Leon v. Rockland Psychiatric Ctr.

• Decision Date: 07 February 2017
• Docket Number: Case No. 15–CV–5040 (KMK)
• Citation: 232 F.Supp.3d 420
• Parties: Joseph LEON, Plaintiff, v. ROCKLAND PSYCHIATRIC CENTER and Patricia Soto, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York

232 F.Supp.3d 420

Joseph LEON, Plaintiff,

v.ROCKLAND PSYCHIATRIC CENTER and Patricia Soto, Defendants.

Case No. 15–CV–5040 (KMK)

United States District Court, S.D. New York.

Signed February 7, 2017

Filed February 8, 2017

Joseph Leon, Woodbourne, NY, Pro Se Plaintiff.

Abigail E. Rosner, Esq., Adam J. Sansolo, Esq., Michael E. Peeples, Esq., Jason A. Buskin, Esq., Office of the New York State Attorney General, New York, NY, Counsel for Defendants.

OPINION & ORDER

KENNETH M. KARAS, United States District Judge

Pro se Plaintiff Joseph Leon ("Plaintiff") brings this Action against the Rockland Psychiatric Center ("RPC"), a psychiatric facility operated by the New York State Office of Mental Health, and Patricia Soto ("Soto" and collectively with RPC, "Defendants") pursuant to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), the New York State Human Rights Law ("NYSHRL"), the New York City Human Rights Law ("NYCHRL"), and the Fourteenth Amendment.¹ Plaintiff contends that Defendants discriminated against him on the basis of his age. (See Am. Compl. 6 (Dkt. No. 16).)² Defendants have filed a Motion To Dismiss the Amended Complaint pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) (the "Motion"). (Dkt. No. 87.) For the reasons stated below, the Motion is granted.

I. Background

A. Factual Background

The following facts are drawn from Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, the documents appended thereto, and the filings Plaintiff submitted in opposition to the instant Motion, and are taken as true for the purpose of resolving the Motion.

On September 8, 2014, Plaintiff interviewed for a Mental Health Therapy Aid Trainee position at RPC. (Am. Compl. 29.) On September 17, 2014, Soto left a voicemail for Plaintiff explaining that her colleagues asked her to offer Plaintiff a job, but first Soto needed him to "check out some retirement things" because he had disclosed during the interview that he was a member of a New York State Public Pension Fund. (Id. at 21, 35.) Plaintiff attempted to contact Soto but was unable to reach her so he left messages for her on two answering machines. (Id. at 21.) Plaintiff explained that he had spoken to the "NYS & Local Retirement System" and that there were "no obstacles or conditions of any kind whatsoever that would prevent [Soto] from hiring" him. (Id. ) Plaintiff "clearly" stated that Soto would not have to take any extra steps or actions to hire him because of his retiree status. (Id. )

On September 24, 2014, Soto called Plaintiff and informed him that RPC could not hire him and that he could only be hired as the last person on the civil service list of people who had the same civil service exam score as Plaintiff due to his status as a retiree collecting retirement benefits. (Id. ; see also id. at 18 ("I was told I would be hired last, from a pool of about 292 people with the same civil service test score, because I'm a civil serv[ice] retiree.").) Plaintiff contends that this policy is illegal and discriminated against him on the basis of his age. (Id. at 22; see also id. at 8 ("The RPC claim that the $30,000 earnings limitation on retirees prevented my hiring is totally false. Publication V01648 and a letter to me from the retirement system prove that I could have been hired by RPC at any time with no conditions or obstacles or special permissions of any kind whatsoever.").)

Following his phone conversation with Soto, Plaintiff contacted the "NYS and Local Retirement System" and it confirmed "that there [was] no such policy that could be applied to [him]." (Id. at 22.) Plaintiff then attempted to contact Soto again to explain his findings. (Id. ) She did not answer her phone, so Plaintiff sent her an email explaining that he spoke to the "NYS & Local Retirement System" and the "NYS Civil Service," which confirmed that his status as a retiree would not prevent RPC from hiring him. (Id. at 23.)³

Plaintiff also requested that Soto provide the source of the policy that required him to be the last person hired for the job. (Id. at 22.) She did not respond to Plaintiff's calls or email. (Id. ) Plaintiff later learned that other individuals were hired for the position. (Id. at 23.) In further support of the claim that Soto discriminated against him on the basis of his age, Plaintiff alleges that he was employed for an unidentified period of time at the Mid–Hudson Forensic Psychiatric Center, another psychiatric facility operated by the New York State Office of Mental Health. (See Letter from Plaintiff to Court (Jan. 31, 2016) 12 (Dkt. No. 41).)

