Leonard v. City of Los Angeles

• Decision Date: 05 April 1973
• Citation: 107 Cal.Rptr. 378,31 Cal.App.3d 473
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: Willie B. LEONARD, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES, Defendant and Appellant. Civ. 40065.

Page 378

107 Cal.Rptr. 378

31 Cal.App.3d 473

Willie B. LEONARD, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES, Defendant and Appellant.

Civ. 40065.

Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 4, California.

April 5, 1973.

Hearing Denied May 30, 1973.

Roger Arnebergh, City Atty., George J. Franscell, Asst. City Atty., and Louis H. De Haas, Jr., Deputy City Atty., for defendant and appellant.

Margolis, McTernan, Smith, Scope & Sacks, and Paul Henry Abram, Los Angeles, for plaintiff and respondent.

DUNN, Associate Justice.

Defendant City of Los Angeles appeals from a judgment entered against it on plaintiff's suit for false imprisonment. Following a nonjury trial the court found that defendant city had, without probable cause, wrongfully arrested and imprisoned plaintiff.

The evidence and the superior court's findings disclose that the arrest occurred in Los Angeles on August 16, 1965. Plaintiff was charged by the officers with violating Pen.Code § 485, a misdemeanor involving lost property valued at less than $200. The superior court which heard plaintiff's civil action found that the officers did not have probable cause to break and enter plaintiff's residence, or to search the residence or arrest plaintiff; that they failed to comply with Pen.Code § 844 and that they wrongfully imprisoned plaintiff.

We are here concerned with the effect of a stipulation that probable cause existed, made in the criminal case between the City Attorney and Leonard's defense counsel prior to the time the criminal complaint was dismissed in the municipal court. The superior court found that, when plaintiff appeared in the municipal criminal court on October 15, 1965, 'after consulting his attorney and being informed of all the consequences, plaintiff WILLIE B. LEONARD, in open Court, stipulated that his arrest was made with probable cause' and thereafter the criminal complaint was dismissed. However, the superior court stated, in its conclusions of law, that the foregoing stipulation as to probable cause 'between WILLIE B. LEONARD, JR., and the CITY OF LOS ANGELES in the criminal proceeding out of which this cause of action arose, is a conclusion of law and is not binding upon this Court in the within civil action.' It is this stipulation with whose effect we are concerned, for if the stipulation established probable cause for the officers to enter and search the premises and arrest plaintiff, the civil action for false imprisonment must fail and the judgment be reversed.

There are so many cases dealing with the subject matter and the effect of stipulations (see E.g., 83 C.J.S. Stipulations, p. 1; 50 Am.Jur., p. 605, 'Stipulations'; 46 Cal.Jur.2d, p. 1, 'Stipulations' 21B McKinney, New Calif. Digest p. 623, 'Stipulations') that this opinion will not be burdened with a recitation of them. Suffice to say, it generally is held that a stipulation between the parties may not bind a court on questions of law, and this includes legal conclusions to be drawn from admitted or stipulated facts. (People v. Jones,6 Cal.2d 554, 555, 59 P.2d 89 (1936); San Francisco Lumber Co. v. Bibb,139 Cal. 325, 73 P. 864 (1903); Haight v. Green, 19 Cal. 113 (1861); Brunt v. Occidental Life Ins. Co., 223 Cal.App.2d 179, 183, 35 Cal.Rptr. 492 (1963); Warburton v. Kieferle, 135 Cal.App.2d 278, 286--287, 287 P.2d 1 (1955); Valdez v. Taylor Automobile Co., 129 Cal.App.2d 810, 821, 278 P.2d 91 (1954); Anno., 92 A.L.R. 663.) A party to a criminal action can, however, and with binding effect, stipulate to evidentiary matters and to the existence or nonexistence of facts (People v. Schoon, 177 Cal. 678, 683--684, 171 P. 680 (1918)) and to any of the steps of an action or proceeding. (In re Battelle, 207 Cal. 227, 252--254, 277 P. 725 (1929); People v. McClain,209 Cal.App.2d 224, 226--228, 26 Cal.Rptr. 244 (1962); People v. Rogers,207 Cal.App.2d 254, 260, 24 Cal.Rptr. 324 (1962); People v. Zavaleta, 182 Cal.App.2d 422, 430, 6 Cal.Rptr. 166 (1960); People v. McCoy, 115 Cal.App.2d 565, 568, 252 P.2d 371 (1953); People v. Houser, 85 Cal.App.2d 686, 695, 193 P.2d 937 (1948); People v. Denningham, 82 Cal.App.2d 117, 119, 185 P.2d 614 (1947); People v. Wilson, 78 Cal.App.2d 108, 119--120, 177 P.2d 567 (1947); People v. Podwys, 11 Cal.App.2d 426, 53 P.2d 1043 (1936); People v. Garvey, 93 Cal.App. 497, 499, 503, 269 P. 702 (1928).) A binding stipulation admitting evidence may be made, even if such evidence is otherwise inadmissible. It also is held that, by stipulation, a criminal defendant may waive benefits granted to him by the Constitution. (People v. Houser, Supra,85 Cal.App.2d at 695, 193 P.2d 937).

