Leon v. Cnty. of Riverside
| Citation | 14 Cal.5th 910,530 P.3d 1093,309 Cal.Rptr.3d 682 |
| Docket Number | S269672 |
| Decision Date | 22 June 2023 |
| Parties | Dora LEON, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE, Defendant and Respondent. |
| Court | California Supreme Court |
Law Office of Steven Zwick, Steven Zwick, James Alquist ; Law Office of Richard L. Antognini and Richard L. Antognini for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Law Offices of Ali Taheripour, Ali Taheripour ; Law Offices of Les T. Zador and Leslie T. Zador for Ali Taheripour and Leslie T. Zador as Amici Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Appellant.
Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith, Arthur K. Cunningham, Jeffry A. Miller and Lann G. McIntyre, San Diego, for Defendant and Respondent.
A provision of the Government Claims Act immunizes public employees from liability for "instituting or prosecuting any judicial or administrative proceeding" within the scope of their employment, "even if" the employees act "maliciously and without probable cause." ( Gov. Code, § 821.6 ( section 821.6 ).) This provision immunizes public employees from claims of injury caused by wrongful prosecution. The question before us is whether, as several Courts of Appeal have held, it also confers immunity from claims based on other injuries inflicted in the course of law enforcement investigations. The answer is no. While other provisions of the Government Claims Act may confer immunity for certain investigatory actions, section 821.6 does not broadly immunize police officers or other public employees for any and all harmful actions they may take in the course of investigating crime.
Plaintiff Dora Leon's husband, José Leon, was shot and killed in the driveway of a mobile home lot near his home.1 When Riverside County Sheriff's deputies arrived on the scene, they heard additional shots. They dragged José behind a vehicle, where they unsuccessfully attempted to revive him. The movement had caused José’s pants to slide down to his ankles, exposing his naked body. His body remained in that uncovered state for approximately eight hours while officers searched for the shooter and investigated the shooting. The officers ultimately determined that the shooter had killed himself shortly after killing José. No charges were filed.
Dora sued, asserting a single cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress. The complaint alleged that the deputies and the public entity that employed them failed to exercise reasonable care when they left José’s body exposed and uncovered for hours, in view of both Dora and the general public.
The County of Riverside (County) moved for summary judgment. Under the Government Claims Act (sometimes the Act), a public entity like the County is ordinarily immune from liability when its employees are immune. ( Gov. Code, § 815.2, subd. (b) ; see Caldwell v. Montoya (1995) 10 Cal.4th 972, 980, 42 Cal.Rptr.2d 842, 897 P.2d 1320.) As relevant here, the County argued that its employees were immune under section 821.6 for "all conduct related to the investigation and filing of charges." Because the suit arose from steps taken while investigating José’s homicide, the County argued, both the employees and their employer were immune from liability. (See Gov. Code, §§ 815.2, 821.6.) The trial court agreed and entered judgment for the County.
The Court of Appeal affirmed. ( Leon v. County of Riverside (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 837, 279 Cal.Rptr.3d 261 ( Leon ).) As it explained, a line of appellate cases "ha[s] consistently construed section 821.6 as immunizing a public employee from liability for any injury-causing act or omission in the course of the institution and prosecution of any judicial or administrative proceeding, including an investigation that may precede the institution of any such proceeding ." ( Id. at p. 846, 279 Cal.Rptr.3d 261, italics added.) Because "the deputies’ negligence, if any, in failing to promptly cover or remove José’s body from the scene, occurred during the course of the deputies’ performance of their official duties [and their] investigation of the shooting," the deputies, and thus the County, were immune. ( Id. at p. 848, 279 Cal.Rptr.3d 261.)
Justice Raphael joined the majority opinion but wrote separately to observe that this court, addressing other fact patterns, had construed section 821.6 more narrowly to "provide[ ] absolute immunity only against malicious prosecution claims." ( Leon , supra , 64 Cal.App.5th at p. 860, 279 Cal.Rptr.3d 261 (conc. opn. of Raphael, J.), citing Sullivan v. County of Los Angeles (1974) 12 Cal.3d 710, 117 Cal.Rptr. 241, 527 P.2d 865.) "Working on a blank slate," Justice Raphael would have adopted the narrower interpretation. ( Leon , at p. 863, 279 Cal.Rptr.3d 261 (conc. opn. of Raphael, J.).) But he concluded, "[A]ny correction to the Court of Appeal's decades-old, expansive application of section 821.6 will have to come from our Supreme Court, rather than from us." ( Id. at p. 864, 279 Cal.Rptr.3d 261 (conc. opn. of Raphael, J.).)
We granted review.
