Price v. Midwest Health Consulting, Inc.
| Docket Number | SD 37322 |
| Decision Date | 07 September 2022 |
| Citation | 652 S.W.3d 379 |
| Parties | Robyn PRICE, Appellant, v. MIDWEST HEALTH CONSULTING, INC., and Division of Employment Security, Respondents. |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
Appellant's attorney: Jeffrey L. Dull, Clinton, MO.
Respondent Division of Employment Security's attorney: Sara L. Lipp, Jefferson City, MO.
Respondent Midwest Health Consulting, Inc.: No brief filed.
Robyn Price ("Claimant") appeals from the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission's ("Commission") order denying her claim for unemployment benefits following an alleged reduction in the work hours provided to her by Midwest Health Consulting, Inc. ("Midwest"). In her sole point, Claimant contends the Commission erred in concluding she was not entitled to unemployment benefits in light of its finding that she consistently worked four to six hours per week. Claimant asserts that this finding qualifies her for partial unemployment benefits under section 288.060.3.1 We affirm the Commission's decision.
During the relevant time period, Claimant was employed by two employers: Midwest and National Therapeutic Associates ("National"). At first, Claimant filed an unemployment claim against National with the Division of Employment Security ("Division") alleging a "Weekly Benefit Amount" of $320.00 for a "Benefit Year" beginning on March 29, 2020. At some point, however, Claimant filed a claim against her other employer, Midwest, for the "Benefit Year" with the same beginning date. Midwest protested, asserting that it still employed Claimant full time. The Division denied the requested benefits, determining that Claimant was ineligible because she "is employed on a full-time basis."
Claimant appealed the Division's decision to the Appeals Tribunal ("Tribunal"). A hearing was held at which the appeals referee received testimony from Claimant and procedural documentation from the Division. Claimant testified that she began working as a PRN (as needed) physical therapist for Midwest in 2018 and she neither owned Midwest nor was self-employed. She testified that she received wages from Midwest in the amount of $55 per hour and had neither voluntarily quit Midwest, been discharged, nor taken a leave of absence. She further testified that because of a lack of patients due to COVID, she was receiving approximately four to six hours of work per week from Midwest and then, after September 15, 2020, no work at all. Claimant testified that she pursued additional employment, including additional PRN work with National.
The Tribunal issued a written decision including, in pertinent part, the following findings of fact and conclusions of law:
Ultimately, the Tribunal affirmed the Division's decision, concluding that Claimant "is ineligible for benefits from March 29, 2020, through March 13, 2021, because [she] was not unemployed."
Claimant appealed the Tribunal's decision to the Commission. Two of the three Commissioners affirmed the Tribunal's decision, holding "it is fully supported by the competent and substantial evidence on the whole record, and it is in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Missouri Employment Security Law." The decision of the Tribunal was adopted as the decision of the Commission. This appeal timely followed.
"When the Commission adopts the decision of the Tribunal, we utilize the Tribunal's decision in reviewing the order of the Commission." Urban v. Regal Beloit Am., Inc. , 465 S.W.3d 512, 514 n.2 (Mo. App. 2015). "The findings of the [C]ommission as to the facts, if supported by competent and substantial evidence and in the absence of fraud, shall be conclusive, and the jurisdiction of the appellate court shall be confined to questions of law." Section 288.210; accord MO. CONST. art. V, § 18. We may modify, reverse, remand for hearing, or set aside the decision only under the following circumstances: (1) "the [C]ommission acted without or in excess of its powers[,]" (2) "the decision was procured by fraud[,]" (3) "the facts found by the [C]ommission do not support the award[,]" or (4) "there was no sufficient competent evidence in the record to warrant the making of the award." Section 288.210. "Essentially, the Missouri Constitution and the Missouri Employment Security Law task this Court with reviewing the Commission's unemployment-compensation decisions for legal error." Mickles v. Maxi Beauty Supply, Inc. , 566 S.W.3d 274, 277 (Mo. App. 2019). "Questions of law are reviewed independently, and the appellate court is not bound by the Commission's conclusions of law or its application of law to the facts." Ayers v. Sylvia Thompson Residence Ctr. , 211 S.W.3d 195, 198 (Mo. App. 2007) (quoting McClelland v. Hogan Pers., LLC , 116 S.W.3d 660, 664 (Mo. App. 2003) ).
In her point relied on, Claimant challenges the Commission's decision that she was ineligible for benefits from March 29, 2020, through March 13, 2021. Claimant contends "the facts found by the Commission do not support that decision and there was no sufficient competent evidence to support that decision[.]"2 In essence, Claimant asserts that the facts found by the Commission authorize benefits and that the Commission ignored or misapplied the controlling statute providing as such. Specifically, Claimant asserts that "the evidence clearly showed that [Claimant] was partially unemployed through no fault of her own and was available for work but suffered a reduction in the number of hours available to her and she was entitled to benefits pursuant to section 288.060.3 RSMo." Claimant is incorrect.
The statutory provision upon which Claimant relies states that "[e]ach eligible insured worker who is partially unemployed in any week shall be paid for such week a partial benefit." That subsection continues on to explain the partial benefit is derived from a calculation involving the difference between the "weekly benefit amount" and "that part of his or her wages for such week in excess of twenty dollars or twenty percent of his or her weekly benefit amount, whichever is greater ...." Section 288.060.3. Claimant, however, fails to discuss or address other relevant statutory provisions that define and explain the relevant terminology found in section 288.060.3. Claimant merely assumes, without factual or legal support, that the terminology applies to her and that she satisfies any associated requirements.
It is necessary, therefore, to turn to those relevant and controlling statutory provisions. As relevant here, for someone to be deemed partially unemployed the following is required:
Effective for calendar year 2007 and each year thereafter, an individual shall be deemed "partially unemployed" in any week of less than full-time work if the wages payable to such individual for such week do not equal or exceed the individual's weekly benefit amount plus twenty dollars or twenty percent of his or her weekly benefit amount, whichever is greater[.]
Thus, for Claimant to be partially unemployed, the employment for which she seeks partial unemployment benefits had to be, as an initial matter, less than "full-time" work. See Scheumbauer v. City of St. Louis , 633 S.W.3d 543, 545-46 (Mo. App. 2021). The Commission found that Claimant worked at least four to six hours per week. Although the term "full-time" is undefined by statute, the Scheumbauer court provided the definition of " ‘full time’ (noun) as ‘the amount of time considered the normal or standard amount for working during a given period’ "; the definition of " ‘full-time’ (adjective) as ‘employed for or working the amount of time considered customary or standard’ "; and a " ‘full-time employee’ is ‘[o]ne who is hired to work at least the normal...
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