University of Southern Cal. v. Moran

• Decision Date: 18 July 2005
• Docket Number: No. 4016.,4016.
• Citation: 617 S.E.2d 135
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court
• Parties: UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA, Appellant, v. Robert J. MORAN, Jr., Personal Representative of the Estate of Alexia Lee Anderson, and Trustee of the Anderson Revocable Trust of 1990, dated the 15th day of September, 1991, Louis A. Chubiz and Michael J. Chubiz, Respondents. In re Louis A. Chubiz and Michael J. Chubiz, Petitioners, v. Robert J. Moran, Jr., Personal Representative of the Estate of Alexia Lee Anderson, and Trustee of the Anderson Revocable Trust of 1990, dated the 15th day of September, 1991, Respondent.

617 S.E.2d 135

UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA, Appellant, v. Robert J. MORAN, Jr., Personal Representative of the Estate of Alexia Lee Anderson, and Trustee of the Anderson Revocable Trust of 1990, dated the 15th day of September, 1991, Louis A. Chubiz and Michael J. Chubiz, Respondents.

In re Louis A. Chubiz and Michael J. Chubiz, Petitioners, v. Robert J. Moran, Jr., Personal Representative of the Estate of Alexia Lee Anderson, and Trustee of the Anderson Revocable Trust of 1990, dated the 15th day of September, 1991, Respondent.

No. 4016.

Court of Appeals of South Carolina.

Heard June 15, 2005.

Decided July 18, 2005.

Robert M. Kunes, of Charleston, for Appellant.

James B. Drennan, III, of Spartanburg, and Ronald Stewart Gaynor, of Pawley's Island, for Respondents.

ANDERSON, J.

Robert Moran, as trustee of the Anderson Trust, entered into a compromise agreement with Louis and Michael Chubiz, which was approved by the probate court. On appeal from the probate court, the circuit court affirmed. The University of Southern California, as a beneficiary of the Anderson Trust, appeals the order of the circuit court. We affirm.

FACTUAL/PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

As part of their estate plan, Alexia Anderson and her husband, Thomas Anderson, executed pour-over wills and created a joint revocable trust, referred to by the parties as the "Anderson Trust." The Andersons left their entire estates, other than tangible personal property, to the Anderson Trust. The provisions of the trust agreement provided upon the death of the first spouse, all property would remain in trust for the benefit of the surviving spouse. Upon the death of the surviving spouse, the trustee would make nine cash distributions from the trust—$50,000 to be held in trust for the care of the couple's dog and $10,000 to each of their eight named nieces and nephews. Under the trust agreement, the remaining amount in the trust was to be distributed to the University of Southern California (the University).

Mrs. Anderson died shortly after her husband's death, leaving approximately $4,436,000 to be distributed through the trust. Robert Moran, an attorney, was appointed as the personal representative of both estates and the successor trustee of the Anderson Trust. After his appointment, Moran flew to Minnesota for the Andersons' memorial service. While in Minnesota, Moran informed the Andersons' nieces and nephews, including Louis Chubiz and Michael Chubiz, that they would receive $10,000 distributions from the Anderson Trust.

The Chubizes threatened to contest Mrs. Anderson's will and the Anderson Trust on the ground that the documents were the product of undue influence. Based on this threat, Moran and the Chubizes negotiated a compromise agreement in which Mrs. Anderson's estate agreed to pay both of the Chubizes $175,000. Moran signed the agreement in his capacity as trustee of the Anderson Trust, but refused to sign it as personal representative of Mrs. Anderson's estate unless the probate court approved the agreement. The Chubizes filed a petition in the probate court seeking approval of the compromise agreement pursuant to sections 62-3-1101 and -1102 of the South Carolina Code (1987 & Supp.2004). The University received notice of the proposed compromise agreement and filed a motion opposing it.

The probate court heard the University's motion and issued an order finding the requirements of section 62-3-1102 had been met. The probate court ruled: (1) the agreement was the result of a good-faith controversy; and (2) Moran as trustee, not the University, was the holder of the beneficial interest affected by the compromise agreement.

The University appealed the probate court's order to the circuit court, arguing the probate court erred in finding both a good-faith controversy existed and the University was not a holder of a beneficial interest. The University maintained its signature was required for judicial approval of the compromise agreement. Following a hearing, the circuit court issued an order affirming the probate court. The University appeals only the issue of whether it was a holder of a beneficial interest.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

"Appeal from the probate court is governed by the provisions of the Probate Code." In re Howard, 315 S.C. 356, 360, 434 S.E.2d 254, 256 (1993). The Probate Code requires appeals from the probate court be to the circuit court. S.C.Code Ann. § 62-1-308 (Supp.2004). The Probate Code further instructs the circuit court to "hear and determine the appeal according to the rules of law." S.C.Code Ann. § 62-1-308(d) (Supp. 2004). "As used in this statute, the phrase `according to the rules of law' means according to the rules governing appeals." In re Howard, 315 S.C. at 360, 434 S.E.2d at 257. "[I]f there is neither a statute nor a rule of court expressly prescribing a different standard of review, the circuit court must apply the same standard that [the appellate court] would apply were the appeal taken directly to either [the supreme court or court of appeals]." Id. at 361, 434 S.E.2d at 257.