After RPC declined to hire Plaintiff, he filed a complaint with the New York State Division of Human Rights ("NYSDHR"), (Pl.'s Mem. of Law in Opp'n to Mot. To Dismiss ("Pl.'s Opp'n") Ex. 5 (Dkt. No. 97)), alleging that RPC discriminated against him on the basis of his age in violation of the ADEA and the NYSHRL, (id. ). Specifically, Plaintiff alleged that RPC's decision to defer his application based on his status as a retiree collecting retirement benefits was discriminatory. (Id. ) The NYSDHR determined that "[t]he evidence gathered during the course of [its] investigation [was] not sufficient to support [Plaintiff]'s allegation of discrimination because of age." (Pl.'s Opp'n Ex. 6.) In May 2015, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission adopted the findings of the NYSDHR and informed Plaintiff of his right to file a lawsuit in federal or state court. (Am. Compl. 10.)

B. Procedural History

Plaintiff filed the Complaint on June 25, 2016. (Dkt. No. 2.) The Amended Complaint was filed on October 13, 2015. (Dkt. No. 16.) Pursuant to a Scheduling Order issued by the Court on April 7, 2016, (Dkt. No. 69), Defendants filed the Motion and accompanying papers on June 7, 2016, (Dkt. Nos. 87–91). Plaintiff filed his papers in opposition to the Motion on July 7 and July 12, 2016. (Dkt. Nos. 97–98.) Defendants filed their reply brief in further support of the Motion on July 20, 2016. (Dkt. No. 99.)

II. Discussion

A. Standard of Review

"The standards of review for a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and under 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim are ‘substantively identical.’ " Gonzalez v. Option One Mortg. Corp. , No. 12-CV-1470, 2014 WL 2475893, at *2 (D. Conn. June 3, 2014) (quoting Lerner v. Fleet Bank, N.A. , 318 F.3d 113, 128 (2d Cir. 2003) ); see also Neroni v. Coccoma , No. 13-CV-1340, 2014 WL 2532482, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. June 5, 2014) (same), aff'd , 591 Fed.Appx. 28 (2d Cir. 2015). "In deciding both types of motions, the Court must accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true, and draw inferences from those allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." Gonzalez , 2014 WL 2475893, at *2 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Seemann v. U.S. Postal Serv. , No. 11-CV-206, 2012 WL 1999847, at *1 (D. Vt. June 4, 2012) (same). However, "[o]n a Rule 12(b)(1) motion, ... the party who invokes the Court's jurisdiction bears the burden of proof to demonstrate that subject matter jurisdiction exists, whereas the movant bears the burden of proof on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6)." Gonzalez , 2014 WL 2475893, at *2 ; see also Sobel v. Prudenti , 25 F.Supp.3d 340, 352 (E.D.N.Y. 2014) ("In contrast to the standard for a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), a plaintiff asserting subject matter jurisdiction has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that it exists." (internal quotation marks omitted)). This allocation of the burden of proof is "[t]he only substantive difference" between the standards of review under these two rules. Smith v. St. Luke's Roosevelt Hosp. , No. 08-CV-4710, 2009 WL 2447754, at *9 n.10 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 11, 2009), adopted by 2009 WL 2878093 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 2, 2009).

1. Rule 12(b)(1)

"A federal court has subject matter jurisdiction over a cause of action only when it has authority to adjudicate the cause pressed in the complaint." Bryant v. Steele , 25 F.Supp.3d 233, 241 (E.D.N.Y. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). "Determining the existence of subject matter jurisdiction is a threshold inquiry[,] and a claim is properly dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) when the district court lacks the statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate it." Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank Ltd. , 547 F.3d 167, 170 (2d Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted), aff'd , 561 U.S. 247, 130 S.Ct. 2869, 177 L.Ed.2d 535 (2010). While a district court resolving a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1)"must take all uncontroverted facts in the complaint ... as true, and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the party asserting jurisdiction," "where jurisdictional facts are placed in dispute, the court has the power and obligation to decide issues of fact by reference to evidence outside the pleadings, such as affidavits," in which case "the party asserting subject matter jurisdiction has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that it exists." Tandon v. Captain's Cove Marina of Bridgeport, Inc. , 752 F.3d 239, 243 (2d Cir. 2014) (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Ray Legal Consulting Grp. v. Gray , 37 F.Supp.3d 689, 696 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) ("[W]here subject matter jurisdiction is contested a district court is permitted to consider evidence outside the pleadings, such as affidavits and exhibits.").

2. Rule 12(b)(6)

"While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds of his [or her] entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) (citation, alteration, and internal quotation marks omitted). Indeed, Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure"demands more than an unadorned, the-defen...