Lewis v. Continental Airlines, Inc.

• Decision Date: 14 December 1999
• Docket Number: No. Civ.A. H-98-2212.,Civ.A. H-98-2212.
• Citation: 80 F.Supp.2d 686
• Parties: Robert L. LEWIS, Plaintiff, v. CONTINENTAL AIRLINES, INC., City of Houston, Houston Police Department, Globe Security Services, Inc., a/k/a Globe Security Systems, and Sandra D. Tisdel, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Texas

80 F.Supp.2d 686

Robert L. LEWIS, Plaintiff, v. CONTINENTAL AIRLINES, INC., City of Houston, Houston Police Department, Globe Security Services, Inc., a/k/a Globe Security Systems, and Sandra D. Tisdel, Defendants.

No. Civ.A. H-98-2212.

United States District Court, S.D. Texas.

December 14, 1999.

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Susan J. Taylor, Bond Taylor and Lee, Houston, TX, for Robert L. Lewis, plaintiff.

Rachel Giesber, Fulbright & Jaworski, Houston, TX, for Continental Airlines Incorporated, defendant.

Richard John Urra, for Houston Police Department, defendant.

Claude R. Treece, Gardere Wynne, Houston, TX, for Globe Airport Security Services Inc, defendant.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

CRONE, United States Magistrate Judge.

Pending before the court is Defendants Continental Airlines, Inc. ("Continental") and Sandra D. Tisdel's ("Tisdel") Motion for Summary Judgment (# 40). Having reviewed the pending motion, the submissions of the parties, the pleadings, and the applicable law, the court is of the opinion that summary judgment should be granted.

I. Background

Plaintiff Robert L. Lewis ("Lewis") was traveling on a Continental flight from Kansas City, Missouri, to Atlanta, Georgia, on April 24, 1997. His itinerary included a connecting flight at Bush Intercontinental Airport in Houston, Texas. According to Lewis, after arriving on time for his connecting flight, he approached a Continental ticket agent who informed him that his connecting flight had been delayed for thirty minutes, and he chose to wait in a seat across from the ticket counter. Lewis maintains that thirty minutes later, upon noticing that the same ticket agent had moved to another gate, he approached the agent and was told that his flight had departed ten minutes earlier. Lewis contends that the airline had not announced the flight's departure. Although Lewis missed the flight, his luggage had already been placed on board, and it continued to Atlanta on the scheduled flight.

Upon learning of the flight's departure, Lewis spoke with Concourse Superintendent Paul Montague about his dilemma. Montague offered Lewis complimentary overnight accommodations and meal vouchers, agreeing that Continental would book him on the earliest possible flight to Atlanta the following morning. According to Lewis, he stayed the night at the hotel arranged by Continental and arrived at the airport early the next morning hoping to book a flight leaving earlier than Continental's 11:00 a.m. departure. A Continental ticket agent purportedly informed him that Delta Airlines had a 6:00 a.m. flight to Atlanta and instructed him to go to a Continental Airlines ticket counter to make the arrangements. At the counter, Lewis claims that he spoke with Continental ticket agent Tisdel. Lewis states in his complaint that he informed Tisdel about his experience the previous night, but "Tisdel was quite rude and not helpful in obtaining the flight ticket for the Delta Airlines flight." Lewis admits that he then stated "in frustration to Tisdel that there could have been a bomb in the luggage that went on to Atlanta the previous night" or words to that effect. There is a dispute as to the exact words that were spoken. At deposition, Lewis contended that he said, "There could have been a bomb in my bag," adding that his purpose in making such a statement was to point out an oversight on the part of Continental, because "there should have been more concern for ... a passenger not being on that flight with his luggage." At deposition, Tisdel recalled that he said, "Well, what if I had a bomb in my bags?" She recounted that, after he made the comment, she "looked at him and [ ] said to him, `I realize that you're angry, but that is not something that you can talk about in the airport.'" According to Tisdel, Lewis then proceeded to say, "`Well, I don't care.' `I don't care if the whole airport blows up.'" Lewis denies having made a comment about the airport blowing up.

