Lewis v. State, 354, 1999.
| Decision Date | 28 July 2000 |
| Docket Number | No. 354, 1999.,354, 1999. |
| Parties | James K. LEWIS, Defendant Below, Appellant, v. STATE of Delaware, Plaintiff Below, Appellee. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Delaware |
Bernard J. O'Donnell, Public Defender, Wilmington, Delaware, for appellant.
Elizabeth R. McFarlan, Department of Justice, Wilmington, Delaware, for appellee.
Before VEASEY, Chief Justice, WALSH and HOLLAND, Justices. HOLLAND, Justice:
This is a direct appeal by James K. Lewis, the defendant-appellant. Lewis and his co-defendant, Linwood Black, were charged with Burglary in the First Degree, Unlawful Imprisonment in the First Degree, Assault in the Second Degree, Conspiracy in the Second Degree and two firearms offenses. Both defendants were represented at a joint trial by the same attorney. Each defendant presented a defense of mistaken identification and separate alibis. After a four-day jury trial, both defendants were convicted of all offenses.
When the co-defendants were sentenced, Black admitted that he had committed the charged offenses. He also advised the sentencing judge that a person other than Lewis had committed the offenses with him and that Lewis had not been involved. Based on Black's statements at sentencing, Lewis moved for a new trial. That motion was denied.
Lewis has raised two arguments on appeal. First, he submits that, as a result of the trial judge's failure to explore the potential conflicts that could arise from dual representation, his Sixth Amendment right to have the effective assistance of counsel at trial was violated. Second, Lewis argues that the trial judge erred in denying his motion for a new trial because of Black's statements at sentencing that Lewis had not been involved in the crimes.1
We have concluded that Lewis' Sixth Amendment right to have the effective assistance of an appointed conflict-free trial attorney was violated because the record reflects an actual conflict and no valid waiver of that right by Lewis. Therefore, the judgments of conviction must be reversed. The assistant public defender who provided Lewis with exemplary and successful representation in this appeal did not represent Lewis at trial.
Nicole Parks testified that she was staying overnight at the home of her friend in Riverside to watch her friend's two young children. Her boyfriend, Greg Selby, was also staying with her that night. Parks and Selby went to sleep in an upstairs bedroom.
Parks testified that she was awakened by two masked individuals, one with a gun, who entered the darkened bedroom shouting at her and Selby. The unarmed individual taped Parks' arms behind her back. Parks testified that she recognized the armed individual from his voice as Black, her former boyfriend. Parks did not recognize the second unarmed individual.
Selby testified that he too was awakened by shouting men. Selby recognized the masked assailant with the gun as Black. After being struck in the head with the gun, Selby punched Black in the face. A struggle ensued which carried out into the hallway. The pistol discharged and a bullet shattered the hallway window.
When the struggle began between Selby and the armed assailant, the other perpetrator fled downstairs and out of the house. Selby testified that the other man was also masked, but that from viewing the back of his head he recognized him as Lewis, Black's friend. Selby acknowledged that it was dark and that the second man who tied up Parks said nothing.
Lewis and his co-defendant, Black, were indicted, tried and convicted on identical charges. At trial, both Lewis and Black were represented by the same attorney. Lewis and Black each presented an independent alibi defense at trial.
Lewis testified that on the night the incident was reported, he went to his girlfriend's house shortly after midnight and watched television. According to Lewis, at about 3:00 a.m. Black came by to tell him that the police were looking for them about a burglary. Lewis admitted that he and Black were good friends. Lewis testified that he had not been with Black earlier on the night in question and had not assaulted Selby and Parks. Lewis' girlfriend, Tia Watson, substantially corroborated Lewis' testimony.
Lewis contends that the trial judge committed reversible error by failing to consider whether he should have been represented by a separate attorney. There are two procedural considerations that would generally bar our examination of Lewis' argument. First, since the question now raised by Lewis was not fairly presented to the trial judge, it will not be addressed by this Court unless "the interests of justice so require."2 Thus, the applicable standard of appellate review requires Lewis to demonstrate plain error. Second, this Court does not usually consider ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims in a direct appeal.3 In Lewis' case, however, the alleged error related to the effective assistance of Lewis' trial attorney ab initio and potentially undermined the attorney's effectiveness during the entire proceedings. We have decided to address the merits of Lewis' argument because it presents important questions relating to the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, attorney ethics, judicial responsibility, and fundamental fairness in the administration of justice throughout a criminal proceeding.4
The Delaware Lawyers' Rules of Professional Conduct impose limitations on multiple representation of clients. Rule 1.7(b) addresses the simultaneous representation of co-parties. The Comment to Rule 1.7 states "[t]he potential for conflict of interest in representing multiple defendants in a criminal case is so grave that ordinarily a lawyer should decline to represent more than one codefendant."5 The United States Supreme Court has explained the rationale for the general rule against joint representation:
The likelihood and dimensions of nascent conflicts of interest are notoriously hard to predict, even for those thoroughly familiar with criminal trials. It is a rare attorney who will be fortunate enough to learn the entire truth from his own client, much less be fully apprised before trial of what each of the Government's witnesses will say on the stand. A few bits of unforeseen testimony or a single previously unknown or unnoticed document may significantly shift the relationship between multiple defendants.6
Accordingly, the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice provide that, except in unusual situations, lawyers should routinely decline to represent multiple defendants in criminal cases. The specific applicable section of the ABA Defense Function Standard regarding conflicts of interest provides:
The ABA Defense Function Standards are 8
The United States Supreme Court and this Court have held that the judiciary has an independent interest in ensuring that criminal trials are conducted within the ethical standards of the profession and that legal proceedings are fair.9 Trial judges "must recognize a presumption in favor of a defendant's counsel of choice."10 The Sixth Amendment right to have assistance by the attorney of one's choice, however, is not absolute.11 In fact, the right to effective representation by an attorney with undivided loyalty is so integral to the proper administration of justice that, in some cases, it must take precedence over the expressed preference of the defendants and their attorney.12 In United States v. Dolan, the Third Circuit held that the exercise of the court's supervisory powers by disqualifying an attorney representing multiple defendants, in spite of the defendant's express desire to retain that attorney, does not necessarily abrogate the defendant's Sixth Amendment rights:
when a trial court finds an actual conflict of interest which impairs the ability of a criminal defendant's chosen counsel to conform with the [applicable] Code of Professional Responsibility, the court should not be required to tolerate an inadequate representation of a defendant. Such representation not only constitutes a breach of professional ethics and invites disrespect for the integrity of the court, but it is also detrimental to the independent interest of the trial judge to be free from future attacks over the adequacy of the waiver or the fairness of the proceedings in his own court and the subtle problems implicating the defendant's comprehension of the waiver. Under such circumstances, the court can elect to exercise its supervisory authority over members of the bar to enforce the...
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