, this has been taken to mean that a state may not condition the right of a criminal defendant to appeal from an erroneous conviction upon relinquishment of the protection against an increased sentence to which he would be entitled if he did not exercise that right. Marano v. United States, 374 F.2d 583 (1st Cir. 1967); Patton v. North Carolina, 381 F. 2d 636 (4th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 905, 88 S.Ct. 818, ...
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Lemieux v. Robbins
...state court, petitioner brought habeas corpus proceedings in the District Court to obtain his discharge. The court ordered the relief, 294 F.Supp. 1171, and the state We will deal first with the issue of double jeopardy, extensively argued by the petitioner but not reached by the court belo......