Lester v. Celebrezze
Decision Date | 20 September 1963 |
Docket Number | No. LR-62-C-177.,LR-62-C-177. |
Citation | 221 F. Supp. 607 |
Parties | Barbara L. LESTER, As Next Friend of William B. Lester, Jr., and Sherry Lester, Plaintiff, v. Anthony J. CELEBREZZE, Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, Defendant. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Arkansas |
COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED
M. Jack Sims, of Pope, Pratt & Shamburger, Little Rock, Ark., for plaintiff.
Robert D. Smith, Jr., U. S. Atty., Charles Mott, Jr., Asst. U. S. Atty., Little Rock, Ark., for defendant.
Plaintiff, who for convenience will be referred to generally as Mrs. Lester, has brought this action to secure a judicial review of the final decision of the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, acting through the Social Security Administration, that her children, William B. Lester, Jr. and Sherry E. Lester, are not entitled to Child's Insurance Benefits as provided by section 202(d) of the Social Security Act, as amended, 42 U. S.C.A. § 402(d). The claim for benefits was based on the fact that both of the minors here involved are the natural children of William B. Lester, who died in January 1961 while a domiciliary of Arkansas. At the time of his death Lester was fully covered by the Act. Jurisdiction of this Court is predicated upon section 205(g) of the Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 405(g).
The claim was denied originally by the Bureau of Old Age & Survivors Insurance, Social Security Administration, on the basis of its finding that neither William B. Lester, Jr. nor Sherry E. Lester was a "child" of William B. Lester within the meaning of the Act, although there was no question that he was the natural father of both children. After the Bureau's initial denial of the claim, and after the Bureau had refused to reconsider its decision, plaintiff sought and obtained a hearing before a Hearing Examiner of the Administration's Bureau of Hearings & Appeals. Plaintiff appeared at the hearing without counsel. She testified in support of the claim and also offered documentary evidence. Upon consideration of the materials before him the Examiner denied the claim, and the Administration's Appeals Council refused to review his decision. That action of the Appeals Council constituted a "final decision" of the defendant Secretary, which is subject to review by this Court.
Section 216(e) of the Act defines a "child" as including "the child or legally adopted child of an individual," and section 216(h) (2) (A) provides that in determining whether a child for whom an application for Child's Insurance Benefits is made is a "child" of the deceased wage earner within the meaning of the law there shall be applied "such law as would be applied in determining the devolution of intestate personal property by the courts of the State in which (the wage earner) * * * was domiciled at the time of his death * * *." And it is further provided that if the child in question "according to such law would have the same status relative to taking intestate personal property as a * * * child * * * (he) shall be deemed such."
Under Arkansas law only legitimate children can inherit personal property from their father in the event of his death intestate. The Examiner found that both children were illegitimate at birth, and that they were never legitimatized; that since under Arkansas law they could not inherit personal property from their father, neither of them was entitled to Child's Insurance Benefits under the Act.
The facts in the case are without substantial dispute.
In 1958 William B. Lester was a married man residing in or near Hot Springs, Arkansas. The name of his wife was Betty Lester. Mr. Lester and Betty Lester seem to have been estranged, and during 1958 Lester commenced an affair with plaintiff which resulted in her pregnancy. While she was carrying on the affair with Lester, and at the time she became pregnant, Mrs. Lester knew that Mr. Lester was not divorced.
Prior to the birth of the child Mr. Lester left Arkansas and went to Austin, Texas, where he found work. Mrs. Lester followed him there, but he sent her back to Hot Springs. Later she went to Fort Worth, Texas, where on December 14, 1958, she gave birth to a son, who was given the name of William B. Lester, Jr.
On March 1, 1959, the wage earner came to Fort Worth, picked up Mrs. Lester and the baby, and took them to Austin where he established a home. Mr. and Mrs. Lester held themselves out as husband and wife, and he recognized his paternity of the child. The Lesters remained in Austin until sometime in August 1959 when they returned to Hot Springs or its vicinity.
