Lester E. Cox Med. Ctr. v. L. & I. REL. COM'N

• Decision Date: 01 October 1980
• Docket Number: No. 10958.,10958.
• Citation: 606 S.W.2d 427
• Parties: LESTER E. COX MEDICAL CENTER and Springfield General Osteopathic Hospital, Petitioners-Respondents, v. LABOR AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION of Missouri and the Division of Employment Security, Respondents-Appellants.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

606 S.W.2d 427

LESTER E. COX MEDICAL CENTER and Springfield General Osteopathic Hospital, Petitioners-Respondents, v. LABOR AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION of Missouri and the Division of Employment Security, Respondents-Appellants.

No. 10958.

Missouri Court of Appeals, Southern District, Division Two.

September 10, 1980.

Motion for Rehearing or Transfer Denied October 1, 1980.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

John F. Gillespie, Rick V. Morris, Jefferson City, for respondent-appellant Division of Employment Sec.

D. J. Chatfield, Jefferson City, for respondent-appellant Industrial Relations Comn.

Donald W. Jones, Gary T. Nelms, Jones, Keeter, Karchmer, Nelms & Sullivan, Springfield, for petitioners-respondents.

HOGAN, Judge.

At various times between January 25 and September 8, 1976, seven persons who had been employees of the Cox Medical Center and three persons who had been employees of the Springfield General Osteopathic Hospital filed claims for employment security under the provisions of Chapter 288, RSMo (1969), as amended. The Division made determinations of eligibility and awards in each case. Each claim was appealed as provided by § 288.190, RSMo (Supp.1975); in each case review of the decision of the appeals tribunal was sought by the former employer. On January 13, 1977, the Commission, by separate orders, denied review of the findings involving claimants Baston, Davis, Hinkley, Landers, Parker, Taylor and Knapp, who had been employed by Cox; on the same day the Commission denied review of the findings involving claimants Batson and Chowning, and on January 26, 1977, the Commission denied review of the finding affecting claimant Smith. Claimants Batson, Chowning and Smith were former employees of Springfield General.

The respondents thereafter filed a joint petition in the Circuit Court of Greene County seeking judicial review of all the orders enumerated above. On January 18, 1978, the court entered a judgment reversing all 11 orders of the Commission.¹ The Commission and the Division have appealed.

The appellants have briefed and argued seven assignments of error; three of the assignments are subdivided. Respondents have taken the points as presented, but a detailed consideration of every point tendered is not required and would probably be imprudent. We shall consider only those matters essential and necessary to an orderly disposition of the appeal on its merits. Logsdon v. Duncan, 293 S.W.2d 944, 9461 (Mo.1956).

The appellants' first two points deal with venue and joinder. The substance of these points is that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction of the claim of Barbara S. Knapp because she was not a resident of Missouri, and that it was improper to review all the orders in one action because the orders did not constitute a single transaction or occurrence, nor involve any common question of law or fact.

Section 288.210, RSMo (1969), governed judicial review of employment security cases when the petition was filed. In part, the statute read:

". . . the director or any other party aggrieved . . . may secure judicial review of the Commission's order by commencing an action in the circuit court . . . of the county of claimant's residence or, in respect to those matters . . . involving a claimant who is not a resident of this state, the circuit court of Cole County...." (Our emphasis).

This statute has repeatedly been held to provide a complete and exclusive procedure which must be complied with before a court can acquire jurisdiction of an action to review an order of the Commission in employment security cases. Springfield Gen. Osteo. Hosp. v. Indus. Com., 538 S.W.2d 364, 371 (Mo.App.1976); Hansen v. Division of Employment Security, 520 S.W.2d 150, 1524 (Mo.App.1975); Duzer v. Industrial Commission, 402 S.W.2d 616, 61812 (Mo.App.1966). In short, § 288.210 is not merely a special venue statute; it is jurisdictional. Hansen v. Division of Employment Security, supra, 520 S.W.2d at 1522-4. We have the view that § 288.210 requires claims by nonresidents to be considered in Cole County in order to facilitate the processing of interstate claims as required by 26 U.S.C., § 3304(a)(9)(A) and (B),² but we decline to go into the history of the statute sua sponte, as we did in Springfield Gen. Osteo. Hosp. v. Indus. Com., supra, 538 S.W.2d at 369-3703-56. Inasmuch as the circuit court acquired no jurisdiction of the Knapp claim, we can acquire no jurisdiction except to determine that the court's order as to claimant Knapp is void, and as to her, the appeal is dismissed. See Ross v. Conco Quarry, Inc., 543 S.W.2d 568, 5711-4 (Mo.App.1976).

