Leon v. Marcos

• Decision Date: 23 September 2010
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 09–cv–02216–MSK–MEH.
• Citation: 742 F.Supp.2d 1168
• Parties: Ferdinand DE LEON, Plaintiff,v.Imelda R. MARCOS; Ferdinand R. Marcos; and Denman Investment Corporation, Inc., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Colorado

742 F.Supp.2d 1168

Ferdinand DE LEON, Plaintiff,

v.Imelda R. MARCOS; Ferdinand R. Marcos; and Denman Investment Corporation, Inc., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 09–cv–02216–MSK–MEH.

United States District Court, D. Colorado.

Sept. 23, 2010.

Richard G. Sander, Sander Ingebretsen & Wake, P.C., Denver, CO, Robert A. Swift, Kohn Swift & Graf, P.C., Philadelphia, PA, for Plaintiff.Eugene Dickey Gulland, John Francis Scanlon, Neil K. Roman, Covington & Burling, LLP, Washington, DC, Geraldine A. Brimmer, Holland & Hart, LLP, Boulder, CO, Gregory E. Goldberg, Jonathan S. Bender, Holland & Hart, LLP, Denver, CO, for Defendants.

CORRECTED ¹ OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS

MARCIA S. KRIEGER, District Judge.

THIS MATTER comes before the Court pursuant to Defendant Denman Investment Corporation, Inc.'s (“Denman”) Motion to Dismiss or to Stay (# 11), the Plaintiff's response (# 22), and Denman's reply (# 27).

FACTS

The operative facts for purposes of the instant motion are undisputed. The Plaintiff is the named representative of a class that holds a judgment ² of almost $2 billion against former Philippines President Ferdinand Marcos.³ The judgment was entered on February 3, 1995, by the United States District Court for the District of Hawaii. In this action, the Plaintiff seeks to collect against certain Colorado real property which, although nominally titled in the name of Defendant Denman, the Plaintiff contends is an asset of Mr. Marcos' estate. The primary relief sought by the Plaintiff is the quieting of title to that property in the estate's name and then the execution of the judgment against that property. Denman moves to dismiss this action on the grounds that the Plaintiff's judgment is no longer enforceable.

In January 1997, the Plaintiff registered the Hawaii judgment in Illinois, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1963, but commenced no efforts to enforce it there. On or about February 3, 2005, the Hawaii judgment expired by operation of Hawaii law. Hi.Rev.Stat. § 657–5.

In April 2005, the Plaintiff registered the Hawaii judgment in Colorado and Texas and commenced suits similar to this one, seeking to execute the judgment against certain real property in those jurisdictions. In or about June 2006, when the defendant in the Texas action raised an argument that the Hawaii judgment had expired, the Plaintiff returned to the District of Hawaii, requesting that the judgment be extended. The District Court extended the judgment for another ten years under the Hawaii statute, but on appeal, the 9th Circuit reversed that ruling, finding that Hawaii law deemed the judgment “extinguished” on or about February 3, 2005 and that any request to extend it had to be brought prior to that date. In re Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos Human Rights Litigation, 536 F.3d 980, 990 (9th Cir.2008). As a result of that ruling, the Hawaii judgment itself was extinguished.

Having no enforceable Hawaii judgment, the Plaintiff then turned to the registered judgment in Illinois. By operation of Illinois law, a judgment registered becomes dormant seven years after registration and must be “revived” by the judgment creditor. 735 Il. Comp. Stat. 5/12–108(a). However, once revived, a judgment in Illinois remains effective for a period of 20 years from the date entry of that judgment. 735 Il. Comp. Stat. 5/2–1602(a). The Plaintiff petitioned the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois to revive that judgment, and on September 4, 2008, the court granted that request, directing the Clerk of the Court to “enter this revived judgment pursuant to FRCP 58.”

The crux of the issue before this Court concerns the effect of the registration of the Hawaii judgment in Illinois and the revival of that judgment by the District Court. The Plaintiff contends that the registration of the Hawaii judgment in Illinois created a wholly new judgment that was enforceable and revivable under Illinois law. Viewed in that light, the Plaintiff contends that the Illinois judgment is not derivative in nature, but an independent judgment that can be registered in other jurisdictions despite the expiration of the Hawaii judgment (and, by extension, its registration in each new jurisdiction creates a new, separately-enforceable judgment). Denman contends that the timely registration of the Hawaii judgment in Illinois allows the Plaintiff to enforce that judgment in Illinois, but does not create (or allow the creation of) a new Illinois judgment that can be “re-registered” and enforced in other jurisdictions.

