Steedle v. Sereff

• Decision Date: 10 September 2007
• Docket Number: No. 05SC811.,05SC811.
• Parties: David W. STEEDLE, M.D.; Neil Waldman, M.D.; City and County of Denver; and Denver General Hospital, n/k/a Denver Health Medical Center, Petitioners v. Bradley Scott SEREFF, individually and as personal representative of the Estate of Jennifer Sereff; Elliott Sereff, through his guardian, father, and next friend, Bradley Scott Sereff; and Skylar Sereff, through her guardian, father, and next friend, Bradley Scott Sereff, Respondents.
• Court: Colorado Supreme Court

167 P.3d 135

David W. STEEDLE, M.D.; Neil Waldman, M.D.; City and County of Denver; and Denver General Hospital, n/k/a Denver Health Medical Center, Petitioners v. Bradley Scott SEREFF, individually and as personal representative of the Estate of Jennifer Sereff; Elliott Sereff, through his guardian, father, and next friend, Bradley Scott Sereff; and Skylar Sereff, through her guardian, father, and next friend, Bradley Scott Sereff, Respondents.

No. 05SC811.

Supreme Court of Colorado, En Banc.

September 10, 2007.

Johnson, McConaty & Sargent, P.C., Craig A. Sargent, Glendale, Colorado, Attorneys for Petitioner David W. Steedle, M.D.

Arlene V. Dykstra, Acting Denver City Attorney, John Eckhardt, Assistant City Attorney, Denver, Colorado, Attorneys for Petitioner Neil Waldman, M.D.

Jaudon & Avery, LLP, Joseph C. Jaudon, David H. Yun, Denver, Colorado, Attorneys for Petitioners City and County of Denver and Denver General Hospital, n/k/a Denver Health Medical Center.

Leventhal, Brown & Puga, P.C., Jim Leventhal, Benjamin Sachs, Denver, Colorado, Attorneys for Respondents.

University of Colorado, Office of University Counsel Patrick T. O'Rourke, Managing Associate University Counsel Denver, Colorado, Attorneys for Amicus Curiae University of Colorado.

Senter Goldfarb & Rice, L.L.C. Thomas S. Rice, Elliot J. Scott, Denver, Colorado, Attorneys for Amici Curiae Colorado Intergovernmental Risk Sharing Agency, Colorado School Districts Self Insurance Pool, Colorado Counties Casualty and Property Pool, and the Colorado Municipal League.

John W. Suthers, Attorney General, Friedrick C. Haines, First Assistant Attorney General, Kathleen Spalding, Assistant Attorney General, Civil Litigation and Employment Section, Attorneys for Amicus Curiae State of Colorado.

Pryor Johnson Carney Karr Nixon, P.C. Elizabeth C. Moran, Greenwood Village, Colorado, Attorneys for Amicus Curiae COPIC Insurance Company.

Justice BENDER delivered the Opinion of the Court.

I. Introduction

In this appeal, we review the court of appeals' opinion in Sereff v. Steedle, 148 P.3d 192 (Colo.App.2005). The court of appeals below reversed the trial court's order granting summary judgment for the defendant hospital and doctors in this wrongful death case. Id. at 198. The court of appeals held that the deceased patient's husband and two children suffered separate injuries for the purposes of the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act ("CGIA"), and thus the $150,000 statutory damages cap applies separately to each family member. Id. At issue are the damages recoverable where multiple parties bring a suit for the wrongful death of a family member against a governmental entity or employee. This case involves the intersection of the Wrongful Death Act, §§ 13-21-201 to -204, C.R.S. (2006), and the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act, §§ 24-10-101 to-120, C.R.S. (2006).

The Wrongful Death Act allows a person's heirs to recover damages for the wrongful death of that person, § 13-21-202, but limits damages by requiring that all claims pursuant to the death of one person be combined into one civil action, § 13-21-203, C.R.S. (2006); Hernandez v. Downing, 154 P.3d 1068, 1070 (Colo.2007). Any damages from this combined civil action are then distributed to the decedent's heirs through the statutes of descent and distribution. §§ 13-21-201(2), -203(1)(a).

The CGIA further limits recovery where a party brings a wrongful death action against a governmental entity or employee. § 24-10-114. The CGIA limits judgments to $150,000 per "injury." § 24-10-114(1)(a) to (b). Thus, the crux of this case is the definition of "injury."¹ The court of appeals held that each family member suffers a separate injury under the Wrongful Death Act, and thus, that each family member may recover up to $150,000 under the CGIA. The Sereffs assert that the court of appeals is correct, citing section 24-10-114(1)(b), which allows recovery of $150,000 per person where more than one person is injured in the same occurrence. The petitioner-defendants argue that for the purposes of a wrongful death action, "injury" means death, such that the Sereffs are limited to a total of $150,000 in damages for the death of Jennifer Sereff.

