Levine v. Katz
| Decision Date | 26 September 2006 |
| Docket Number | No. 05CA0490.,05CA0490. |
| Citation | 167 P.3d 141 |
| Parties | Rodney LEVINE, individually, as personal representative of the Rosamond H. Levine Estate and as trustee of the Rosamond H. Levine Trust; Cathy Hatfield; and Sharri Zelson, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Michael M. KATZ, Esq.; Peter R. Moison, Esq.; Kathryn A. Reeves, Esq.; and Katz, Look, & Moison, P.C., f/k/a Elrod, Katz, Preeo, Look, Moison, and Silverman, P.C., a Colorado professional corporation, Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | Colorado Court of Appeals |
Law Office of David C. Feola, P.C., David C. Feola, Evergreen, Colorado, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.
McConaughy & Sarkissian, P.C., Gerald D. Pratt, Englewood, Colorado, for Defendants-Appellees.
Plaintiffs, Rodney Levine, individually, as personal representative of the Rosamond Levine Estate, and as trustee of the Rosamond Levine Trust; Cathy Hatfield; and Sharri Zelson (collectively Levine), appeal an order of the Denver Probate Court granting a motion to dismiss Levine's claims for failure to state a claim. Defendants are Michael M. Katz, Peter R. Moison, Kathryn A. Reeves, and Katz, Look & Moison, P.C. (the lawyers). We vacate the probate court order.
This is a legal malpractice action against the lawyers who provided estate planning and trust administration services to decedents, Gerald and Rosamond Levine (the parents). The parents were survived by five children, Rodney Levine, Cathy Hatfield, Sharri Zelson, Wendy Julia, and Henry Levine. Wendy Julia and Henry Levine are not parties to these lawsuits.
In a complaint filed in the Denver District Court, Levine alleged that upon the death of the parents, trust and estate assets were distributed pursuant to documents prepared by the lawyers, but that Julia received more of the trust and estate assets than their parents had intended. Levine alleged seven claims for relief: breach of contract, breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, fraudulent concealment, fraudulent misrepresentation, and negligent misrepresentation. The relief requested against the lawyers included disgorgement; compensatory, consequential, and exemplary damages; and interest, costs, and attorney fees.
The lawyers moved to dismiss pursuant to C.R.C.P. 12(b)(1), contending the Denver District Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Levine's claims and that the Denver Probate Court had original and exclusive jurisdiction over the case. The district court denied the lawyers' motion.
Before trial, a successor judge was assigned to the case, and the lawyers filed a second motion to dismiss pursuant to C.R.C.P. 12(b)(1), along with a motion for summary judgment under C.R.C.P. 56(h) (). Both motions asserted the same grounds, namely, that the Denver District Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because such jurisdiction was vested in the probate court.
The successor judge concluded he was not bound by the law of the case and ruled that the Denver Probate Court had exclusive jurisdiction over the case. Accordingly, the successor judge granted the lawyers' motion and dismissed Levine's claims without prejudice. The district court's ruling in that case is currently on appeal in this court (04CA2399).
Levine then filed the complaint in this case in the Denver Probate Court alleging the same malpractice claims against the lawyers. The appeal from the Denver District Court case (04CA2399) and this appeal have been treated as companion cases but were not formally consolidated.
Thereafter, Levine also filed a motion in Denver District Court asking the court to reconsider its order of dismissal. The district court denied Levine's motion.
Meanwhile, the lawyers moved to dismiss the probate court action pursuant to C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5). They argued that "unless and until" Levine obtained a determination of the parents' intent and the proper distribution of the trust and estate assets, the probate court complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Levine responded on the merits and also requested that the probate court conclude it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the action.
The probate court denied Levine's request, stating that the court of appeals was the appropriate forum to determine subject matter jurisdiction. Nevertheless, the probate court proceeded to dismiss Levine's case without prejudice for failure to state a claim and, thus, exercised jurisdiction over the case. The probate court stated that until the parents' intent was established, the probate court would be unable to determine whether their "intent . . . was carried out and if not, why not, and who bears responsibility or liability for error, if any is proven, and who has standing to seek damages for any such errors." The probate court referred to the pending probate case involving Rosamond Levine's estate (case no. 98PR1790) as a potential forum for determining the parents' intent.
In the companion case, Levine contends the Denver District Court erred in granting the lawyers' motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Levine maintains that if we uphold the rulings of the district court and the probate court, we would leave Levine with no forum in which to obtain legal redress against the lawyers. Levine further maintains that while the pending probate case involving Rosamond Levine's estate (case no. 98PR1790) may be a potential forum for determining the parents' intent, contrary to the probate court's conclusion it is not an appropriate forum in which to address Levine's malpractice allegations or to award damages based on those allegations.
In an opinion announced today in the companion appeal, we conclude the Denver District Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this case, and it erred in determining otherwise.
Subject matter jurisdiction is defined as a court's power to resolve a dispute in which it renders judgment. Trans Shuttle, Inc. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 58 P.3d 47 (Colo.2002); Ashton Props., Ltd. v. Overton, 107 P.3d 1014 (Colo.App.2004). A court has subject matter jurisdiction if "the case is one of the type of cases that the court has been empowered to entertain by the sovereign from which the court derives its authority." Horton v. Suthers, 43 P.3d 611, 615 (Colo.2002)(quoting Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc. v. Adams, 718 P.2d 508, 513 (Colo.1986)).
"Whether a court possesses such jurisdiction is generally only dependent on the nature of the claim and the relief sought." Trans Shuttle, Inc. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, supra, 58 P.3d at 50. "It is the facts alleged and the relief requested that decide the substance of a claim, which in turn is determinative of the existence of subject matter jurisdiction." Trans Shuttle, Inc. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, supra, 58 P.3d at 50 (quoting City of Boulder v. Pub. Serv. Co., 996 P.2d 198, 203 (Colo.App.1999)).
The Colorado Constitution vests district courts with general subject matter jurisdiction in civil cases. See Colo. Const. art. VI, § 9. As courts of general jurisdiction, the district courts in Colorado have the authority to consider questions of law and of equity and to award legal and equitable remedies. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc. v. Adams, supra.
The Denver Probate Court was created as a constitutional court of record in 1964, effective January 12, 1965. Colo. Const. art. VI, § 9(3); 1964 Colo. Sess. Laws., ch. 47, § 37-20-1 at 445 (now codified at § 13-9-101, C.R.S.2005); see Barbara Bintliff, A Jurisdictional History of the Colorado Courts, 65 U. Colo. L.Rev. 577 (1994). The probate courts' jurisdiction is limited to those matters conferred by statute and by the Colorado Constitution. See generally Colo. Const. art. VI, § 9(3); § 13-9-106, C.R.S.2005.
Article VI, § 9(3) of the Colorado Constitution provides:
In the city and county of Denver, exclusive original jurisdiction in all matters of probate, settlements of estates of deceased persons, appointment of guardians, conservators and administrators, and settlement of their accounts, the adjudication of the mentally ill, and such other jurisdiction as may be provided by law shall be vested in a probate court. . . .
Section 13-9-103(1), C.R.S.2005, provides that in Denver the probate court has original and exclusive jurisdiction of:
Section 15-16-201(1), C.R.S.2005, of the Colorado Probate Code further provides that the probate court has exclusive jurisdiction of certain proceedings concerning trusts:
See § 15-10-201(10), C.R.S.2005 ().
An appellate court applies a mixed standard of review to motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Hanson v. Colo. Dept...
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