Lewis v. Krueger, Hutchinson and Overton Clinic

• Decision Date: 30 June 1954
• Docket Number: No. A-4533,A-4533
• Citation: 269 S.W.2d 798,153 Tex. 363
• Parties: LEWIS v. KRUEGER, HUTCHINSON AND OVERTON CLINIC.
• Court: Texas Supreme Court

Page 798

269 S.W.2d 798

153 Tex. 363

LEWIS v. KRUEGER, HUTCHINSON AND OVERTON CLINIC.

No. A-4533.

Supreme Court of Texas.

June 30, 1954.

Boling & Smith, Lubbock, for petitioner.

Klett, Bean & Evans and Crenshaw, Dupree & Milam, Lubbock, for respondents.

CULVER, Justice.

Petitioner, Lewis, a young physician, entered the employ of respondents in January 1950 under a written agreement. It provided in part that if the employment of petitioner ceased he would not thereafter practice his profession in Lubbock County.

Three years later petitioner resigned and entered private practice for himself in Lubbock. Respondents filed suit praying for injunction, and thereafter moved for summary judgment based upon affidavits and deposition of the parties. The trial court sustained exception addressed to the petition on the ground that the covenant, though reasonably limited as to space, was void and unenforceable because unlimited as to time. On appeal the cause was reversed and remanded, with directions that respondents' motion for summary judgment be sustained but reducing the injunctive relief to a period of three years. 266 S.W.2d 885.

We are of the opinion that this decision is correct.

In one authority the rule is thus stated:

'Generally, an agreement imposing a restraint reasonably limited in space is not against public policy, although unlimited in time of operation, regardless of the nature of the business or occupation restrained.' 17 C.J.S., Contracts, § 244.

The case of Randolph v. Graham, Tex.Civ.App., 254 S.W. 402, is in point, though it deals with the sale of one physician's practice to another. Under somewhat similar facts as here presented, it was held in Foster v. White, 248 App.Div. 451, 290 N.Y.S. 394, 395, that though the covenant be unlimited as to time this fact will not preclude the granting of an injunction where the area of restraint is limited and reasonable. In an earlier Supreme Court of Rhode Island case, Tillinghast v. Boothby, 20 R.I. 59, 37 A. 344, the holding is to the same effect.

As the rule makes no distinction between a profession and any other occupation, such cases as Patterson v. Crabb, Tex.Civ.App., 51 S.W. 870; Langever v. United Advertising Corporation, Tex.Civ.App., 258 S.W. 856, and Moore v. Duggan Abstract Co., Tex.Civ.App., 154 S.W.2d 519, come into application.

In view of the full discussion by the Court of Civil Appeals and the many other authorities referred to in its opinion, we need pursue the point no further.

Many cases are cited by petitioner but none seem to support his contention. For instance, in the recent case of Parker v. Slayter, Tex.Civ.App., 238 S.W.2d 814, the court held that the area, namely, that of Harris County, was too inclusive and therefore harsh and unreasonable. The parties had operated a chiropractic clinic in Baytown a suburb of Houston. Their patrons came from only a small portion of the county, whereas the patients of respondents were drawn from all over Lubbock County and the contiguous area.

In Miller v. Chicago Portrait Co., Tex.Civ.App., 195 S.W. 619, the contract of employment provided the employee would not engage in a rival business in a certain territory stipulating that in the event of a violation, liquidated damages were fixed at the sum of $1,000. The court held that an injunction would not issue to enjoin the employee from engaging in such business within the state, there being no evidence of trade secrets connected with the business or a showing that damages were inadequate.

In Union Transfer & Storage Co. v. Greve, Tex.Civ.App., 131 S.W.2d 796, the case turned on a question of fact. There was no proof of injury, no diversion of patronage.

The Court of Civil Appeals, after holding that the unlimited time element, coupled with the limitation as to territory, was not unreasonable and did not render the contract void, reduced the limitation to three years. The clinic in its appeal had prayed that if the period of restriction was thought to be unreasonable, the duration of the injunction should be limited to three or five years. The court treating the proposition as an offer on the part of respondents to accept a reduction of time and as a waiver of their legal right to insist on injunctive relief for an unlimited time, reduced the period accordingly. Of this petitioner could not complain as it inured to his benefit. His point to the effect that the court was reforming the contract and trying the case on a different theory is without merit.

We agree with the result reached by the Court of Civil Appeals but upon somewhat of a different theory. Merely because a limit has not been fixed for the duration of the restraint, the agreement will not be struck down but will be enforceable for such period of time as would appear to be reasonable under the circumstances. Corbin on Contracts, § 1391. This rule is properly applicable to the facts of our case. The restraint for three years will amply protect the practice of respondents and to extend the time further would serve no useful purpose.

We overrule petitioners' contention that the court is...