Lewiston-Porter Cent. School Dist. v. Sobol

• Decision Date: 12 October 1989
• Docket Number: LEWISTON-PORTER
• Citation: 546 N.Y.S.2d 227,154 A.D.2d 777
• Parties: , 56 Ed. Law Rep. 562 In the Matter ofCENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, Appellant, v. Thomas SOBOL, as Commissioner of Education, et al., Respondents.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Page 227

546 N.Y.S.2d 227

154 A.D.2d 777, 56 Ed. Law Rep. 562

In the Matter of LEWISTON-PORTER CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, Appellant, v. Thomas SOBOL, as Commissioner of Education, et al., Respondents.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division Third Department.

Oct. 12, 1989.

Bartolomei & Del Monte (Paul Grenga, of counsel), Niagara Falls, for appellant.

Robert E. Diaz (Robert Wright, of counsel), Albany, for Thomas Sobol, respondent.

O'Hara & Crough (Dennis G. O'Hara, of counsel), Syracuse, for Gail M. Stephens, respondent.

Before MAHONEY, P.J., and KANE, CASEY, WEISS and HARVEY, JJ.

HARVEY, Justice.

Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court (Kahn, J.), entered March 27, 1989 in Albany County, which dismissed petitioner's application, in a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78, to review a determination of respondent Commissioner of Education ordering petitioner to reinstate respondent Gail M. Stephens to her former position.

Respondent Gail M. Stephens was employed as superintendent of schools for petitioner, the Lewiston-Porter Central School District, pursuant to a written contract dated March 19, 1985. The contract provided for a three-year term of employment commencing on July 1, 1985. Thereafter, on June 16, 1987, pursuant to a provision in the contract giving petitioner's Board of Education (hereinafter the Board) the discretion to extend the contract beyond the original three-year period, the Board approved a three-year extension of Stephens' contract through June 30, 1991. Subsequently, the Board became disenchanted with Stephens' performance and, in September 1988, terminated her employment and declared the position of superintendent of schools to be vacant. This action was taken without notice to Stephens and without a hearing.

Stephens appealed the Board's action to respondent Commissioner of Education. Finding, inter alia, that petitioner breached the contract by terminating Stephens without notice, the Commissioner thereafter sustained Stephens' appeal and ordered the Board to immediately restore Stephens to her position nunc pro tunc with full back pay and benefits. Petitioner then commenced this CPLR article 78 proceeding to challenge the Commissioner's determination. Supreme Court confirmed the determination and dismissed the petition. This appeal followed.

We affirm. Initially, we reject petitioner's contention that the Commissioner exceeded his jurisdiction when he determined that a valid and enforceable employment contract existed between the parties rather than defer to a court of law to decide the issue. The appellate jurisdiction of the Commissioner over any matters involving actions of a district school board is authorized by Education Law § 310 and the employment contract of a school superintendent is a matter governed by the Education Law (see, e.g., Education Law § 1711[3]. Notably, the Commissioner's jurisdiction over proceedings to enforce school superintendents' contracts is well established (see, e.g., Matter of Wilson v. Board of Educ. of Union Free School Dist. No. 9 of Town of Cheektowaga, 276 App.Div. 482, 95 N.Y.S.2d 735). In Little Falls City School Dist. v. Ambach, 68 A.D.2d 995, 414 N.Y.S.2d 799, a determination by the Commissioner that a valid contract existed between a school district and its superintendent was sustained by this court.

Next, we also reject petitioner's assertion that the employment contract in question was void as violative of public policy and that the three-year extension of the contract was illegal or improperly executed. Petitioner's public policy argument is basically that the original employment contract was violative of public policy because it improperly delegated to Stephens certain of the Board's statutory duties under Education Law § 1709. However, as noted by the Commissioner, although it did in fact delegate certain of its duties to Stephens, the delegation was not unrestricted in the contract but was specifically subject to the approval of the Board in those situations where such approval is required by law. Moreover, no "important constitutional or statutory duty or responsibility" (Port Jefferson Station Teachers Assoc. v. Brookhaven Comsewogue Union Free School Dist., 45 N.Y.2d 898, 899, 411 N.Y.S.2d 1, 383 N.E.2d 553) of the Board is at issue here; therefore, we find petitioner's contravention of public policy argument unpersuasive.

Regarding the extension of the employment contract, petitioner first argues that the language of the contract permitting the extension violates Education Law § 1711, which restricts the contractual term to a maximum of...