Lewis v. Erie Ins. Exchange
Decision Date | 21 March 2002 |
Citation | 793 A.2d 143,568 Pa. 105 |
Parties | Robert A. LEWIS, Linda S. Lewis, Husband and Wife, and Robert J. Lewis, Appellants, v. ERIE INSURANCE EXCHANGE, Appellee. |
Court | Pennsylvania Supreme Court |
Todd Berkey, Pittsburgh, for Robert A. Lewis, et al.
John W. Pollins, Greensburg, for Pennsylvania Trial Lawyers Association. Craig R.F. Murphey, Erie, for Erie Insurance Exchange.
Christine P. Busch, James C. Haggerty, Philadelphia, for Pennsylvania Defense Institute.
Before FLAHERTY C.J., and ZAPPALA, CAPPY, CASTILLE, NIGRO, NEWMAN and SAYLOR, JJ.
The question presented is whether technical requirements imposed upon insurers under the Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Act to effectuate a first named insured's decision to decline uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage also pertain in circumstances involving acceptance of coverage at designated policy limits.
In June of 1992, Appellants Robert A. and Linda Lewis contracted with Appellee, Erie Insurance Exchange ("Erie"), for automobile insurance coverage as named insureds. On the face of the declarations page (as of at least November, 1992), the policy provided, inter alia, bodily injury liability coverage limited to $500,000 per person and per accident; uninsured motorist ("UM") and underinsured motorist ("UIM") coverage with limits of $50,000 per person and $100,000 per accident; and stacking of UM and UIM benefits by virtue of multiple vehicle premium payments. The UM/UIM coverage appears to have been modified in November of 1992 via a form provided by Erie and signed by Mr. Lewis as the first named insured. The single-page form is divided into two primary sections, each of which is separately outlined in box style prominently labeled as pertaining to "uninsured motorist coverage options" and "underinsured motorist coverage options," respectively. The two primary sections are each subdivided into three discrete, individually labeled blocks containing operative language to accomplish waiver or rejection of coverage; reduction of coverage limits; and/or rejection of stacked limits of coverage. Each of the three individual blocks within each primary section contains a line calling for the signature of the first named insured to effectuate selection of the option if chosen. Mr. Lewis's signature appears on the form in both the UM and UIM sections within the blocks labeled "Reduced Limits of [UM/UIM] Motorist Protection," and providing as follows:
No signature is present in any of the four blocks pertaining to waiver/rejection of UM and UIM coverage and stacking.
In July of 1997, the Lewises' son was injured in a motor vehicle accident while a passenger in a vehicle insured by a different company. Pursuant to provisions of the Erie policy extending coverage to resident relatives and affording a degree of portability in the UIM component, the Lewises' son was treated as a covered person thereunder, and Erie apparently conceded coverage limited to $100,000, after stacking, consistent with the declarations page of the policy. The Lewises, however, contended that the limits of available UIM coverage should be extended to the bodily injury liability limits ($500,000, and $1 million after stacking), since Erie's UM/UIM coverage options form failed to conform to Section 1731 of the MVFRL, 75 Pa.C.S. § 1731, governing the mandatory offering by insurers of UM and UIM insurance, and specifically the requirement of Section 1731(c.1) that an insurer must provide forms for waiver/rejection of such offerings printed on separate pages pertaining to each form of coverage waived. See 75 Pa.C.S. § 1731(c.1).1 Erie disputed the applicability of Section 1731(c.1) in instances involving the selection of specific coverage limits rather than outright waiver/rejection. As relates to an insured's selection of particular limits, Erie identified Section 1734 of the MVFRL as the controlling provision, emphasizing that its provisions require only that a request for specific limits for UM/UIM coverage be in writing but contain no analog to Section 1731(c.1)'s separate-page requirement.2
720 A.2d at 453-54. The common pleas court distinguished these decisions on the basis that, since the 1990 amendments to the MVFRL,4 reformation has been expressly required as a remedy for violation of Section 1731's separate-page requirement pertaining to UM/UIM waiver/rejection. See 75 Pa.C.S. § 1731(c.1) ().5
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