Based on the plain language of the CGIA, we agree with the defendants that the court of appeals erred in interpreting the CGIA. By its own statutory definition, section 24-10-103(2) of the CGIA defines an "injury" as including "death." In addition, we note that if death were not the operative injury for actions brought under the Wrongful Death Act, then the word "death" in the CGIA statutory definition of "injury" would be rendered meaningless. Further, the Sereffs' interpretation is inconsistent with the method of distributing damages for a wrongful death action to heirs through the statutes of descent and distribution. Hence, we hold that the operative injury for the purposes of a wrongful death action is the wrongful death itself, i.e., the death of Jennifer Sereff, and section 24-10-114(1)(a) of the CGIA limits damages to $150,000 in this wrongful death case. We thus reverse the court of appeals' decision and remand this case to be returned to the trial court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

II. Facts and Proceedings Below

Jennifer Sereff checked into the emergency department at Swedish Medical Center complaining of severe migraine headaches on December 26, 1994. Dr. Neil Waldman, a resident in emergency medicine, administered a drug to alleviate her symptoms. Within a few minutes, she began suffering seizures and became unresponsive, at which time she was transferred to the Intensive Care Unit. Jennifer Sereff died three days later without regaining consciousness.

Dr. Waldman was a resident with Denver Affiliated Residency in Emergency Medicine, a program sponsored by Denver General Hospital and the City and County of Denver. Residents in this program circulate through the emergency rooms of several hospitals, including Swedish Medical Center. Dr. Waldman's supervisor during this time was Dr. David Steedle, who was employed by the same residency program.

Jennifer Sereff's immediate family, including her husband Bradley and her two children, sued Dr. Steedle, Dr. Waldman, the City and County of Denver, and Denver General Hospital under the Wrongful Death Act, asserting that the negligent administration of medication caused Jennifer Sereff's death. Because all of the defendants are public entities or public employees, the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act applies to the Sereffs' lawsuit.

The defendants moved for summary judgment and for leave from the trial court to deposit $150,000 into the court registry on the grounds that this was the maximum amount the Sereffs could recover. The defendants noted that the CGIA limits damages to $150,000 per "injury" and asserted that the operative injury in this case was the death of Jennifer Sereff. The trial court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment and ruled that the plaintiffs' claims are subject to a collective $150,000 damages limit under section 24-10-109(1)(a), C.R.S. (2003).²

The Sereffs appealed this decision, arguing that the $150,000 damages cap applies to each individual claimant because each family member suffers a separate injury from a wrongful death for the purposes of the CGIA. The court of appeals agreed and reversed the trial court's decision, holding that the Sereffs could recover up to $150,000 each for a total of $450,000 in damages under the CGIA. The court of appeals noted that this amount is subject to any other statutory limitations imposed on recovery, such as the cap on noneconomic damages in the Wrongful Death Act.

The defendants petitioned this Court for certiorari review and argue that the court of appeals' interpretation of the CGIA damages cap is contrary to the plain language of the CGIA. We agree. We reverse the court of appeals' decision and remand this case to the court of appeals to be returned to the trial court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

III. Analysis

This case requires a determination of the damages recoverable where multiple parties bring a wrongful death suit against a governmental entity or employee. Thus, we consider how the Wrongful Death Act and the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act operate together to define damage caps in such a case.

The Wrongful Death Act allows a person's heirs to recover damages for the wrongful death of that person. § 13-21-202.³ The Wrongful Death Act, however, limits damages in several ways. First, the Wrongful Death Act requires all claims pursuant to the death of one person to be combined into one civil action. § 13-21-203(1)(a);⁴ Hernandez, 154 P.3d at 1070. Any damages from this combined civil action are then distributed to the decedent's heirs through the statutes of descent and distribution. § 13-21-201(2);⁵ see also § 13-21-203(1)(a) (stating that damages accruing under section 13-21-202 "shall be sued for and recovered by the same parties and in the same manner as provided in section 13-21-201"). Second, the Wrongful Death Act caps noneconomic damages for medical malpractice actions accruing before July 1, 2003, at $250,000. See § 13-21-203(1)(b); Colo. Permanente Med. Group v. Evans, 926 P.2d 1218, 1229-30 (Colo.1996). Section 13-21-203(1)(b) references the limitations for noneconomic damages in the Health Care Availability Act, sections 13-64-101 to -503, C.R.S. (2006).⁶

When the CGIA is overlaid onto the Wrongful Death Act, recovery is further limited when a party brings a wrongful death action against a governmental entity or employee. The CGIA limits judgments to $150,000 "for any injury to one person in any single occurrence." § 24-10-114(1)(a) (emphasis added). Further, the CGIA limits judgments to $600,000 "for an injury to two or more persons in any single occurrence ... except that, in such instance, no person may recover in excess of $150,000." § 24-10-114(1)(b) (emphasis...