Lewis v. Warden

Decision Date03 October 2016
Docket NumberCivil No. 3:15-cv-92
PartiesWILLIAM SOLOMON LEWIS, Petitioner v. WARDEN, U.S.P. CANAAN, Respondent
CourtU.S. District Court — Middle District of Pennsylvania

(Judge Mariani)

MEMORANDUM

Presently before the Court is a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 filed by Petitioner, William Solomon Lewis, an inmate currently confined at the United States Penitentiary, Canaan, in Waymart, Pennsylvania ("USP-Canaan"). (Doc. 1). Named as the sole Respondent is the Warden of USP-Canaan. Lewis claims that his due process rights were violated in the context of a prison disciplinary hearing. The petition is ripe for disposition and, for the reasons that follow, will be denied.

I. Background

On April 1, 2013, while incarcerated at the United States Penitentiary in Coleman, Florida, Lewis was charged in incident report number 2427489 with refusing to participate in a required physical test or examination unrelated to testing for drug abuse, in violation of Federal Bureau of Prisons ("BOP") Prohibited Acts Code Section 227. (Doc. 1-1, p. 2; Doc. 7-2, Ex. 1, Attach. C).

A disciplinary hearing was held and the disciplinary hearing officer ("DHO") ultimately found that Lewis committed the act as charged and sanctioned him with a loss of 27 days of good conduct time, 30 days of disciplinary segregation, 90 days loss of commissary and telephone privileges, and 30 days impounding of personal property. (Doc. 1-1, p. 4; Doc. 7-2, Ex. 1, Attach. E).

On May 7, 2013, Lewis filed Administrative Remedy No. 733314-R1 with the Northeast Regional Office. (Doc. 7-2, p. 16, Administrative Remedy Generalized Retrieval). On May 29, 2013, Administrative Remedy No. 733314-R1 was denied. (Id.). On January 27, 2014, Lewis appealed the denial of Administrative Remedy No. 733314-R1 to the BOP Central Office, designated as Administrative Remedy No. 733314-A1. (Id.). On February 18, 2014, the BOP Central Office rejected the appeal because Lewis failed to attach a copy of the regional appeal. (Id.). The Central Office advised Lewis to resubmit his appeal in proper form within fifteen (15) days. (Id.). There is no record that Lewis filed any other administrative remedies concerning the claims raised in the present habeas petition.

The instant petition was filed on January 15, 2015. (Doc. 1). In the petition, Lewis argues that he never refused to participate in a required physical test or examination, and insufficient evidence supports the DHO's finding that he refused to submit to a mandatory tuberculosis skin test. (Doc. 1-1, pp. 1-5). For relief, Lewis requests that the Court restore his good time credits and expunge the incident report. (Id. at p. 7).

II. Discussion
A. Exhaustion

Respondent argues that the petition should be denied based on Lewis' failure to comply with the BOP's administrative review process. (Doc. 7, pp. 6-8). Despite the absence of a statutory exhaustion requirement attached to § 2241, courts have consistently required a petitioner to exhaust administrative remedies prior to bringing a habeas claim under § 2241. See Callwood v. Enos, 230 F.3d 627, 634 (3d Cir. 2000); Moscato v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 98 F.3d 757, 760 (3d Cir. 1996). Exhaustion is required "for three reasons: (1) allowing the appropriate agency to develop a factual record and apply its expertise facilitates judicial review; (2) permitting agencies to grant the relief requested conserves judicial resources; and (3) providing agencies the opportunity to correct their own errors fosters administrative autonomy." Moscato, 98 F.3d at 761-62 (citing Bradshaw v. Carlson, 682 F.2d 1050, 1052 (3d Cir. 1981)). Nevertheless, exhaustion of administrative remedies is not required where exhaustion would not promote these goals. See, e.g., Gambino v. Morris, 134 F.3d 156, 171 (3d Cir. 1998) (exhaustion not required where petitioner demonstrates futility); Lyons v. U.S. Marshals, 840 F.2d 202, 205 (3d Cir. 1988) (exhaustion may be excused where it "would be futile, if the actions of the agency clearly and unambiguously violate statutory or constitutional rights, or if the administrative procedure is clearly shown to be inadequate to prevent irreparable injury"); Carling v. Peters, No. 00-2958, 2000 WL 1022959, at *2 (E.D. Pa. July 10, 2000) (exhaustion notrequired where delay would subject petitioner to "irreparable injury").

