Lexington Ins. Co. v. James

• Decision Date: 08 May 2020
• Docket Number: No. 1D19-1954,1D19-1954
• Parties: LEXINGTON INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellant, v. Towanna JAMES, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Naomi James, Seatruck, Inc., Seafreight Line, Ltd., Seafreight Agencies (USA), Inc., Norton Lilly International, Inc., and Crowders Fleet Maintenance, LLC, Appellees.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

295 So.3d 367

LEXINGTON INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellant,

v.Towanna JAMES, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Naomi James, Seatruck, Inc., Seafreight Line, Ltd., Seafreight Agencies (USA), Inc., Norton Lilly International, Inc., and Crowders Fleet Maintenance, LLC, Appellees.

No. 1D19-1954

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

May 8, 2020

Michael R. D'Lugo of Wicker, Smith, O'Hara, McCoy & Ford, P.A., Orlando, for Appellant.

Guy Bennett Rubin of Rubin & Rubin, Stuart, for Appellee, Towanna James.

Samuel B. Spinner and Hinda Klein of Conroy Simberg, Hollywood, for Appellees Seatruck, Inc., Seafreight Line, Ltd., and Seafreight, Agencies (USA), Inc.

LEWIS, J.

Appellant, Lexington Insurance Company, challenges the trial court's order denying its motion to intervene in an action brought by Appellee Towanna James, as the personal representative of the estate of Naomi James, against Appellees Seatruck, Inc., Seafreight Line, Ltd., Seafreight Agencies (USA), Inc., Norton Lilly International, Inc., and Crowders Fleet Maintenance, LLC, for the wrongful death of Naomi James that arose out of a tractor-trailer crash. We affirm because Appellant has failed to show that the trial court abused its discretion.

BACKGROUND

In her wrongful death action, James alleged that on April 11, 2014, Naomi's car was stopped behind a school bus when it was rear-ended by a tractor-trailer that was recklessly operated by Joseph Pickett, Sr., within the course and scope of his employment with Seatruck and was carrying a load arranged by Norton Lilly and/or Seafreight Agencies. Naomi and her passenger were killed in the crash. James asserted claims for negligence, negligent entrustment, strict vicarious liability, and negligent hiring and retention.^*

In December 2016, Seatruck filed a notice of bankruptcy. In October 2017, the bankruptcy court granted James's motion for relief from the automatic stay put in place by the bankruptcy filing, allowing her to continue her wrongful death litigation. The bankruptcy court's order provided in part as follows:

2. Accordingly, the automatic stay is modified for cause ... to permit Creditor Towanna James, as Personal Representative of Naomi James ("Creditor") to continue proceedings in ... the ... Wrongful Death Case ... against debtor Seatruck, Inc. ("Debtor") and the non-debtor defendants therein, and to pursue all rights, remedies, recovery and settlement against the non-debtor defendants and against the insurance coverage of debtor, provided that Creditor shall not seek recovery against Debtor or Debtor's estate beyond the extent of insurance coverage outside of this bankruptcy case.

3. Upon entry of final judgment ... in the Wrongful Death Case, and expiration of the time to appeal from it, Creditor's claim against Debtor will be allowed in the amount of the judgment against Debtor, less amounts recovered from Debtor's insurance coverage, but the remaining unpaid amount of the judgment against Debtor shall be enforceable against Debtor or Debtor's estate only by means of a claim herein; notwithstanding that restriction, however, the judgment shall be fully enforceable against the Wrongful Death Case Defendants other than Debtor, and the automatic stay and any bankruptcy discharge shall have no effect upon Creditor's rights and remedies as to the defendants other than the Debtor.

In December 2018, Appellant filed a motion to intervene in the wrongful death action, wherein it asserted as follows. The tractor-trailer accident at issue involved multiple vehicles and resulted in several bodily injury claims, in addition to two wrongful death claims. Two global mediations led to the settlement of several of the bodily injury claims and the other wrongful death claim, but Seatruck was unable to resolve James's claim. Seatruck had an insurance coverage of $2,000,000 that was comprised of $1,000,000 through a Great West policy and $1,000,000 through a Lexington excess coverage policy. Following settlements with various claimants, $1,999,990 was tendered out of the insurance proceeds, leaving $10 of available insurance coverage through Appellant. Seatruck is being administratively dissolved, is ceasing operations, and its remaining assets are being liquidated. The bankruptcy court's October 2017 order constitutes res judicia and caps James's recovery against Seatruck at the extent of its available insurance coverage of $10. Given the foregoing, Appellant "hereby moves to intervene in this action for the purpose of distributing its remaining ten dollars in available insurance proceeds in an effort to promote judicial economy."

At the hearing on the motion to intervene, Appellant reiterated its arguments that James's claim against Seatruck is capped at $10, "no matter what happens from here forward, Lexington's involvement is capped at exactly $10," and it was seeking to intervene "for the sole purpose of distributing that $10." In opposing intervention, Appellees argued that Appellant was seeking to intervene to pay the $10 in order to discharge its obligation to defend its insured, Seatruck, whose attorney was getting paid by Appellant pursuant to the terms of their insurance policy. Appellees asserted that intervention would provide "zero judicial economy" because the case would proceed to trial irrespective of whether Appellant paid the $10. Appellees also contended that the bankruptcy court's order does not limit James's recovery to $10; rather, it simply requires her to return to the bankruptcy court with regard to Seatruck upon the entry of a judgment.

The trial court noted that it did not know what Appellant's insurance policy says about the duty to defend, and it denied the motion as follows:

[I]t's not up to me today to decide what Lexington's rights and duties are under its policy, but I don't think that it can -- the way to figure that out is not to intervene in this case and do anything to alter the course of this case. I'm not sure what the right path is, but I don't think that that's the right path to determine Lexington's rights to the extent that they can even be determined at this point in time, so I'm going to deny the motion to intervene.

This appeal followed.

ANALYSIS

We review a trial court's denial of a motion to intervene for an abuse of discretion. Fla. House of Representatives v. Florigrown, LLC , 278 So. 3d 935, 938 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019). Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.230 governs interventions and provides that "[a]nyone claiming an interest in pending litigation may at any time be permitted to assert a right by intervention, but the intervention shall be in subordination to, and in recognition of, the propriety of the main proceeding, unless otherwise ordered by the court in its discretion." Rule 1.230 "may be utilized by the omitted party if the plaintiff has left out a necessary or proper party ." Fla. House of Representatives , 278 So. 3d at 938.

Florida courts must apply a two-step analysis in ruling on a motion to intervene:

First, the trial court must determine that the interest asserted is appropriate to support intervention. ... Once the trial court determines that the requisite interest exists, it must exercise its sound discretion to determine whether to permit intervention. In deciding this question the court should consider a number of factors, including the derivation of the interest, any pertinent contractual language, the size of the interest, the potential for conflicts or new issues, and any other relevant circumstance.

Second, the court must determine the parameters of the intervention. ... Thus, intervention should be limited to the extent necessary to protect the interests of all parties.

Union Cent. Life Ins. Co. v. Carlisle , 593 So. 2d 505, 507–08 (Fla. 1992) (concluding that Union Central/insurer demonstrated the requisite interest to intervene given the contractual language entitling it to a refund of the medical benefits it had paid to the Carlisles/insureds which they subsequently recover in their malpractice action against the third-party tortfeasor, but "[b]ecause the right to intervene is limited only to the extent of that interest, Union Central may monitor the trial as a spectator, but it cannot participate in any way other...