Leone v. Medical Bd. of Cal.

• Decision Date: 03 April 2000
• Docket Number: No. S065485.,S065485.
• Citation: 995 P.2d 191,94 Cal.Rptr.2d 61,22 Cal.4th 660
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: Nelson F. LEONE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. MEDICAL BOARD OF CALIFORNIA, Defendant and Respondent. Shashi D. Ganti, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Medical Board of California, Defendant and Respondent.

94 Cal.Rptr.2d 61

22 Cal.4th 660

995 P.2d 191

Nelson F. LEONE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. MEDICAL BOARD OF CALIFORNIA, Defendant and Respondent.

Shashi D. Ganti, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Medical Board of California, Defendant and Respondent.

No. S065485.

Supreme Court of California.

April 3, 2000.

Andrew R. Willing, Los Angeles, and Albert J. Garcia, Emeryville, for Plaintiff and Appellant Nelson F. Leone.

Catherine I. Hanson, Astrid G. Meghrigian, San Francisco, and Gregory M. Abrams, for California Medical Association as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Appellant Nelson F. Leone.

Law Offices of James Jay Seltzer, James Jay Seltzer and Timothy D. Murphy, Emeryville, for Plaintiff and Appellant Shashi D. Ganti.

Daniel E. Lungren and Bill Lockyer, Attorneys General, Nancy Ann Stoner, Cindy M. Lopez and Beth Faber Jacobs, Deputy Attorneys General, for Defendant and Respondent.

KENNARD, J.

The Medical Board of California (MBC), a state administrative agency, has authority to discipline a physician for unprofessional conduct by restricting, suspending, or revoking the physician's license to practice medicine. (Bus. & Prof.Code, § 2227.) A physician whom the MBC has disciplined in this way may obtain judicial review of the MBC's order by commencing an administrative mandate proceeding. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5.) The superior court has original jurisdiction of these administrative mandate proceedings. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 10.) For this limited category of actions, the Legislature has provided that the Court of Appeal shall review the superior court's decision, not by direct appeal, but "pursuant to a petition for an extraordinary writ." (Bus. & Prof.Code, § 2337; hereafter section 2337.)

We granted review in this case to decide whether section 2337 — making a writ petition the method for obtaining appellate review of superior court decisions in these physician licensing matters — violates the clause of the California Constitution stating that, except when a judgment of death has been pronounced, "courts of appeal have appellate jurisdiction when superior courts have original jurisdiction...." (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 11.) Consistent with our resolution of a similar question in Powers v. City of Richmond (1995) 10 Cal.4th 85, 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 839, 893 P.2d 1160 (hereafter Powers), we hold that section 2337 does not violate this appellate jurisdiction clause of the California Constitution.

I

The MBC's Division of Medical Quality separately charged Dr. Nelson F. Leone, a psychiatrist, and Dr. Shashi D. Ganti, an ophthalmologist, with professional misconduct. For each physician, a hearing before an administrative law judge resulted in a recommendation of license revocation. The MBC adopted each of these recommendations and ordered the physicians' licenses revoked. Each physician sought and obtained judicial review of the MBC's adverse decision by petitioning the superior court for a writ of administrative mandate. In each of these judicial proceedings, the superior court upheld the license revocation.

Notwithstanding section 2337, which makes an extraordinary writ petition the exclusive method for obtaining appellate review of a superior court decision in a physician license revocation matter, Drs. Leone and Ganti each filed a notice of appeal. Relying on section 2337, the MBC moved in the Court of Appeal to dismiss both appeals. For the purpose of ruling on these motions, the Court of Appeal consolidated the two appeals. It then heard oral argument and issued a single opinion in which it denied the MBC's motions to dismiss. The Court of Appeal construed the appellate jurisdiction clause of the California Constitution as granting litigants a constitutional right of appeal, and it held section 2337 unconstitutional because, as the Court of Appeal put it, "the Legislature does not have the power to destroy the right of an appeal that is constitutionally granted."

This court granted the MBC's petition for review, which framed the issues this way:

"1. Does the Legislature have the authority to specify the mode of appellate review of physician discipline without infringing on the `appellate jurisdiction' of the appellate court under article VI, section 11 of the California Constitution?

"2. Is Business and Professions Code section 2337 constitutional under California's Constitution, article VI, section 11, to the extent that it specifies the mode of appellate review of a superior court's decision regarding physician discipline and permits appellate review solely by extraordinary writ?"