In general, the BOP's administrative review remedy program is a multi-tier process that is available to inmates confined in institutions operated by the BOP for review of an issue which relates to any aspect of their confinement. (Doc. 7-2, Ex. 1, Declaration of Michael Figgsganter, BOP Attorney Advisor ("Figgsganter Decl.") ¶ 10, citing 28 C.F.R. § 542.10, et seq.). With respect to disciplinary hearing decision appeals, a BOP inmate can initiate the first step of the administrative review process by filing a direct written appeal to the BOP's Regional Director (thus bypassing the institutional level of review) within twenty days after receiving the Discipline Hearing Officer's ("DHO") written report. 28 C.F.R. § 542.14(d)(2). If dissatisfied with the Regional Director's response, a Central Office Appeal may then be filed with the BOP's Office of General Counsel within thirty days of the date the Regional Director signed the response. 28 C.F.R. § 542.15(a). This is the inmate's final available administrative appeal. (Id.).

In the instant matter, Lewis filed his initial administrative remedy to the Northeast Regional Office. (Doc. 7-2, p. 16). The appeal was denied. (Id.). More than seven (7) months later, Lewis filed an appeal with the Central Office. (Id.). The Central Office rejected Lewis' appeal on February 18, 2014 because he failed to attach a copy of the original appeal. (Id.). The Central Office instructed Lewis to resubmit his appeal in proper form with fifteen (15) days. (Id.). Lewis did not submit any further appeals after the BOPCentral Office rejected his appeal. Rather than comply with the directive of the Central Office, Lewis then filed the instant petition.

Respondent asserts that Lewis failed to exhaust the required BOP administrative process prior to filing this action. (Doc. 7, pp. 5-8; Doc. 7-2, Figgsganter Decl. ¶ 11). In support of the non-exhaustion argument, Respondent has submitted a declaration under penalty of perjury by BOP Attorney Advisor Michael Figgsganter who acknowledges that Lewis filed an appeal from the DHO's decision with the Regional Director which was denied on May 29, 2013. (Figgsganter Decl. ¶ 11). While Respondent also acknowledges that Lewis appealed that denial to the Office of General Counsel, he asserts that Lewis' appeal was untimely and he failed to provide the required documentation from his regional appeal. (Id.). The Administrative Remedy Program provides that, "[a]n inmate who is not satisfied with the Regional Director's response may submit an Appeal on the appropriate form (BP-11) to the General Counsel within 30 calendar days of the date the Regional Director signed the response," 28 C.F.R. § 542.15(a). Lewis did not appeal to the Central Office within thirty (30) days.

In response, Lewis asserts that he never received the response from the Regional Office, rendering the administrative remedy process unavailable. (Doc. 10, pp. 2-3). Respondent maintains that the BOP regulations clearly provide that, "[i]f the inmate does not receive a response within the time allotted for reply, including extension, the inmate mayconsider the absence of a response to be a denial at that level." (Doc. 7, p. 7, citing 28 C.F.R. § 542.18). Respondent further asserts that even assuming that Lewis' Central Office appeal was timely, he failed to resubmit his appeal to the Central Office with proper documentation, as instructed. (Doc. 7, p. 7).

Under the circumstances in the present case, Respondent may have sufficiently demonstrated that Lewis failed to properly exhaust his administrative remedies prior to filing the instant action and, therefore, procedurally defaulted his claims. However, we decline to have this case turn on whether exhaustion was satisfied or excused, because it is clear based upon the reasoning set forth below, that Lewis is not entitled to relief with respect to any challenge he is attempting to assert regarding his institutional disciplinary proceeding.

B. Merits

Respondent argues that the petition should be denied on the merits because Lewis was afforded all of his procedural rights, and "some evidence" supports the finding of the Disciplinary Hearing Officer regarding incident report number 2427489. (Doc. 7, pp. 8-12).

As stated, on April 1, 2013, Lewis was served with incident report number 2427489 charging him with a code 227 violation for refusing to participate in a required physical test or examination unrelated to testing for drug abuse. (Doc. 1-1, p. 2; Doc. 7-2, Ex. 1, Attach. C). The incident report describes the incident as follows:

Inmate Lewis, William #73998-279 is due for his annual tuberculosis skin test. Inmate Lewis was instructed that this was a mandatory test. I/M Lewis stated"I am not taking this test. I refuse, call the LT and tell him I refuse." The tuberculosis test was not completed as a result of this refusal.

(Doc. 7-2, Ex. 1, Attach. C, Incident Report).

On April 1, 2013, the investigating lieutenant gave Lewis advanced written notice of the charges against him. (Id. at ¶¶ 14-16).

During the investigation, Lewis was advised of his right to remain silent, and he indicated that he understood his rights. (Id. at ¶¶ 23-24). Lewis made no statement and did not request any witnesses. (Id. at ¶¶ 24-25). At the conclusion of the investigation, the lieutenant determined that Lewis was appropriately charged and referred the incident report to the Unit Discipline Committee ("UDC") for further disposition. (Id. at ¶¶ 26-27).

On April 2, 2013, Lewis appeared before the UDC. (Id. at ¶¶ 17-21). Lewis stated "I told Stanley that I have an allergic...

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