Leniart v. Bundy

• Decision Date: 16 March 2017
• Docket Number: CIV. NO. 3:09CV9(HBF)
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut
• Parties: GEORGE M. LENIART v. WILLIAM BUNDY, et al.

GEORGE M. LENIART v. WILLIAM BUNDY, et al.

CIV. NO. 3:09CV9(HBF)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT

March 16, 2017

RULING ON PLAINTIFF'S RENEWED MOTION FOR JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW [DOC. #265]

Plaintiff George M. Leniart ("plaintiff") brought this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. section 1983, alleging that defendants¹ violated his constitutional rights by conducting warrantless searches of his residence and unlawfully arresting him on two separate occasions. See Doc. #35, Amended Complaint.² A jury trial was held on February 10 through 13, 2015, on the following claims: (1) unreasonable search on October 5, 2006, against defendants Bransford, Hoagland, Blanchette and Bundy; and (2) unreasonable search and seizure on September 25, 2007, against defendant Ellison. At the end of evidence, plaintiff orally moved for judgment as a matter of law with respect to the September 25, 2007, seizure and examination of a microcassette audiotape by defendant Ellison. [Doc. #252]. Following oralargument, the Court denied this motion on the record before charging the jury. [Doc. #253, 254]. On February 13, 2015, the jury rendered a verdict in favor of all defendants and against plaintiff. [Doc. #256]. On February 25, 2015, plaintiff filed his Renewed Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(b). [Doc. #265]. On March 18, 2015, defendants filed a Memorandum in Opposition to plaintiff's motion [Doc. #266], to which plaintiff timely filed a Reply [Doc. #274]. For the reasons articulated below, the Court DENIES plaintiff's Renewed Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law. [Doc. #265].³

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The court "will grant a motion for judgment as a matter of law only if, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, a reasonable juror would be compelled to find in favor of the moving party." Drew v. Connolly, 536 F. App'x 164, 165 (2d Cir. 2013) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). "When evaluating a motion under Rule 50, courts are required to 'consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the party against whom the motion was made and to give that party the benefit of all reasonable inferences that the jury might have drawn in its favor from the evidence.'" INGGlob. v. United Parcel Serv. Oasis Supply Corp., 757 F.3d 92, 97 (2d Cir. 2014) (quoting Tolbert v. Queens Coll., 242 F.3d 58, 70 (2d Cir. 2001)). "The Court cannot assess the weight of conflicting evidence, pass on the credibility of the witnesses, or substitute its judgment for that of the jury, and must disregard all evidence favorable to the moving party that the jury is not required to believe." Id. (quoting Tolbert, 242 F.3d at 70) (internal quotation marks omitted). "In other words, either there must be such a complete absence of evidence supporting the verdict that the jury's finding could only have been the result o[f] sheer surmise and conjecture or the evidence must be so overwhelming that reasonable and fair-minded persons could only have reached the opposite result." Hardy v. Saliva Diagnostic Sys., Inc., 52 F. Supp. 2d 333, 336-37 (D. Conn. 1999) (collecting cases) (internal quotation marks omitted).

In short, the court cannot substitute its judgment for that of the jury. LeBlanc-Sternberg v. Fletcher, 67 F.3d 412, 429 (2d Cir. 1995) (citations omitted). Rather, judgment as a matter of law may only be granted if:

(1) there is such a complete absence of evidence supporting the verdict that the jury's findings could only have been the result of sheer surmise and conjecture, or

(2) there is such an overwhelming amount of evidence in favor of the movant that reasonable and fair minded persons could not arrive at a verdict against it.

Munn v. Hotchkiss Sch., 24 F. Supp. 3d 155, 168 (D. Conn. 2014) (collecting cases); see also Cotto v. City of Middletown, 158 F. Supp. 3d 67 (D. Conn. 2016) ("The test on a Rule 50(b) motion is not the strength or weakness of the evidence, but whether the evidence presented was such that a 'reasonable juror would have been compelled to accept the view of the moving party.'" (quoting Densberger v. United Technologies Corp., 125 F.Supp.2d 585, 590 (D. Conn. 2000))). Accordingly, "[w]here a jury has rendered a verdict for the non-movant, a court may grant [judgment as a matter of law] only if the court, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant, concludes that a reasonable juror would have been compelled to accept the view of the moving party." MacDermid Printing Sols. LLC v. Cortron Corp., 833 F.3d 172, 180 (2d Cir. 2016) (footnote and internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis in original).

II. RELEVANT FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Bearing in mind the Rule 50(b) standard articulated above, the following comprises the relevant evidence at trial. The Court limits the following background to plaintiff's claim for the allegedly unreasonable search and seizure on September 25, 2007, against defendant Ellison.