Whether reasonable or probable cause exists, generally presents a question of mixed fact and law. Here, however, the parties to the criminal proceedings stipulated to no facts but only that the arrest was made with probable cause.

Considering the circumstances under which the stipulation was made one may speculate that, if it were not made, the criminal action would not have been dismissed but would have gone to trial, the prosecution being prepared to present its evidence to show probable cause. If, at such trial, defendant wished to stipulate to the existence of probable cause to arrest and search he certainly could have done so. Were a contrary rule to prevail, a defendant would be deprived of a common tactic, namely, the opportunity by stipulation to exclude evidence which he believed might otherwise be disadvantageous to him. (See E.g.: People v. Schoon, Supra, 177 Cal. at 684, 171 P. 680.) Also, such a contrary rule could unduly extend a trial since, if defendant is satisfied that the facts against him would be established by the People's evidence, court time would be wasted by requiring the People to produce such evidence. The right to make a binding stipulation is not lost by the fact no trial is held. A litigant can propose a stipulation before, as well as during, trial to the effect that it will be unnecessary for the other side to produce evidence on a certain point and to concede that the point is established.

When a proposed stipulation is accepted by the other side, such stipulation becomes binding upon the court so long as it is not illegal or contrary to public policy. (In re Bailleaux, 47 Cal.2d 258, 259, 302 P.2d 801 (1956); Hehr v. Swendseid, 243 Cal.App.2d 142, 149, 52 Cal.Rptr. 107 (1966); People v. Selz, 138 Cal.App.2d 205, 208--209, 291 P.2d 186 (1955); Estate of Howe, 88 Cal.App.2d 454, 458, 199 P.2d 59 (1948); People v. Raner, 86 Cal.App.2d 107, 110, 194 P.2d 37 (1948); Capital National Bank v. Smith, 62 Cal.App.2d 328, 343, 144 P.2d 665 (1944).) In the criminal case pending against Leonard the only practical effect of the stipulation, had the case gone to trial, would have been to require that items seized in the search be admitted into evidence; the lawfulness or unlawfulness of Leonard's arrest would not have been relevant to proving him guilty of violating Pen.Code § 485.

We are not unaware that the stipulation undoubtedly was solicited and made in order to foreclose the very type of civil suit with which we are here involved. However, we are not now concerned with its purpose but with the right of the parties to make such a stipulation and its binding effect upon the trial court in the civil case.

A stipulation may, but need not, constitute a contract. (Harris v. Spinali Auto Sales, Inc., 240 Cal.App.2d 447, 453--454, 49 Cal.Rptr. 610 (1966); L. A. City Sch. Dist. v. Landier Inv. Co., 177 Cal.App.2d 744, 750--751, 2 Cal.Rptr. 662 (1960).) If the stipulation had been made in consideration of the dismissal of the criminal charge, a different situation than here exists might arise. Thus, if made in return for a promise to dismiss, such stipulation could be treated as a contract and subject to a determination whether such a promise contravened public policy. (See E.g.: Keating v. Morrissey, 6 Cal.App. 163, 169, 91 P. 677 (1907); 6A Corbin on Contracts § 1421; Restatement of Contracts, § 549.) We note, incidentally, that the most the prosecutor could have promised would have been that he would move for a dismissal, since the authority to grant the motion, or to deny it, is not within the province of counsel, but rests exclusively with the court. (Pen.Code §§ 1385, 1386; People v. Romero, 13 Cal.App.2d 667, 670, 57 P.2d 557 (1936).) No such promise here appears.

It must be observed that the court in the criminal case dismissed the misdemeanor action. Under such circumstances, the criminal charge could not be refiled. (Pen.Code §§ 1385, 1387; In re Krieger, 272 Cal.App.2d 886, 890, 77 Cal.Rptr. 822 (1969).)

Respondent at no time moved to be relieved from his stipulation and it has been ruled that "Relief from a stipulation may not be granted when requested for the first time upon appeal. The proper course is to make timely application to the court in which the stipulation was made, by a motion requesting relief, notice of which should be given to the opposing party. A hearing should then be had on affidavits and counter-affidavits." (Warburton v. Kieferle, Supra, 135 Cal.App.2d at 286, 287 P.2d at 6; 46 Cal.Jur.2d, 'Stipulations' § 18, p. 46.) Respondent never claimed the stipulation was entered into by mistake, inadvertence, fraud or misrepresentation, nor did he ask to be relieved of its effect. (People v. Dugas, 242 Cal.App.2d 244, 252, 51 Cal.Rptr. 478 (1966).)

This case is to be distinguished from those cases relied upon by respondent wherein facts were stipulated to and a further stipulation was made as to the legal effect of those facts, I.e.: Swift & Co. v. Hocking Valley R. Co., 243 U.S. 281, 288--289, 37 S.Ct. 287, 61 L.Ed. 722, 725 (1917); Michel v. Smith, 188 Cal. 199, 205--210, 205 P. 113 (1922); San Francisco Lumber Co. v. Bibb, Supra, 139 Cal. 325, 73 P. 864 and Aitken v. White, 93 Cal.App.2d 134, 208 P.2d 788 (1949). In the circumstances presented in such cases, the legal effect of the facts stipulated to...