In the meantime Betty Lester had filed a suit for divorce against Mr. Lester who, it appears, executed a waiver of notice and process and entered his appearance in the case. On March 10, 1959, the Chancery Court of Garland County, Arkansas, where the suit was filed, which County has Hot Springs for its county seat, entered a decree awarding Betty Lester an absolute divorce from Mr. Lester. Mr. Lester was not notified of the rendition of this decree and never learned of it. Mrs. Lester did not learn that Mr. Lester had been divorced until after his death in 1961. In September 1960 Betty Lester wrote a letter to Mr. Lester to the effect that she had not been divorced due to the fact that she had not been able to pay her attorney his fee. Although Mr. and Mrs. Lester returned to Garland County in August 1959 neither of them made any effort to ascertain the status of the divorce action either before or after the receipt of the September 1960 letter just mentioned. Mr. and Mrs. Lester were never ceremonially married in any jurisdiction.
Following their return to Arkansas in August 1959 Mr. and Mrs. Lester went on living together just as before. Mrs. Lester became pregnant again and on July 2, 1960, was delivered of a daughter, Sherry E. Lester. Mr. Lester recognized his paternity of the second child just as he had done in the case of the older child.
Late in 1960 Mr. Lester began to drink heavily and to abuse Mrs. Lester who finally left him, taking the two children with her. About ten days later Mr. Lester killed himself.
In passing upon the claim filed by plaintiff the Hearing Examiner considered the status of each child separately. As to the second child, who had been born in Arkansas, the Examiner stated simply that under Arkansas law a child born out of wedlock can inherit from its mother but cannot inherit from its father unless the parents later marry and the father thereafter recognizes the child as his. Ark.Stats.1947, § 61-103. Since Mr. and Mrs. Lester did not marry subsequent to the birth of the daughter, the Examiner concluded that the daughter never became legitimate and could not inherit from her father, and for that reason was not entitled to benefits under the Federal Act.
As to the other child, who was born in Texas, the Examiner was of the opinion that this child's status depended in final analysis upon the applicability to him of section 42 of the Probate Code of Texas. Vernon's Texas Civil Statutes, Vol. 17A, § 42. That section provides that if a child is born to unmarried parents, he becomes legitimate if the parents subsequently marry.1 The same section of the Texas Code, like Ark.Stats.1947, § 61-104, provides that the issue of marriages deemed null in law shall be deemed legitimate. The Examiner noted correctly that if William B. Lester, Jr. would be recognized as legitimate in Texas, he would be so recognized in Arkansas. Bickford v. Carden, 215 Ark. 560, 563, 221 S.W.2d 421; Leflar, The Law of Conflict of Laws, 1959, § 179, p. 344. However, for reasons to be stated the Examiner came to the conclusion that the Texas legitimation statute was not applicable to William B. Lester, Jr., and that he would be considered illegitimate under both Texas and Arkansas law, and hence was not entitled to Child's Insurance Benefits.2
In seeking to reverse the Examiner plaintiff contends that on March 1, 1959, she and Mr. Lester formed in Texas a relationship which under the laws of that State would have been a valid common law marriage except for the existence of the impediment consisting of Mr. Lester's prior undissolved marriage; that the dissolution of the marriage by the decree of the Arkansas Chancery Court removed the impediment; that she and Mr. Lester continued to live together as husband and wife after the removal of the impediment, and that by reason of such continued cohabitation a valid common law marriage came into existence in Texas, notwithstanding the fact that neither of the parties knew that the impediment had been removed. From these premises plaintiff argues that under Texas law the first child became legitimate when the allegedly valid common law marital status of his parents came into existence, that the second child was born legitimate, and that both children were entitled to inherit from their father under Arkansas law, and were and are entitled to Child's Insurance Benefits under the Act.
Under the express provisions of section 205(g) of the Social Security Act the factual findings of the agency are final and binding upon the courts if such findings have substantial evidentiary support in the record considered as a whole, and this finality extends to permissible inferences drawn from the evidence by the administrative fact finder. Celebrezze v. Bolas, 8 Cir., 316 F.2d 498; Hoffman v. Ribicoff, 8 Cir., 305 F.2d 1; Cody v. Ribicoff, 8 Cir., 289 F.2d 394, 88 A.L.R. 970. No such finality attaches to the agency's conclusions of law, and, as this Court has said in Lewis v. Flemming, E.D.Ark., 176 F.Supp. 872, 874, a finding or conclusion based upon an erroneous view of the law cannot be sustained. But, if it appears that the agency has reached a correct ultimate legal result on the basis of established facts, the administrative determination should be affirmed even though the reviewing court may not find itself in accord with all of the agency's reasoning in reaching...
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