Lemmons v. Maced. Water Works, Inc.
| Decision Date | 22 July 2020 |
| Docket Number | Opinion No. 5747,Appellate Case No. 2017-002171 |
| Parties | Joey LEMMONS d/b/a Rugs International, Appellant, v. MACEDONIA WATER WORKS, INC., Respondent. |
| Court | South Carolina Court of Appeals |
Christopher David Kennedy and N. Douglas Brannon, both of Kennedy & Brannon, P.A., of Spartanburg; and J. Falkner Wilkes, of Greenville, for Appellant.
Joseph L. Mathis and Joseph L.V. Johnson, both of Saint-Amand Thompson & Mathis, LLC, of Gaffney; and Lawrence Emile Flynn, III, of Pope Flynn, LLC, of Columbia, for Respondent.
Appellant Joey Lemmons, d/b/a Rugs International (Customer) seeks review of the circuit court's order granting summary judgment to Respondent Macedonia Water Works, Inc. (Utility) in Customer's action seeking a refund. Customer argues the circuit court erred in declining to enforce section 58-5-390 of the South Carolina Code (2015), which limits the fee a utility may charge for the installation and maintenance of a fire sprinkler system. Utility seeks a dismissal of this appeal on the ground that Customer did not timely serve the notice of appeal. We deny the motion to dismiss and affirm the circuit court's order.
In 1999, Customer purchased a commercial building in Cherokee County, near Gaffney, for his business, Rugs International.1 At that time, a single tap onto Utility's water main supplied the water for the building's dual-purpose service line to a potable water system and a fire sprinkler system. The eight-inch line was accompanied by a four-inch bypass line to accommodate the variance in the volume of water flow—when the flow was low, a valve within the service line's compound meter assembly closed to force all of the water to flow through the assembly's four-inch meter, and when the flow increased to a certain point, the valve opened to allow the water to flow through the assembly's eight-inch meter. This assembly increased the accuracy of metering—a low flow could not be measured accurately by a large meter; therefore, the meter assembly compounded the readings between the eight-inch meter and the four-inch bypass meter.
Utility has billed its customers a certain monthly minimum charge based primarily on the size of the customer's water meter. The minimum charge has covered water usage up to 2,000 gallons, and a volumetric charge has been added for usage exceeding 2,000 gallons. Utility's water rate schedule (effective January 1, 2001) indicates that the minimum charge for an eight-inch meter is $650. Utility determined this amount to be the actual cost of providing an eight-inch line, explaining that this amount includes the cost of increased capacity in the event that a customer "decides to make maximum use of the volumes of water that are available to him at any time." On the other hand, the monthly charge for a service line that is dedicated exclusively to a fire sprinkler system is a flat rate of $50. These accounts are charged much less than other accounts because "consumption virtually never occurs ... unless there is a fire."2
In 2012, Customer became aware of section 58-5-390 of the South Carolina Code, which limits the fee a utility may charge for the installation and maintenance of a fire sprinkler system.3 Customer believed that the statute applied to his water line and sought a refund of amounts he claimed Utility had overbilled him. Utility took the position that it had not overbilled Customer because his building did not have a service line dedicated exclusively to a fire sprinkler system.
In March 2014, Customer added a new one-inch meter to his building to accommodate the potable water system and dedicated the eight-inch meter to the fire sprinkler system. From that point forward, Utility charged Customer $50 per month for the line dedicated to the fire sprinkler system and a monthly minimum of $20 for the one-inch line to the potable water system.
On November 24, 2014, Customer filed this action seeking a refund based on section 58-5-390. In his complaint, Customer alleged that his former compound meter had included an eight-inch meter and a two-inch meter and regular water usage had flowed through the two-inch meter. Customer also alleged that the higher volume of water had flowed through the eight-inch meter only when a fire activated the sprinkler system and only fifteen gallons had passed through the eight-inch meter since it had been installed. After filing an answer to Customer's complaint, Utility filed a motion for summary judgment, and the circuit court conducted a hearing on the motion on January 6, 2017. In its order granting summary judgment to Utility, the circuit court concluded that section 58-5-390 did not apply to Customer's former dual-purpose line because it was not dedicated exclusively to a fire sprinkler system as contemplated by the statute. The circuit court later denied Customer's Rule 59(e) motion. This appeal followed. Utility did not file a separate motion to dismiss this appeal, but rather raised the issue of appellate jurisdiction for the first time in its appellate brief.
1. Does this court have appellate jurisdiction over this action?
2. Did the circuit court err by interpreting section 58-5-390 to apply to only those lines dedicated exclusively to a fire sprinkler system?
3. Did Customer have a separate fire sprinkler line for purposes of section 58-5-390 during the period for which he seeks a refund?
This court reviews the grant of a summary judgment motion under the same standard applied by the trial court pursuant to Rule 56(c), SCRCP. Jackson v. Bermuda Sands, Inc. , 383 S.C. 11, 14 n.2, 677 S.E.2d 612, 614 n.2 (Ct. App. 2009). Rule 56(c), SCRCP, provides that summary judgment shall be granted when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Further, when a circuit court grants summary judgment on a question of law, such as statutory interpretation, the appellate court must review the ruling de novo. Wright v. PRG Real Estate Mgmt., Inc. , 426 S.C. 202, 212, 826 S.E.2d 285, 290 (2019) ; see Lightner v. Hampton Hall Club, Inc. , 419 S.C. 357, 363, 798 S.E.2d 555, 558 (2017) .
Utility asserts that this appeal should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because Customer did not timely serve the notice of appeal.4 See Rule 203(b)(1), SCACR ( ); Camp v. Camp , 386 S.C. 571, 574–75, 689 S.E.2d 634, 636 (2010) .
Specifically, Utility contends that Customer's Rule 59(e) motion did not stay the time for serving the notice of appeal because the motion was not served until after the ten-day deadline. See Rule 59(e), SCRCP (); Rule 203(b)(1), SCACR (); see also Rule 59(f), SCRCP .
Utility bases its argument on the premise that the time-stamp on the circuit court's e-mail providing the parties notice of the entry of its summary judgment order was the starting point for calculating the ten-day deadline, relying on Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Fallon Props. S.C., LLC , 422 S.C. 211, 217, 810 S.E.2d 856, 859 (2018). In Wells Fargo , our supreme court discussed the thirty-day deadline for filing a notice of appeal and stated, "[A]n email providing written notice of entry of an order or judgment for purposes of Rule 203(b)(1), SCACR [,] triggers the time to appeal as long as the email is received from the court, an attorney of record, or a party. " 422 S.C. at 217, 810 S.E.2d at 859. The court explained that the notice of entry of the order being appealed does not have to be formally served by the court or an opposing party but rather "[a]ll that is required to trigger the time to appeal is that the parties receive such notice." Id. at 215–16, 810 S.E.2d at 858.
Notably, the date the appellants in Wells Fargo received the e-mail from the circuit court's administrative assistant was not in dispute. Rather, the appellants argued that their receipt of notice by e-mail rather than by regular mail or hand delivery could not trigger the time within which to file the notice of appeal. Id. at 215, 810 S.E.2d at 858. However, in the instant case, Customer challenges the date of receipt of the e-mail because there was no record created before the circuit court as to that critical date.
Customer maintains that the time-stamp on the e-mail...
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