Leonard v. Green
| Decision Date | 30 September 1885 |
| Citation | 24 N.W. 915,34 Minn. 137 |
| Parties | Charles Leonard v. Nellie K. Green |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Appeal by defendant from an order of the district court for Ramsey county refusing a new trial, -- the action having been tried before Brill, J., without a jury. The decision on a former appeal in this action is reported in 30 Minn. 496.
There are no other points in the case which appear necessary to be specially considered, and the judgment should be affirmed.
McMillan & Beals, for appellant.
The plaintiff's case is solely to enforce a resulting trust under Gen. St. 1878, c. 43, §§ 7-8. It is essential to the existence of a resulting trust in favor of existing creditors that it arise from some conveyance or deed. Durfee v. Pavitt, 14 Minn. 319, (424.) The entire purchase-money must be paid by the debtor and the land conveyed to another before a trust will result; Olcott v Bynum, 17 Wall. 44; or, if part of the purchase price is paid by the debtor, it must be for a definite portion of the whole land purchased. Olcott v. Bynum supra; McGowan v McGowan, 14 Gray 119; Perry v. McHenry, 13 Ill 227; White v. Carpenter, 2 Paige 217, 241; Sayre v. Townsends, 15 Wend. 647; Rogers v. Murray, 3 Paige 390; Smith v. Burnham, 3 Sumner 435, 466-467; Dudley v. Bachelder, 53 Me. 403.
The trust must arise, if at all, at the time the purchase is made; the funds must then be advanced. It is not sufficient that the payment be made after the title has vested. The whole foundation of the trust is the payment before, or at the time of, the purchase. Olcott v. Bynum, supra; 4 Kent Com. 305; Hays v. Hollis, 8 Gill, 357; Hollida v. Shoop, 4 Md. 465; Botsford v. Burr, 2 John Ch. 405; Rogers v. Murray, 3 Paige 390; Jackson v. Moore, 6 Cowen, 706; Steere v. Steere, 5 John. Ch. 1; Alexander v. Tams, 13 Ill. 221; Barnet v. Dougherty, 32 Pa. 371; Lehman v. Lewis, 62 Ala. 129; Coles v. Allen 64 Ala. 98; Appeal of Cross, 97 Pa. 471.
The equitable interest of the debtor, if any, which arises from the part-payment of the purchase-money cannot be reached by proceedings under the statute. Snow v. Paine, 114 Mass. 520; Clark v. Chamberlain, 13 Allen 257; Appeal of Cross, 97 Pa. 471; Lehman v. Lewis, 62 Ala. 129; Matthews v. Torinus, 22 Minn. 132. The trust must have been coeval with the deeds, or it cannot exist at all. Coles v. Allen 64 Ala. 98; Westerfield v. Kimmer, 82 Ind. 365. The general principles that governed the court of chancery in administering trusts of this nature are applicable to this case. McCartney v. Bostwick, 32 N.Y. 53, 62; Gorton v. Massey, 12 Minn. 83, (145;) Rounds v. Green, 29 Minn. 139.
Warner, Stevens & Lawrence, for respondent.
The plaintiff is the owner of a judgment recovered by himself and another against Joseph C. Green, husband of the defendant, on the eighth day of December, 1876, growing out of an indebtedness existing in 1874. The judgment debtor has since been insolvent, and an execution issued upon such judgment has been duly returned unsatisfied. This action is brought to enforce a trust in favor of creditors, arising under Gen. St. 1878, c. 43, § 8, in certain real property in the city of St. Paul, alleged to have been purchased and paid for by Joseph C. Green, but at his instance conveyed to the defendant, his wife, with the intent to place the same beyond the reach of legal process, and to defraud his creditors.
1. The judgment debtor, Joseph C. Green, was originally joined as a defendant; but, on the trial, upon plaintiff's application, leave was given, against the objection of the defendant, to strike out his name as a party defendant in the action. It is the usual, and I think the better, practice to join the judgment debtor in such cases. He is a proper, though not a necessary, party; the action being to subject a parcel of land in which he has no interest to the payment of a judgment against him. No substantial right of the defendant was affected by the action of the court. And this court will not interfere with the discretionary order of the trial court in granting or refusing such application. This was expressly so ruled on the former appeal in this case. 30 Minn. 496. See, also, Campbell v. Jones, 25 Minn. 155; Wait, Fraud. Conv. § 129. Any contingent interest which he might have in real estate of his wife by virtue of the marital relation would not be affected, nor need he be joined because of such interest. It is not deemed necessary, nor is it usual in practice, to join the husband or wife of an alleged trustee in a suit by a creditor to reach the trust estate in such cases.
2. Plaintiff's case is certainly no weaker from the fact that he alleges, and the court expressly finds, that the conveyance was caused to be made to the defendant with the intent to hinder, delay, and defraud the creditors of her husband. If the finding is true, it would still cover the case provided for by the statute declaring a trust in favor of creditors. It would also preclude the idea of any advancement or bona fide payment to or provision for the wife. Wood v. Robinson, 22 N.Y. 564.
3. It is alleged and found that Chadwick, the vendor of the premises in question, for the consideration of $ 1,600, granted and conveyed the same to the defendant on the 24th day of February, 1882; while it appears from the evidence that the transaction was not completed by the payment of the consideration and delivery of the deed till about 30 days later, and that, as a part of the consideration, Green agreed to assume a mortgage of $ 600, which he afterwards paid. The point is made that the plaintiff is concluded by the finding in respect to the date of the conveyance, and that the evidence, therefore, shows that the money was not paid till after the sale was completed. The finding might have been corrected and made more definite in respect to these matters if the defendant had asked it; (Bradbury v. Bedbury, 31 Minn. 163;) but as it stands, it will be presumed therefrom that it was a cash sale, and that the conveyance was made upon the payment of the consideration, and not afterwards. But the error in referring the completion of the transaction to the date of the deed, instead of the time of its delivery, is entirely immaterial, and works no prejudice to any one.
4. The evidence in plaintiff's behalf tended to prove that the contract for the purchase of the land was made by Joseph C Green in person, through an agent of the grantor who was absent from the state; but at the request of Green the name of the defendant was inserted as grantee. It also appears that on the 18th day of February, 1882, he had received the sum of $ 2,225 in cash upon the sale by him of his interest in a life-insurance business in the city of St. Paul, and that of this sum he paid $ 1,600 for the land, and $ 50 to the agent for his commissions. The premises were incumbered by a mortgage of $ 600, the amount of which was deducted, and agreed to be paid by Green, and was in fact so paid by him...
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