Levin-Townsend Computer Corp. v. City of Hartford

• Decision Date: 04 June 1974
• Docket Number: LEVIN-TOWNSEND
• Citation: 349 A.2d 853,166 Conn. 405
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: COMPUTER CORPORATION v. CITY OF HARTFORD.

Page 853

349 A.2d 853

166 Conn. 405

LEVIN-TOWNSEND COMPUTER CORPORATION v. CITY OF HARTFORD.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

June 4, 1974.

Richard M. Cosgrove, Deputy Corp. Counsel, Hartford, with whom, on the brief, was Alexander A. Goldfarb, Corp. Counsel, Hartford, for appellant (defendant).

Douglas A. Strauss, Bridgeport, with whom, on the brief, was William B. Rush, Bridgeport, for appellee (plaintiff).

Before HOUSE, C.J., and SHAPIRO, LOISELLE, MacDONALD and BOGDANSKI, JJ.

BOGDANSKI, Associate Justice.

The plaintiff, the Levin-Townsend Computer Corporation, appealed to the board of tax review of the defendant, the city of Hartford, from the July 1, 1968, assessment of its personal property. The board refused to strike the assessed property from the grand list and the plaintiff appealed to the Court of Common Pleas. From the judgment sustaining the plaintiff's appeal the defendant has appealed to this court.

The parties have stipulated to the pertinent facts. On and before July 1, 1968, the plaintiff, a New Jersey corporation with its office in the City of New York, was engaged in the business of leasing computer equipment. The plaintiff did not maintain an office or transact business in the state of Connecticut. On November 22, 1967, the plaintiff agreed to furnish to the Hartford Fire Insurance Company (Hartford Fire) computer equipment for use at its Hartford offices. The equipment was delivered between January 11 and February 1, 1968. It was installed and maintained by employees of the International Business Machines Corporation pursuant to an agreement between that corporation and the plaintiff. The equipment remained in the Hartford Fire offices through July 1, 1968, the assessment date.

On October 25, 1968, the assessor of the city of Hartford informed the plaintiff that its computer equipment located at the offices of Hartford Fire was assessed on the grand list of July 1, 1968, at $877,000. The plaintiff appealed the assessment to the board of tax review of the defendant, seeking to have the equipment stricken from the grand list. The board refused the requested relief and the plaintiff appealed to the Court of Common Pleas. In sustaining the appeal, the court concluded that since the plaintiff's computer equipment had not been located in the city of Hartford for a period of seven months prior to July 1, 1968, it was not taxable under § 12-59 of the General Statutes.

Personal property can be taxed only at the residence of the owner or at a place where the property has acquired a situs. Bridgeport Projectile Co. v. Bridgeport, 92 Conn. 316, 319, 102 A. 644. '(P)rovisions fixing the situs of property for the purposes of taxation are common in the statutes.' Preston v. Norwich Compressed Air Power Co., 83 Conn. 561, 565, 78 A. 312, 313. General Statutes § 12-59 provides, in pertinent part, that 'all of the personal estate of . . . (a domestic or foreign) corporation which is permanently located or stationed in any town shall be set in the list of the town in which such property is located . . .. The words 'permanently located,' as used herein, means (sic) located for any seven or more of the twelve months preceding the assessment day.'

The defendant claims that the General Assembly provided two alternative tests for situs in § 12-59 by using the phrase 'permanently located or stationed.' The defendant bases the taxability of the plaintiff's equipment not on its being 'permanently located' in Hartford, but rather on its being 'stationed' there. It argues that since the legislature did not define the word 'stationed,' although it did define the term 'permanently located,' the word must be given its common and ordinary meaning. It takes 'stationed' to denote 'the place where a person or thing stands or is located.' The defendant contends that the General Assembly employed the term 'stationed' to cover personal property which is located in the town on the assessment date but not for seven of the twelve months prior to that date. Otherwise, the defendant argues, the plaintiff or any other foreign corporation could avoid paying taxes by moving its personal property from one town to another every six months.

Municipalities have no inherent powers of taxation. Their power to tax depends upon an express grant by the legislature; Hartford Electric Light Co. v. Wethersfield, 165 Conn. 211, 219, 223, 332 A.2d 83 (35 Conn.L.J., No. 2, pp. 3, 5), Consolidated Diesel Electric Corporation v. Stamford, 156 Conn. 33, 36, 238 A.2d 410; and must be exercised in strict conformity to the provisions of the granting statute. The authority of the city of Hartford to tax the plaintiff's property, therefore, must clearly appear in the provisions of General Statutes § 12-59, the only applicable grant of taxing authority. Doubts as to the taxing authority of the municipality must be resolved in favor of the taxpayer. Hartford Electric Light Co. v. Wethersfield, supra; Consolidated Diesel Electric Corporation v. Stamford, supra; Curtis v. Corbin, 93 Conn. 648, 656, 107 A. 506.

This court has never before had occasion to consider the independent meaning of the word 'stationed' in General Statutes § 12-59 or its predecessors. It is a commonplace that '(n)o word in a statute should be treated as superfluous, void or insignificant unless there are impelling reasons . . . why this principle cannot be followed.' General Motors Corporation v. Mulquin, 134 Conn. 118, 126, 55 A.2d 732, 736. It is also true that nontechnical statutory words and phrases must be construed 'according to the commonly approved usage of the language.' General Statutes § 1-1. But those '(g)eneral propositions do not decide (this) concrete case.' Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76, 25 S.Ct. 539, 547, 49 L.Ed. 937 (Holmes, J., dissenting). The use of two words of similar meaning, 'stationed' and 'located,' where either one would seem to suffice, creates an ambiguity. Moreover, although the word 'stationed' may, in common parlance, refer generally to the place where something, is located, it may also refer more specifically to a terminal or stopping place. See Webster, Third New International Dictionary.

Thus, the meaning of the word 'stationed' in General Statutes § 12-59 is not immediately apparent. The plaintiff argues that the maxim of noscitur a sociis is therefore applicable: '(T)he meaning of doubtful words may be determined by reference to their association with other associated words and phrases. . . . (W)hen two or more words are grouped together, and ordinarily have a similar meaning, but are not equally comprehensive, the general word will be limited and qualified by the special word.' 2A Sutherland, Statutory Construction (4th Ed.) § 47.16; see also Griffin v. Fancher, 127 Conn. 686, 690, 20 A.2d 95. The plaintiff asserts that the phrase 'permanently located' qualifies the word 'stationed,' and in particular that personal property 'stationed' in a town cannot be taxed there under General Statutes § 12-59 unless it has been located there for seven out of the twelve months preceding the assessment day.

The plaintiff...