Lewis v. State

• Decision Date: 06 January 1930
• Docket Number: 28390
• Citation: 125 So. 419,155 Miss. 810
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
• Parties: LEWIS v. STATE

125 So. 419

155 Miss. 810

LEWIS v. STATE

No. 28390

Supreme Court of Mississippi

January 6, 1930

(En Banc.)

1. CRIMINAL LAW. In proceeding for order fixing date for execution of sentence of hanging, convict could present answer or suggestion of insanity (Hemingway's Code 1927 sections 1350, 1351).

In proceeding under Code 1906, section 1524 (Hemingway's Code 1927, section 1351), for an order fixing date for execution of sentence of hanging, convict could present an answer or suggestion of insanity, since remedy under Code 1906, section 1523, as amended by Laws 1926, chapter 186 (Hemingway's Code 1927, section 1350) relating to execution in capital cases where convict is insane, is not exclusive, but is merely an additional or cumulative remedy not found in common law.

2. CRIMINAL LAW. In proceeding to fix date for hanging, court was not required to order trial on issue of convict's insanity, where he did not allege insanity arose after conviction (Hemingway's Code 1927, section 1351).

Where convict, in proceeding under Code 1906, section 1524 (Hemingways' Code 1927, section 1351), for an order fixing date for execution of sentence, presented suggestion of insanity, court was not required to order trial on issue of insanity where issue had been tried in main trial and convict did not allege that insanity arose subsequent to trial.

3 COURTS. Courts must adjudicate cases according to established rules of procedural as well as of substantive law.

Courts must adjudicate cases according to established and necessary general and practical rules of procedural as well as of substantive law.

HON. W L. CRANFORD, Judge.

APPEAL from circuit court of Simpson county HON. W. L. CRANFORD, Judge.

R. V. Lewis was convicted of murder, but date fixed for execution of sentence was passed, and the state applied for an order fixing a date for the execution of the sentence. From an order fixing such date, defendant appeals. Affirmed.

Affirmed.

W. D. Hilton and R. T. Hilton, both of Jackson, J. B. Sykes, of Mendenhall, and S. C. Broom and Oscar P. Gober, both of Jackson, for appellant.

Section 1350, Hemingway's Code of 1927, does not provide the exclusive method of raising the question of the insanity of a person subsequent to conviction.

Howie v. State, 121 Miss. 197.

A verdict of guilty and sentence of court thereon establishes beyond doubt from a legal point of view that the accused was sane when the crime was committed and at the time of his trial and sentence. If proof is subsequently made of the insanity of the convict, then the insanity arose subsequent to his conviction.

Sears v. State, 112 Ga. 383.

If a person becomes insane after his conviction but before execution thereunder, the question of his sanity vel non should be inquired into and determined by the court.

Aaron v. State, 40 Ala. 307; People v. Geary, 298 Ill. Rep. 236; State of Ala. v. John Williams, 43 So. 490; 10 L.R.A. 1129; Howie v. State, 121 Miss. 197; Howie v. State, 125 Miss. 589; Davis v. State, 119 So. 805.

At common law a defendant has the right to present a plea of insanity between the sentence date and the date of execution, or any time he may be brought before the court, and this legal right is not taken away from him by statute.

Section 1350 of the Code of 1927; Hollman v. Bennet, 44 Miss. 322; Yazoo & M. V. R. Co. v. Scott, 67 So. 491, 108 Miss. 871.

Forrest B. Jackson, Assistant Attorney-General, for appellee.

One under the sentence of death cannot suggest insanity subsequent to conviction and sentence and subsequently to appeal on two occasions to the Supreme Court where the question of insanity was fully presented as a legal reason for staying the judgment of the court in fixing a new date for the execution of the death penalty, but such person has a full and complete remedy afforded him in section 1350, Hemingway's Code of 1927, if he is in fact insane.

Nobles v. Georgia, 168 U.S. 398, 18 S.Ct. 87, 42 L.Ed. 515.

A suggestion of insanity after conviction and original sentence must show that the insanity arose subsequently to the conviction.

Section 3035, Criminal Law; 16 C. J., page 1283; Section 3135, 16 C. J., pages 1337 and 1338; State v. Brinkley, 5 Ala. 241; Williams v. State, 45 Fla. 128, 34 So. 279; Baughn v. State, 100 Ga. 554, 28 S.E. 68; 38 Fla. 128; Nobles v. Georgia, 168 U.S. 398, 18 S.Ct. 87, 42 L.Ed. 515; State v. Potts, 49 La. Ann. 1500, 22 So. 738; Commonwealth v. Buccieri, 153 Penn. 535, 26 A. 228; State v. Patton, 12 La. Ann. 288; People v. Knott, 122 Cal. 410, 55 P. 154; Springer v. State, 63 Tex. Cr. 266, 140 S.W. 99; Stover v. Commonwealth, 92 Va. 780, 22 S.E. 874.

Argued orally by S. C. Broom and W. D. Hilton, for appellant, and by Forrest B. Jackson, Assistant Attorney-General, for the state.

OPINION

Griffith, J.

At the March, 1928, term of the circuit court of Simpson county, appellant Lewis was convicted of murder and was sentenced to be hanged. An appeal to this court was had, pending which the date fixed by the circuit court for the execution of the sentence was passed. The judgment was by this court affirmed (118 So. 708), and the 13th day of December, 1928, was fixed as the day of the execution. A few days before the date last aforesaid the chancellor of the district erroneously granted a writ of habeas corpus, whereby the date for the execution again passed. Upon the hearing in habeas corpus the chancellor denied relief, and an appeal was thereupon taken to this court from that decree. Again there was an affirmance in this court (121 So. 493) on April 8, 1929, but, because the habeas corpus court had no power to fix a new date for the execution, this court on that appeal had no such power, and no date was fixed.

When the next succeeding, the September, 1929, term of the said circuit court came on, the state applied, under section 1524, Code 1906 (section 1351, Hemingway's 1927 Code), to the court for an order fixing a date for the execution of the sentence, whereupon appellant through his attorneys answered that appellant, "the said defendant, R. V. Lewis, is now insane," and supported the said answer by two affidavits by competent medical experts to the effect that they had examined the said Lewis and his family history and also the entire record in the case in which he was convicted, and that in their opinion "the said R. V. Lewis is now insane." The state moved to strike the said answer as being insufficient in law, which motion was sustained, and, after proof by the state of the facts set out in the first paragraph hereinabove, the court then fixed Friday, the 18th day of October, 1929, as the date for the execution, from which order an appeal was taken, and thus the case is again and for the third time before this court.

It is the first contention of the state, and apparently was the view upon which the trial court acted, that under the section of the statutes above mentioned the convict could not present an answer or suggestion of insanity, but that the exclusive remedy of the convict is under section 1523, Code 1906, as amended chapter 186, Laws 1926 (section 1350, Hemingway's 1927 Code). In this contention the state is mistaken. The section first mentioned "is simply declaratory of the common law," Ex parte Bell, 56 Miss. 282, 285, while the section last cited is an additional or cumulative remedy not found in the common law. The two sections stand, neither being repulsive to the other, and neither exclusive of the other.

But the question is whether, on another ground the answer or suggestion of insanity is sufficient. It was one of the defenses of appellant, urged against his conviction, in the main trial of his case, that he was insane. This issue was found against him by the trial jury and court and was affirmed by this court. As already stated, his answer and the supporting affidavits now before us allege only that he "is now insane," and do not aver that the insanity now pleaded is an insanity that has arisen since the conviction. Consequently it cannot be told from the said averments whether as a matter of fact a new issue is presented or whether it is in whole...