Lemire v. Haley.

• Decision Date: 26 June 1944
• Docket Number: No. 3474.,3474.
• Citation: 39 A.2d 10
• Parties: LEMIRE v. HALEY.
• Court: New Hampshire Supreme Court

39 A.2d 10

LEMIRE

v.HALEY.

No. 3474.

Supreme Court of New Hampshire.

June 26, 1944.

Transferred from Superior Court, Strafford County; Goodnow, Judge.

Action by Sadie Lemire against John Haley, administrator of the estate of William J. Haley, deceased, for the value of services rendered by plaintiff to deceased. Transferred to the Supreme Court on both parties' exceptions after a jury's verdict for plaintiff.

Judgment on the verdict.

Probate Appeal. Retrial of the same case reported in 92 N.H. 358, 31 A.2d 62. The plaintiff seeks to recover from the estate of William J. Haley the fair value of services rendered the decedent in his lifetime. Trial by jury and verdict for the plaintiff for $7,500. Recovery was first sought on a contract held to be unenforceable because of the Statute of Frauds. 91 N.H. 357, 19 A.2d 436. In the present proceeding the defendant concedes that the plaintiff is entitled to compensation for her services. See 92 N.H. 10, 23 A.2d 769.

The defendant excepted to certain statements made by plaintiff's counsel in his argument to the jury and to the refusal of the Court to make certain rulings in advance of trial and to grant certain requests for instructions. The plaintiff excepted to the denial of her motion to order judgment on the verdict with interest from the date of the original demand and to the refusal of the Court to try the case on the basis of the original contract and to admit evidence of the oral contract and the amount of the decedent's estate.

Transferred by Goodnow, J.

Hughes & Burns and Walter A. Calderwood, all of Dover, for plaintiff.

Cooper, Hall & Grimes, of Rochester, and George D. Varney, of Portsmouth, for defendant.

MARBLE, Chief Justice.

As a general rule, questions of law once decided in a particular case will not be re-examined upon a subsequent transfer. Vallee v. Spaulding Fibre Company, 89 N.H. 558, 199 A. 894; Watkins v. Boston & M. Railroad, 84 N.H. 124, 126, 146 A. 865; Robertson v. Monroe, 80 N.H. 258, 264, 116 A. 92; Whittemore v. Boston & M. Railroad, 77 N.H. 61, 62, 86 A. 824; Kidd v. New York Security & Trust Company, 75 N.H. 154, 158, 71 A. 878, and cases cited. This rule applies to many of the questions presented by the present record.

The defendant requested the Court to instruct the jury that the value of the services which the plaintiff rendered the decedent was not to be determined by the benefit which the decedent derived therefrom but by the detriment which the plaintiff suffered in rendering those services; that in determining the reasonable value of the services the jurors were to consider the amount and kind of work the plaintiff performed and the rate customarily paid for similar services at that time and in that locality, and that they were not to consider on the issue of value the personal relationship existing between the plaintiff and the decedent.

Cases which adopt the detriment rule for which the defendant contends treat the party who relies on the Statute of Frauds as if he were a contract-breaker (Williston & Thompson, Contracts, § 536) and permit the plaintiff to recover for his loss even though the actual benefit conferred upon the defendant has been negligible. See note on Randolph v. Castle, 190 Ky. 776, 228 S.W. 418, in 5 Minn.Law Rev. 567; 71 C.J. 166, § 142. The Presiding Justice did not deny the defendant's requests altogether but instructed the jurors that in determining the reasonable value of the plaintiff's services they were to consider “the detriment and inconvenience she incurred and the responsibility she assumed of which the decedent was relieved.”

The measure of damages commonly applied in cases of this kind is the fair price it would have cost to obtain the service in question from a person in the plaintiff's position. Restatement, Contracts, § 348, Comment a. But the plaintiff's position here was not that of an ordinary domestic servant or nurse, and it could well be found that her work, because of its high quality, was reasonably worth more than the rate customarily paid for the type of service she performed. As indicated in the last opinion, the fact that she occupied the position of a foster daughter was a circumstance to be considered with other evidence as tending to prove that her services were especially valuable.

It should be borne in mind that the end sought to be attained in this class of cases is restitution for benefits received, the term “received” not being “narrowly defined” (Restatement, Contracts, § 348, Comment a), and although there may be no precise commercial standard by which to measure the value of a particular service in view of the individual qualities of the person who performs it (see Wig.Ev., 3d Ed., § 715), this does not mean that its value cannot be fairly appraised. The usual rules for determining what a person's services are reasonably worth govern, so far as applicable, and the jury in deciding the question of value is entitled to consider the situation and relationship of the parties as well as the nature and extent of the services rendered. Ham v. Goodrich, 37 N.H. 185, 190; Sutherland, Damages, 4th Ed., § 679, p. 2474; 2 Sedgwick, Damages, 9th Ed., § 664a; Annotation 69 A.L.R. 14, 100.

“The ascertainment of the fair market value of services so unusual in nature and so uncommon in ordinary experience is doubtless a matter of some difficulty, but the problem lies primarily in the domain of fact and its solution must to a large extent be left to the good sense, practical wisdom and sound judgment of the trier of fact, mindful of the evidence and guided by the correct principles of law.” Downey v. Union Trust Company, 312 Mass. 405, 417, 45 N.E.2d 373, 380.

The defendant is of...