In September 2007, plaintiff, a registered sex offender, was living in the community, having been previously released on special parole on July 5, 2007. See Doc. #266-2, TrialTranscript (hereinafter "Tr."), at 121:5-8; 141:17-23;⁴ see also Def. Ex. 507. Plaintiff was subject to numerous parole conditions while on special parole. Id. at 141:24-142:2; see also Def. Ex. 505. These conditions included, in pertinent part, that: plaintiff would live in a residence approved by his parole officer; his parole officer had the right to visit plaintiff's residence at any reasonable time; plaintiff would participate in a mental health treatment program for anger management; he would have no contact in any manner with any minors; and that plaintiff would participate in a mental health evaluation and treatment program for problem sexual behavior. See Def. Ex. 505. In anticipation of his release, plaintiff also signed a State of Connecticut Computer Access Agreement, which stated, inter alia, that plaintiff: would not access any website that is questionable as it relates to sexually explicit or graphic material; would not enter, or participate in, any bulletin boards or chat rooms of any type; and would agree to an examination of his computer, including an examination of all added devices, CDs or diskettes. See Def. Ex. 506.

Plaintiff's special parole conditions also required him to wear a GPS monitoring device, which consisted of an ankle monitor and a box transmitter, which plaintiff wore on hiswaist. Tr. 144:13-145:5. In order for the GPS device to work, the ankle monitor and the box transmitter had to be within 60 feet of each other. Tr. 144:23-144:1. At the time of the September 25, 2007, search, plaintiff was being supervised by defendant parole officer Larry Bransford, to whom plaintiff complained about the GPS device malfunctioning. Tr. 145:6-9, 273:13-21, 309:19-22.⁵ On the morning of September 25, 2007, defendant Bransford made a home visit to plaintiff's residence due to the malfunctioning of the GPS device, where he verified that there was in fact a problem with the unit. Tr. 274:9-18. During the visit, plaintiff indicated that he needed to go to work, and following the verification of the device's malfunction, defendant Bransford permitted plaintiff to attend work. Tr. 274:19-275:3.

On September 25, 2007, defendant Bransford was supervised by defendant Parole Manager Eric Ellison. Tr. 275:4-9, 450:23-24.⁶ While at plaintiff's residence, defendant Bransford called defendant Ellison to advise that plaintiff's GPS device was malfunctioning. Tr. 275:16-17. Later that morning, defendant Ellison advised defendant Bransford that plaintiff would need to be remanded to custody due to alleged parole violations. Tr. 275:19-25, 368:19-20.

Sergeant William Bundy at the time was a unit supervisor, detective sergeant, with the Connecticut State Police Eastern District Major Crime Unit located at Troop E in Montville, Tr. 423:19-424:24. He testified at trial that around July 2007, plaintiff was a person of interest in several crimes that Troop E was then investigating, including several sexual assaults. Tr. 438:8-20.⁷ Between July and September 2007, Troop E was providedinformation by witnesses to, and victims of, crimes allegedly committed by plaintiff. Tr. 438:21-439:4. Sergeant Bundy testified that around September 25, 2007, one of his detectives had been in contact with Parole Officer Cartagena regarding this information about plaintiff, and in light of these allegations, Sergeant Bundy "reached out to then program manager Eric Ellison, to bring the information to [parole's] attention." Tr. 439:7-13 (alterations added). At a meeting with Parole Officers Cartagena and Ellison, Sergeant Bundy provided these officers with copies of the witness and victim statements relating to the crimes allegedly perpetrated by plaintiff. Tr. 439:14-19, 455:23-456:11. One of these sworn statements was that of Doug Leniart, plaintiff's son, which described, inter alia, an alleged sexual assault by plaintiff on "a kid ... from New York." Tr. 456:6-458:18; see also Def. Ex. 537. Defendant Ellison was also provided with the "statement from [a] confidential victim to law enforcement officials in the state of New York[,]" which also described an alleged sexual assault on the victim by plaintiff, as well as plaintiff providing the victim with alcohol to the point of intoxication. Tr. 459:14-461:15; see also Def. Ex. 539. Defendant Ellison was also provided with another sworn statement from the confidentialvictim to the Connecticut State Police, which again detailed an alleged sexual assault on the minor victim by plaintiff, as well as plaintiff providing the minor victim with alcohol to the point of intoxication. Tr. 461:19-465:18; see also Def. Ex. 538.⁸

The information contained in these statements raised a number of immediate concerns for defendant Ellison, including that plaintiff had committed numerous parole violations, that is, assault...