Tisdel responded to Lewis's remarks by first commenting that she should call security and then summoning a security officer. Lewis states "[u]pon information and belief" that, at that point, an employee of defendant Globe Airport Security Services, Inc. ("Globe") approached him, requested picture identification, and "was rude and obnoxious and treated [him] like a criminal." He contends that Globe personnel turned him over to officers of the Houston Police Department ("HPD"), who took him to an interrogation room. Tisdel maintains that she never saw a Globe officer on the scene and that it was HPD officers who answered her call. Lewis alleges that upon being approached by the officers, he "was fully cooperative and allowed them to search his person as well as a computer bag that he was carrying. Nothing of any substance was found either on [his] person or in the computer bag." Continental, however, contends that Lewis was initially uncooperative with security and would not immediately surrender his identification when asked.

Lewis claims that following the interrogation, he was handcuffed and taken to the Harris County Jail, where he was incarcerated for twelve to fourteen hours after being charged with aggravated assault against Tisdel and with making a terroristic threat. He also contends that despite his informing the HPD that he was epileptic and that his medication was in his luggage on board the flight that arrived in Atlanta the previous evening, the HPD refused him any medical attention. After he was released on bond, Lewis returned to Kansas City the following morning on an American Airlines flight. Ultimately, on July 16, 1997, the charges against him were dismissed for insufficient evidence.

Lewis instituted this action on July 14, 1998, asserting claims against Continental, the City of Houston, the HPD, Globe, and Tisdel for assault, negligence, gross negligence, malicious prosecution, false arrest, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and violation of his right to be free from unwarranted search and seizure under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. His claims against the City of Houston, the HPD, and Globe were subsequently dismissed. On August 21, 1998, Continental filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that all of Lewis's claims against it were preempted by the Federal Aviation Act ("FAA"), 49 U.S.C. §§ 41713-41742, which preempts state laws related to the price, route, or service of an air carrier. The court denied the motion to dismiss on March 10, 1999, rejecting Continental's argument in the context of this case. Subsequently, on July 21, 1999, Continental and Tisdel filed the instant motion, seeking summary judgment on all Lewis's claims. Lewis responded in part, arguing that "there are genuine issues of fact with respect to each element of Plaintiff's causes of action for assault, negligence/gross negligence, malicious prosecution and false arrest."

II. Analysis

A. Summary Judgment Standard

Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." FED.R.CIV.P. 56(c). The parties seeking summary judgment bear the initial burden of informing the court of the basis for their motion and identifying those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions on file, and affidavits, if any, which they believe demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Colson v. Grohman, 174 F.3d 498, 506 (5th Cir.1999); Marshall v. East Carroll Parish Hosp. Serv. Dist., 134 F.3d 319, 321 (5th Cir.1998); Wenner v. Texas Lottery Comm'n, 123 F.3d 321, 324 (5th Cir.1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1073, 118 S.Ct. 1514, 140 L.Ed.2d 667 (1998). The moving parties, however, need not negate the elements of the nonmovant's case. See Wallace v. Texas Tech Univ., 80 F.3d 1042, 1047 (5th Cir.1996) (citing Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994)).

Once a proper motion has been made, the nonmoving party may not rest upon mere allegations or denials in the pleadings, but must present affirmative evidence, setting forth specific facts, to show the existence of a genuine issue for trial. See Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548; Anderson, 477 U.S. at 257, 106 S.Ct. 2505; Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 585-86, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986); Colson, 174 F.3d at 506; Marshall, 134 F.3d at 321-22; Wallace, 80 F.3d at 1047; Little, 37 F.3d at 1075. All the evidence must be construed "in the light most favorable to the non-moving party without weighing the evidence, assessing its probative value, or resolving any factual disputes." Williams v. Time Warner Operation, Inc., 98 F.3d 179, 181 (5th Cir.1996) (citing Lindsey v. Prive Corp., 987 F.2d 324, 327 n. 14 (5th Cir.1993)); see Colson, 174 F.3d at 506; Marshall, 134 F.3d at 321; Messer v. Meno, 130 F.3d 130, 134 (5th Cir.1997), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 119 S.Ct. 794, 142 L.Ed.2d 657 (1999); Hart v. O'Brien, 127 F.3d 424, 435 (5th Cir.1997), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 119 S.Ct. 868, 142 L.Ed.2d 770 (1999); Songbyrd, Inc. v. Bearsville Records, Inc., 104 F.3d 773, 776 (5th Cir.1997). "`The evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.'" Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170, 190 n. 3, 113 S.Ct. 1163, 122 L.Ed.2d 525 (1993) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505); Palmer v. BRG of Ga., Inc., 498 U.S....