The standard of review applicable to cases originating in the probate court depends upon whether the underlying cause of action is at law or in equity. In re Estate of Hyman, 362 S.C. 20, 25, 606 S.E.2d 205, 207 (Ct.App.2004); In re Thames, 344 S.C. 564, 568, 544 S.E.2d 854, 856 (Ct.App.2001). An issue regarding statutory interpretation is a question of law. Wimberly v. Barr, 359 S.C. 414, 597 S.E.2d 853 (Ct.App.2004). Thus, "the circuit court may not disturb the probate court's findings of fact unless a review of the record discloses there is no evidence to support them." In re Howard, 315 S.C. at 361, 434 S.E.2d at 257; see also In re Estate of Pallister, 363 S.C. 437, 447, 611 S.E.2d 250, 256 (2005) ("If the proceeding in the probate court is in the nature of an action at law, the circuit court and the appellate court may not disturb the probate court's findings of fact unless a review of the record discloses there is no evidence to support them."). The standard of review at law is the same whether the facts are found by a jury or the judge sitting without a jury. In re Howard, 315 S.C. at 361, 434 S.E.2d at 257.

LAW/ANALYSIS

The University argues the probate court and the circuit court erred in finding the compromise agreement entered into by Moran, as trustee, and the Chubizes met the requirements of sections 62-3-1101 and — 1102 of the South Carolina Code. Specifically, the University contends it held a beneficial interest in Mrs. Anderson's estate. Therefore, the University asserts its signature was necessary to meet the requirements set forth in section 62-3-1102 for court approval of a compromise of a controversy regarding a decedent's estate. We disagree.

I. Rules of Statutory Construction

The cardinal rule of statutory interpretation is to determine the intent of the legislature. Bass v. Isochem, Op. No. 3996, ___ S.C. ___, ___ S.E.2d ___ (S.C. Ct.App. filed June 6, 2005) (Shearouse Adv. Sh. No. 24 at 42); Georgia-Carolina Bail Bonds, Inc. v. County of Aiken, 354 S.C. 18, 579 S.E.2d 334 (Ct.App.2003); see also Gordon v. Phillips Utils., Inc., 362 S.C. 403, 406, 608 S.E.2d 425, 427 (2005) ("The primary purpose in construing a statute is to ascertain legislative intent."). All rules of statutory construction are subservient to the one that legislative intent must prevail if it can be reasonably discovered in the language used, and that language must be construed in the light of the intended purpose of the statute. McClanahan v. Richland County Council, 350 S.C. 433, 567 S.E.2d 240 (2002); Ray Bell Constr. Co. v. School Dist. of Greenville County, 331 S.C. 19, 501 S.E.2d 725 (1998).

The legislature's intent should be ascertained primarily from the plain language of the statute. Bass v. Isochem, Op. No. 3996, ___ S.C. ___, ___ S.E.2d ___ (S.C. Ct.App. filed June 6, 2005) (Shearouse Adv. Sh. No. 24 at 42); State v. Landis, 362 S.C. 97, 606 S.E.2d 503 (Ct.App.2004); Stephen v. Avins Constr. Co., 324 S.C. 334, 478 S.E.2d 74 (Ct.App.1996). The language must also be read in a sense which harmonizes with its subject matter and accords with its general purpose. Mun. Ass'n of South Carolina v. AT & T Communications of S. States, Inc., 361 S.C. 576, 606 S.E.2d 468 (2004); Hitachi Data Sys. Corp. v. Leatherman, 309 S.C. 174, 420 S.E.2d 843 (1992). The court's primary function in interpreting a statute is to ascertain the intent of the General Assembly. Smith v. South Carolina Ins. Co., 350 S.C. 82, 564 S.E.2d 358 (Ct.App.2002). "Once the legislature has made [a] choice, there is no room for the courts to impose a different judgment based upon their own notions of public policy." South Carolina Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Mumford, 299 S.C. 14, 19, 382 S.E.2d 11, 14 (Ct.App.1989).

When a statute's terms are clear and unambiguous on their face, there is no room for statutory construction and a court must apply the statute according to its literal meaning. Miller v. Aiken, 364 S.C. 303, 613 S.E.2d 364 (2005); Carolina Power & Light Co. v. City of Bennettsville, 314 S.C. 137, 442 S.E.2d 177 (1994). If a statute's language is unambiguous and clear, there is no need to employ the rules of statutory construction and this Court has no right to look for or impose another meaning. Tilley v. Pacesetter Corp., 355 S.C. 361, 585 S.E.2d 292 (2003); Paschal v. State Election Comm'n, 317 S.C. 434, 454 S.E.2d 890 (1995); see also City of Camden v. Brassell, 326 S.C. 556, 561, 486 S.E.2d 492, 495 (Ct.App.1997) ("Where the language of the statute is clear and explicit, the court cannot rewrite the statute and inject matters into it which are not in the legislature's language."). What a legislature says in the text of a statute is considered the best evidence of the legislative intent or will. Bayle v. South Carolina Dep't of Transp., 344 S.C. 115, 542 S.E.2d 736 (Ct.App.2001). The words of a statute must be given their plain and ordinary...