Levitz v. State
Decision Date | 05 June 1980 |
Docket Number | No. 14450,14450 |
Citation | 126 Ariz. 203,613 P.2d 1259 |
Parties | Gary R. LEVITZ and M. D. Pruitt Furniture Company, an Arizona Corporation, Appellees, v. STATE of Arizona; City of Phoenix, a Municipal Corporation; Carlos Bryant, Supervisor, Sign Section, Building & Safety Department; Will Tolhurst, Sign Inspector, and all other agents, servants, employees, appointed and elected officials; John Doe, Appellants. |
Court | Arizona Supreme Court |
Andrew Baumert, III, City Atty. by Michael D. House, Asst. City Atty., Phoenix, for appellants.
Ben C. Pearson, Phoenix, for appellees.
This appeal has been brought by the City of Phoenix from a judgment of the Superior Court declaring the City's Ordinance G-1508 invalid. The Superior Court also enjoined the City from initiating or continuing any criminal prosecutions of appellees based on the ordinance's provisions. We assumed jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 19(e), Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure, 17A A.R.S.
Prior to December 27, 1967, the City of Phoenix regulated signs and billboards through its Zoning Ordinance. On the above date the City Council adopted Ordinance G-831 which placed the regulations of all signs in a separate chapter of the City Code known as Chapter 29. All provisions of the Zoning Ordinance relating to signs and billboards were later repealed leaving Chapter 29 as the sole source of regulation of signs and billboards. On November 18, 1975, the City Council enacted Ordinance G-1508 which revised and readopted the sign regulations in Chapter 29.
In May, 1977, the City of Phoenix caused criminal complaints to be filed against appellees charging them with violation of several sections of Chapter 29 of the City Code dealing with portable ground signs.
The appellees filed an action in the Superior Court seeking to declare the City's Ordinance G-1508 invalid and seeking to enjoin the City from further prosecuting or enforcing the sign ordinance.
The issue presented by this appeal is whether the Ordinance G-1508, under which the City sought to prosecute the appellees, is valid.
The City readily admits that the revised sign ordinance in question was not enacted in accordance with the statutory requirements of the Urban Environment Management Act, A.R.S. § 9-461 et seq. There was no attempt to comply with the procedural requirements of A.R.S. § 9-462.04 which requires, among other things, notice and public hearings.
The City maintains that the regulations of signs is purely a local matter subject to regulation by the local government under the power given to charter cities by Article 13 § 2 of the Arizona Constitution.
The position of the City is not correct. We thought that our decision in City of Scottsdale v. Scottsdale Associated Merchants, Inc., 120 Ariz. 4, 583 P.2d 891 (1978) resolved the issue. In that case dealing with regulation of signs by a charter city we stated:
120 Ariz. at 5, 583 P.2d 892. The binding effect of the state zoning statute on municipalities was first made clear in Wood v. Town of Avondale, 72 Ariz. 217, 232 P.2d 963 (1951), when this court struck down a zoning ordinance which had been enacted without following the notice requirements of the state statute in effect at the time. In Manning v. Reilly, 2 Ariz.App. 310, 408 P.2d 414 (1965), the Court of Appeals pointed out that the general rule governing enactment of zoning ordinances is that the statutory procedure must be strictly pursued, and an ordinance enacted without substantial compliance with the statutory requirements is void. In Committee for Neighborhood Preservation v. Graham, 14 Ariz.App. 457, 484 P.2d 226 (1971) the Court of Appeals emphasized that the State had preempted the field of zoning legislation, and cities and counties were bound to follow the state guidelines established by the Legislature.
Appellant, however, seeks to distinguish the regulation of signs, which antedate zoning regulations as such, contending that such regulations are not zoning but a local matter dealing with a purely local problem signs.
In support of its position the City points out that Division One of the Court of Appeals in State v. Jacobson, 121 Ariz. 65, 588 P.2d 358 (App.1978) has held that the power to regulate signs is not tied to the zoning power, and a city may regulate signs under its charter power.
The City notes that its ordinances regulating signs were in existence long before the State enacted any zoning legislation. It is a fact that municipal regulation of advertising signs began before comprehensive zoning. Restrictions in the location, size, and construction of billboards were common during the early 1900s. See Anderson, American Law of Zoning 2d Vol. 2 § 15.82.
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