For many years before the Government Claims Act was enacted in 1963, California courts had applied a common law doctrine of governmental immunity that generally barred tort suits against public entities. ( Muskopf v. Corning Hospital Dist. (1961) 55 Cal.2d 211, 214–215, 11 Cal.Rptr. 89, 359 P.2d 457.) Over time, however, this common law immunity became "riddled with exceptions" that "operate[d] so illogically as to cause serious inequality." ( Id. at p. 216, 11 Cal.Rptr. 89, 359 P.2d 457.) As scholarly criticism mounted, other jurisdictions judicially abolished governmental tort immunity. ( Ibid. , citing, e.g., Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit District No. 302 (1959) 18 Ill.2d 11, 14–25, ; Colorado Racing Com'n v. Brush Racing Ass'n (1957) 136 Colo. 279, 284–285, ; Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach (Fla. 1957) 96 So.2d 130, 132–134.) In 1961, this court joined those jurisdictions and abrogated the common law rule of governmental tort immunity. ( Muskopf , at p. 216, 11 Cal.Rptr. 89, 359 P.2d 457.)
Presented with the abrupt discontinuation of governmental immunity from tort suits, the Legislature temporarily restored the status quo ante pending further study. (Civ. Code, former § 22.3, enacted by Stats 1961, ch. 1404, § 1, pp. 3209–3210; see Corning Hospital Dist. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 488, 492–495, 20 Cal.Rptr. 621, 370 P.2d 325.) The California Law Revision Commission (sometimes Commission) completed a comprehensive review of governmental immunity and submitted to the Legislature a series of proposed statutes governing the tort liability of public entities and employees. (Recommendation Relating to Sovereign Immunity, Number 1 – Tort Liability of Public Entities and Public Employees (Jan. 1963) 4 Cal. Law Revision Com. Rep. (1963) p. 801 (Recommendation).) In 1963, the Legislature enacted the Commission's proposed scheme, with minor modifications, as the California Tort Claims Act (Stats. 1963, ch. 1681, § 1, pp. 3266–3284), which has since been retitled the Government Claims Act (see Quigley v. Garden Valley Fire Protection Dist. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 798, 803, fn. 1, 249 Cal.Rptr.3d 548, 444 P.3d 688 ( Quigley )).
The Government Claims Act abolished common law tort liability and immunity for public entities, replacing it with "a comprehensive statutory scheme governing the liabilities and immunities of public entities and public employees for torts." ( Quigley , supra , 7 Cal.5th at p. 803 ; see Gov. Code, § 815.) As a general rule, the Act makes public entities liable for injuries proximately caused by their employees in the course of employment but immunizes the public entity from liability when the employee is immune. ( Gov. Code, § 815.2, subds. (a), (b).) The Act contains numerous provisions conferring immunity on employees, including for acts or omissions resulting from an exercise of discretion vested with the employee (id. , § 820.2); for the execution of enactments when carried out with due care (id. , § 820.4); and for the failure to adopt or enforce an enactment (id. , § 821). The immunity provision at issue in this case, section 821.6, provides in full: "A public employee is not liable for injury caused by his instituting or prosecuting any judicial or administrative proceeding within the scope of his employment, even if he acts maliciously and without probable cause."
This is not our first encounter with section 821.6. In Sullivan v. County of Los Angeles , supra , 12 Cal.3d 710, 117 Cal.Rptr. 241, 527 P.2d 865 ( Sullivan ), this court considered whether section 821.6 immunized a county and its officials from a false imprisonment suit for failing to discharge an inmate once his lawful term expired. Based on examination of the text and legislative history, we concluded section 821.6 afforded no such immunity. "[T]he Legislature," we explained, "intended the section to protect public employees from liability only for malicious prosecution and not for false imprisonment ." ( Sullivan , at p. 719, 117 Cal.Rptr. 241, 527 P.2d 865.)
We reiterated and expanded on this conclusion in Asgari v. City of Los Angeles (1997) 15 Cal.4th 744, 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 842, 937 P.2d 273, which involved a claim against police officers and their employer for false arrest and imprisonment before a trial at which Asgari was ultimately acquitted. As in Sullivan , the defendants invoked section 821.6. We explained in Asgari that police officers are not, by virtue of their job title alone, outside the scope of section 821.6. Because section 821.6 "focus[es] upon the nature of the alleged tort, rather than the nature of the governmental duties performed by the defendant" ( Asgari , at p. 756, 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 842, 937 P.2d 273 ), the immunity it confers can extend beyond " ‘prosecuting attorneys and other similar individuals’ ... ‘to police officers as well’ " ( id. at pp. 756–757, 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 842, 937 P.2d 273, citation omitted). But immunity under section 821.6 " ‘is dependent on how the injury is caused.’ " ( As...
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