II

Plaintiff doctors contend that the California Constitution's appellate jurisdiction clause grants them a right of direct appeal from final judgments in administrative mandate proceedings in which superior courts exercise original jurisdiction. In their view, this constitutional right of appeal necessarily includes the rights to oral argument, a decision on the merits, and a written opinion explaining the basis of the appellate court's decision. Plaintiffs contend that section 2337 violates this constitutional right of appeal because it precludes them from appealing the superior courts' judgments in their administrative mandate actions and because it relegates them to seeking review by an extraordinary writ petition, which a Court of Appeal may deny summarily, without hearing oral argument or issuing a written opinion. A majority of this court rejected the core of plaintiffs' argument in Powers, supra, 10 Cal.4th 85,40 Cal.Rptr.2d 839,893 P.2d 1160, concluding instead that the appellate jurisdiction vested in the Courts of Appeal by article VI, section 11, of the California Constitution encompasses review by extraordinary writ as well as review by direct appeal. (Powers, supra, at pp. 92-93, 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 839,893 P.2d 1160 (plur. opn. of Kennard, J.); id. at p. 122, 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 839,893 P.2d 1160 (cone. opn. of George, J.).) The Court of Appeal in this case failed to recognize that the plurality and concurring opinions in Powers agreed on this crucial point. Although Powers provides controlling authority that makes further analysis unnecessary, we summarize the reasoning of the Powers plurality that supports this conclusion.

When construing a constitution, courts view as the paramount consideration the intent of those who enacted the provision at issue. (Davis v. City of Berkeley (1990) 51 Cal.3d 227, 234, 272 Cal.Rptr. 139, 794 P.2d 897.) To determine that intent, courts look first to the language of the constitutional text, giving the words their ordinary meaning. (Ibid.; see also Bowens v. Superior Court (1991) 1 Cal.4th 36, 48, 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 376, 820 P.2d 600; Lungren v. Deukmejian (1988) 45 Cal.3d 727, 735, 248 Cal.Rptr. 115, 755 P.2d 299.)

The constitutional text at issue here is this:

"The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction when judgment of death has been pronounced. With that exception courts of appeal have appellate jurisdiction when superior courts have original jurisdiction...." (Cal. Const, art. VI, § 11.)

Nothing in this language conveys an intention to grant litigants a right of direct appeal from judgments in proceedings within the superior courts' original jurisdiction. "Giving the words their ordinary meaning, the provision serves to establish and allocate judicial authority, not to define or guarantee the rights of litigants. Indeed, the provision nowhere mentions direct appeals or a `right of appeal'" (Powers, supra, 10 Cal.4th 85, 91, 40 Cal. Rptr.2d 839, 893 P.2d 1160 (plur. opn. of Kennard, J.).)

In particular, the reference to "appellate jurisdiction" does not imply a right of litigants to bring direct appeals. A legal dictionary defines "appellate" as "[p]ertaining to or having cognizance of appeals and other proceedings for the judicial review of adjudications." (Black's Law Diet. (6th ed.1990) p. 97, col. 2, italics added.) The same dictionary defines "appellate jurisdiction" as "[t]he power vested in an appellate court to review and revise the judicial action of an inferior court" and as "the power of review and determination on appeal, writ of error, certiorari, or other similar process." (Id. at p. 98, col. 1, italics added.)

The United States Supreme Court has declared that the "essential criterion of appellate jurisdiction" is "that it revises and corrects the proceedings in a cause already instituted, and does not create that cause." (Marbury v. Madison (1803) 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 175, 2 L.Ed. 60, 73.) Applying this definition, the high court has concluded that a court exercises appellate jurisdiction when it reviews a lower court's decision in ruling on a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. (Ex Parte Watkins (1833) 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 568, 572, 8 L.Ed. 786, 788.) Courts in other states have defined "appellate jurisdiction" similarly. (See Powers, supra, 10 Cal.4th 85, 92-93, 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 839, 893 P.2d 1160 (plur. opn. of Kennard, J.), and cases cited therein.)

Thus, the ordinary and widely accepted meaning of the term "appellate jurisdiction" is simply the power of a reviewing court to correct error in a trial court proceeding. By common understanding, a reviewing court may exercise this power in the procedural context of a direct appeal or a writ petition. A review of the process that resulted in adoption of the California Constitution's appellate jurisdiction clause reinforces this construction. The voters enacted the appellate jurisdiction clause in substantially its present form at the November 8, 1966, General Election, when the previous article VI of the California Constitution was repealed and its provisions revised and redistributed. This comprehensive revision of the provisions concerning the judicial branch of state government was largely drafted by the California Constitutional Revision Commission, and a court may consult the commission's official reports to determine the intent and objective of ambiguous provisions. (Mosk v. Superior...