This precise issue was considered in proceedings involving the Plaintiff before the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas. In Del Prado v. B.N. Development Co., 602 F.3d 660 (N.D.Tex.2009), the court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss the Plaintiff's suit, rejecting the Plaintiff's argument that 28 U.S.C. § 1963 operates to create a new, independent judgment upon the registration of a foreign judgment. On appeal, the 5th Circuit disagreed, finding that registration of a judgment under § 1963 created a new judgment that “had all of the attributes of a judgment rendered by the [jurisdiction of registration],” that, in turn “may be re-registered” in other jurisdictions. Del Prado v. B.N. Development Co., 602 F.3d 660, 667 (5th Cir.2010).

ANALYSIS

A. Standard of review

In reviewing a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the Court must accept all well-plead allegations in the Complaint as true and view those allegations in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Stidham v. Peace Officer Standards and Training, 265 F.3d 1144, 1149 (10th Cir.2001), quoting Sutton v. Utah State Sch. For the Deaf & Blind, 173 F.3d 1226, 1236 (10th Cir.1999). The Complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim “unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45–46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957); Benefield v. McDowall, 241 F.3d 1267, 1270 (10th Cir.2001); GFF Corp. v. Associated Wholesale Grocers, Inc., 130 F.3d 1381, 1384 (10th Cir.1997). The Court must limit its review to the four corners of the Complaint, but may also consider documents attached to the Complaint as exhibits, Oxendine v. Kaplan, 241 F.3d 1272, 1275 (10th Cir.2001), as well as unattached documents which are referred to in the Complaint and central to the plaintiff's claim, so long as the authenticity of such documents is undisputed. Jacobsen v. Deseret Book Co., 287 F.3d 936, 941 (10th Cir.2002); Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Howsam, 261 F.3d 956, 961 (10th Cir.2001).

Here, the Plaintiff objects to Denman's submission of certain extraneous material in support of its motion. As the following discussion reveals, the only extraneous material the Court has considered with regard to this matter are the contents of filings by the Plaintiff in the Northern District of Illinois. Whether the Court takes note of these pleadings as a result of judicial notice, see Continental Coal, Inc. v. Cunningham, 511 F.Supp.2d 1065, 1071 (D.Kan.2007) (court may take judicial notice of pleadings filed in other cases on Rule 12 motion), or whether the Court reasons that the pleadings themselves are merged into the Illinois judgment, which in turn is attached to the Complaint in this action as proof of the Plaintiff's assertion that that judgment has been registered in this Court, is immaterial; in either instance, the Court finds it appropriate to consider those documents on a Rule 12 motion.

B. Merits

Much of Denman's original motion—filed after the Northern District of Texas' ruling in Del Prado but before the ruling of the 5th Circuit—concerns questions of collateral estoppel and is no longer viable. The only question requiring consideration in this case is the same one faced by the Northern District of Texas and the 5th Circuit: does registration of a judgment pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1963 create a wholly new judgment that can, in turn, be re-registered to create wholly new judgments in other jurisdictions?

This issue appears to be one of first impression in the 10th Circuit. Consequently, the Court has carefully considered the reasoning of Northern District of Texas, the 5th Circuit, and the various authorities cited by the parties. For the reasons that follow, this Court respectfully respectfully disagrees with the 5th Circuit's reasoning. This Court concludes that only an original judgment, issued by a court upon the substantive merits of an adversarial dispute, can be registered pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1963, and it cannot be registered once it is extinguished under the law of the jurisdiction where it was entered. A judgment created by registration (a “registered judgment”) is enforceable in jurisdiction where it is registered in accordance with the law of that jurisdiction, but it cannot be subsequently “re-registered” in other jurisdictions. In this case, the rule that this Court finds proper would allow the Plaintiff to enforce his registered judgment in Illinois, but because the original Hawaii judgment has been extinguished before it was registered elsewhere, the Plaintiff cannot register or enforce any judgment outside of Illinois.

The Court begins with the fundamental legal axiom that a judgment is “the final determination of an action,” that embodies a court's adjudication of “a claim pressed and resisted (or the opportunity for resistance) by adversaries”. 10 Wright, Miller & Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure, Civil 3d Ed., § 2651, quoting In the Matter of Fidelity Tube, 167 F.Supp. 402, 404 (D.N.J.1958); see also Am. Jur. (2d Ed.) Judgments, § 1 (“It is the final decision of the court, resolving the dispute and determining the rights and obligations of the parties, and the law's last word in a judicial controversy”). Enforcement of a judgment entered by a federal court is constrained both by federal law and...