The Commission's adjunctive argument that the other nine claims were improperly joined in a single petition for review is without merit. In the first place, the Commission's own records show that all the claimants except claimant Knapp were residents of Greene County; § 288.210, RSMo (1969), required judicial review of an order of the Commission in the county of the claimant's residence; there is no question about the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court of Greene County; the only question presented is a procedural question. The precedents relied on by the Commission were considerably modified or perhaps overruled by our Supreme Court in State ex rel. Farmers Insurance Co., Inc. v. Murphy, 518 S.W.2d 655 (Mo.banc 1975). There, the precise question before the court was whether claims sounding in tort could be joined with claims arising ex contractu in a single action, but the court undertook, in the course of its opinion, to re-examine the scope of permissive joinder of claims and joinder of parties under Mo.R.Civ.P. 52.05(a). Observing that the Civil Rules proceed upon the theory that no inconvenience can result from the joinder of any two or more matters in the pleadings, but only from trying two or more matters together which have little or nothing in common, and that the liberal policy regarding joinder of claims in the pleadings should extend to cases in which multiple parties are involved, the court concluded that ". . . the philosophy of permissive joinder . . . is to promote judicial economy, expedite final disposition of litigation and prevent inconsistent results due to multiple separate lawsuits.. . ." State ex rel. Farmers Insurance Co., Inc. v. Murphy, supra, 518 S.W.2d at 662.

Pursuing the matter in context, could it be said that it was inconvenient, unwise or unfair to the appellants to request review of all the contested orders in a single proceeding? We think not. The scope of judicial review in employment security cases was defined and limited by that part of § 288.210, RSMo (1969), which read as follows:

". . . In any judicial proceeding under this section, the findings of the commission as to the facts, if supported by competent and substantial evidence and in the absence of fraud, shall be conclusive, and the jurisdiction of said court shall be confined to questions of law. Such actions . . . shall be heard in a summary manner and . . . the court shall enter an order either affirming the decision of the commission or remanding the cause to the commission for further proceedings not inconsistent with the declarations of law made by the court. . . ." (Our emphasis).

It is obvious that this part of the statute was enacted to implement Article V, § 22 of the original Constitution of 1945. Hansen v. Division of Employment Security, supra, 520 S.W.2d at 152. Except in unusual cases, the reviewing court's only function is to determine whether the Commission's findings are supported by competent and substantial evidence upon the whole record. Dubinsky Brothers, Inc. v. Industrial Com'n of Mo., 373 S.W.2d 9, 16 (Mo.banc 1963); Globe-Democrat Publishing Co. v. Industrial Com'n, 361 S.W.2d 325, 3285 (Mo.App. 1962). A circuit court can discharge its ordinary function by examining the several administrative transcripts at its convenience. There is no new evidence to be heard; there is little or no likelihood of confusion of issues, and in our view no reason to require a circuit court to review each of the Commission's orders in a separate action.

There is even less basis for the Commission's objection to the joinder of parties. The word "transaction," as used in Mo.R. Civ.P. 52.05(a) may comprehend a series of occurrences, depending not so much upon the immediacy of their connection as upon their logical relationship. State ex rel. Farmers Insurance Co., Inc. v. Murphy, supra, 518 S.W.2d at 659; Cantrell v. City of Caruthersville, 359 Mo. 282, 288, 221 S.W.2d 471, 474 (1949). The claims which the respondents contested were filed over a period of about 7 months. In each case, the appeals tribunal based its decision at least in part upon the conclusion that the employer had failed to present evidence sufficient to convince the tribunal that the determination appealed from was in error. In each case, upon application for review, the respondents argued that the appeals tribunal's construction of 8 C.S.R. 10-5.010(8) shifted the burden of proof, and suggested to the Commission that they were in some manner deprived of procedural due process. Review of each administrative appellate decision was refused, and in each case one member of the Commission dissented. There was thus a logical connection between all the claims, addressed to a question of law, and it can fairly be said in this particular case that there was a single transaction or, perhaps, a series of transactions involving a common question of law. There was no misjoinder of parties.

On the merits, both parties have briefed a number of points directed to the trial court's findings. Essentially, the trial court found that none of the decisions of the Commission were supported by competent and substantial evidence upon the whole record because there was no evidence in any administrative transcript to indicate the particular claimant was able to work, available for work and was actively and earnestly...