Lewis v. Harry White Ford, Inc.
Decision Date | 28 June 1973 |
Docket Number | No. 2,No. 48143,48143,2 |
Citation | 199 S.E.2d 599,129 Ga.App. 318 |
Parties | Katherine J. LEWIS v. HARRY WHITE FORD, INC., et al |
Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Ross & Finch, Charles E. McCranie, Baxter H. Finch, Atlanta, for appellant.
Greene, Buckley, DeRieux & Jones, Hugh Robinson, Jr., Atlanta, for appellees.
Syllabus Opinion by the Court
This is an appeal by plaintiff seeking to reverse a summary judgment rendered for defendant employer in a case brought by plaintiff for personal injuries against both employer, Harry White Ford, Inc., and employee, Jackson. This does not involve a respondeat superior situation as the collision between the automobile operated by plaintiff and that driven by Jackson occurred while Jackson was on a personal mission unconnected with his employment. Because Jackson was driving a 1966 Ford automobile owned by employer, plaintiff seeks to hold employer as a co-defendant upon two theories: (1) Negligent entrustment in that the employer should have known defendant Jackson was an incompetent, dangerous and negligent driver, and (2) that the employer furnished Jackson with an automobile which was mechanically defective and that employer knew or in the exercise of ordinary care should have known that it was dangerous to operate such vehicle with defective brakes. Defendant employer denied liability and its motion for summary judgment was sustained herein. Held:
1. The evidence in the record concerning the driver's alleged incompetency totally fails to support plaintiff's contentions as to that claim. Prior to employing Jackson the employer investigated 'his background, his references, his credit, his driver's record, etc.' Reports were received from the police and a credit bureau as well as checking with former employers. No adverse information was developed. Unknown to employer Jackson had been found guilty of criminal offenses. These involved larceny of an automobile, wife beating, and bastardy. None of these crimes has any relevancy concerning competency in driving an automobile. Nor would such convictions prevent one from holding a valid driver's license. Although employer acknowledges that if these matters had been learned during the investigation that such criminal background would have made Jackson ineligible for employment with that concern, such employment policy does not involve any question of recklessness or driving competency. See Saunders v. Vikers, 116 Ga.App. 733, 736, 158 S.E.2d 324; Brown v. Sheffield, 121 Ga.App. 383(2a), 173 S.E.2d 891. As to this theory of negligent entrustment the court below was correct.
2. A different situation confronts us in reviewing the evidence presented on the question of the employer's exercise of ordinary care as to the allegations concerning the condition of the vehicle. Jackson testified that the brakes did not perform correctly above certain speeds. He gave no estimate of his speed at the time of the incident. He further specified that the brake on one side pulled and then grabbed, that there was a noise in the brake drum on one side. Defendant's evidence sought to rebut this contention and also to show that the alleged defective condition of the brakes had no relevancy to the head-on collision which occurred when Jackson drove to the left of the center line to avoid another vehicle and that the brakes played no part in this.
Code Ann. § 68-1715(a, b, c) sets the standards for the brake equipment required, the performance ability of brakes and the maintnance of brakes. Concerning maintenance of brakes, it is stated that 'All brakes shall be maintained in good working order and shall be so adjusted as to operate as equally as practicable with respect to the wheels on opposite sides of the vehicle.' Considering Jackson's unrebutted testimony as to the performance of the brakes in view of this requirement, a jury question is raised as to whether the brakes were defective.
Gregory v. Ross, 214 Ga. 306, 311; 104 S.E.2d 452, 456.
Other factual questions are presented by the record in seeking to determine if the employer defendant in the exercise of ordinary care should have known of the defect. Did the customary road-testing of the car when first placed on employer's used car lot within a period of less than one month reveal the supposed defect? After the repairs to the car should another road test have been made? These questions place this case in the category that "circumstance was shown which could have served to put the defendant upon notice or inquiry as to such a defect, or from which it could have been inferred that he might have discovered it by the exercise of ordinary care." Cruse v. Taylor, 89 Ga.App. 611, 618, 80 S.E.2d 704, 710, quoting from Mathis v. Mathis, 42 Ga.App. 1, 155 S.E. 88. Thus a possible jury question was presented which was not resolvable by the summary judgment on the record as it presently exists.
3. Additionally, a jury question exists concerning the contention that the brakes did not constitute the proximate cause. . . . Wright v. Southern R. Co., 62 Ga.App. 316, 319, 7 S.E.2d 793, 796.
Milton Bradley Co. of Ga. v. Cooper, 79 Ga.App. 302, 307, 53 S.E.2d 761, 765.
Stone's Independent Oil v. Bailey, 122 Ga.App. 294(1), 176 S.E.2d 613, 619. In accord, Southern R. Co. v. Lunsford, 57 Ga.App. 53, 194 S.E. 602. Jackson's testimony that the right brake grabbed, that the left brake did not work and that he turned the steering wheel as far as possible to the left to avoid the truck infers that the performance and non-performance of the brakes could reasonably have accounted for his attempt to correct by over-steering.
'It is basic that an inference can be drawn only from a fact and that whether a fact will authorize a particular inference is a matter of law . . . (The court must determine) 'whether the evidence reasonably establishes a given theory . . . There must be more than a 'scintilla' of circumstances to carry the case to the jury. (Cits.) More than a 'scintilla' of circumstances 'means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.' (Cit.) . . . (A)n inference is legitimate deduction whereas conjecture is mere unregulated suspicion. If the evidence reasonably establishes the plaintiff's theory it must be submitted to the jury . . ." Layton v. Knight, 129 Ga.App. 113, 198 S.E.2d 915.
Defendant has not negated the supposed brake defect as one of the factors constituting proximate cause along with Jackson's over-steering and the speed of the car. Defendant employer had not shown as a matter of law an absence of negligende.
In summary judgment proceedings the burden is on the movant to show the lack of substantial factual issue. Holland v. Sanfax Corp., 106 Ga.App. 1, 4, 126 S.E.2d 442; International Brotherhood v. Newman, 116 Ga.App. 590, 592, 158 S.E.2d 298; Sanfrantello v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 118 Ga.App. 205, 206, 163 S.E.2d 256. Burnette Ford, Inc. v. Hayes, 124 Ga.App. 65(1), 183 S.E.2d 78.
Burnette Ford, Inc. v. Hayes, supra, p. 67, 183 S.E.2d p. 79.
Judgment reversed.
Plaintiff received injuries and damages in an automobile mishap. He contended the mishap occurred as a result of negligence of Jackson, who was driving...
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