Tsuji v. Fleet
| Decision Date | 04 August 2021 |
| Docket Number | No. 1D20-901,1D20-901 |
| Citation | 326 So.3d 143 |
| Parties | Samantha Elaine TSUJI and Crystal Ivy Williams, Appellants, v. H. Bart FLEET, as the duly appointed Personal Representative of the Estate of Thomas E. Morton, Jr., Deceased, and The Lewis Bear Company, Appellees. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Bryan S. Gowdy, Meredith A. Ross, and Dimitrios A. Peteves of Creed & Gowdy, P.A., Jacksonville; and Coy H. Browning of Browning Law Firm, P.A., Fort Walton Beach, for Appellants.
Charles Wiggins and Terrie L. Didier of Beggs & Lane, RLLP, Pensacola, for The Lewis Bear Company, Appellee.
No appearance for H. Bart Fleet, as the duly appointed Personal Representative of the Estate of Thomas E. Morton Jr., deceased.
Samantha Elaine Tsuji and Crystal Ivey Williams (Appellants) appeal an order granting summary judgment for The Lewis Bear Company (LBC). The trial court determined that Appellants’ vicarious liability claims against LBC were time-barred because Appellants’ negligence claims against the estate of LBC's deceased agent were time-barred. Finding no reversible error by the trial court, we affirm.
In June 2014, Appellants were injured in a motor vehicle accident. Thomas E. Morton Jr., while he was working for LBC and driving an LBC-owned vehicle, collided with Appellants’ car. Within four years of the accident, Appellants sued Morton and LBC, alleging that Morton was negligent and caused injury to Appellants. Appellants alleged that LBC was vicariously liable for Morton's actions. Not long after they sued, Appellants learned that Morton died a few weeks after the accident. Appellants moved to substitute H. Bart Fleet, as the personal representative of Morton's estate, for Morton.
LBC then moved for summary judgment, arguing that Appellants’ claims were barred by sections 733.702(5) and 733.710(1), Florida Statutes (2013), of the Florida Probate Code. Those statutes require creditors to present claims against a decedent's estate within two years of the decedent's death. In support of its motion, LBC cited this Court's decision in Buettner v. Cellular One, Inc. , 700 So. 2d 48 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997). Appellants opposed the motion. Citing the Fourth District's decision in Pezzi v. Brown , 697 So. 2d 883 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997), they argued that a plaintiff may bring a cause of action against a tortfeasor's estate more than two years after the tortfeasor's death when the plaintiff seeks to recover damages only from the tortfeasor's casualty insurance. Appellants argued that their claim against Morton's estate was not barred because they were not seeking to hold the estate liable. Rather, they sought to recover damages from Morton's casualty insurer, and only up to the limits of the insurance policy.
After considering the parties’ arguments and determining that Buettner was dispositive, the trial court entered summary judgment for LBC. The trial court found that if Appellants could not hold Morton's estate liable, LBC could not be vicariously liable for Morton's negligence. The court found that under section 733.710(1), Appellants had to file any claims against Morton's estate within two years of his death. Because Appellants sued outside the time limits in section 733.710(1), the court determined that the claims against Morton and LBC were time-barred. This timely appeal follows.
Appellants argue that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment for LBC based on its conclusions that: (1) Appellants had to sue within two years of Morton's death to recover under the casualty insurance policy; and (2) Appellants’ vicarious liability suit against LBC could not proceed absent a judgment holding Morton liable. We review the trial court's grant of summary judgment de novo. Wilson v. Jacks , 310 So. 3d 545, 546 (Fla. 1st DCA 2021).
Florida's Probate Code serves many purposes. Chief among them is to promote the timely settlement of a decedent's estate. See In re: Brown's Estate , 117 So. 2d 478, 480 (Fla. 1960) ( ); In re Jeffries’ Estate , 136 Fla. 410, 181 So. 833, 837 (1938) ().
Chapter 733 of the Florida Probate Code covers the "Administration of Estates." Part VII of that chapter explains how "Creditors’ Claims" may be presented against an estate. At issue are sections 733.702 and 733.710. Both fall under Part VII and limit the time for a creditor to present claims against an estate. Section 733.702(1) requires creditors to present most claims within three months after the first publication of the notice to creditors or within thirty days after service on a creditor. § 733.702(1), Fla. Stat. Section 733.702(2) provides that no cause of action will survive the decedent's death unless the creditor files the claim within the time set out in the statute. § 733.702(2), Fla. Stat.
As for the limitations on claims under section 733.702, there are exceptions. Subsection (4) of the statute exempts from the time limits for presenting a claim in subsection (1), "[t]o the limits of casualty insurance protection only, any proceeding to establish liability that is protected by the casualty insurance." § 733.702(4)(b), Fla. Stat. (2013). In other words, when a creditor files an action to establish liability of the estate and casualty insurance covers that liability, the creditor need not present its claim against the estate within the time for presenting claims under section 733.702(1). But if the creditor presents a claim that seeks recovery beyond the limits of the casualty insurance policy, the creditor must present the claim to the estate within time limits established in section 733.702(1).
Even so, while allowing for certain exceptions to the short time periods under section 733.702 for presenting claims against an estate under section subsection (1), the Legislature emphasized in subsection (5) that nothing in section 733.702 extends the limitations period set out in section 733.710. That section, which cuts off the estate's liability for claims presented more than two years after the decedent's death, is entitled, "Limitations on claims against estates." Subsection (1) of the statute provides:
Notwithstanding any other provision of the code, 2 years after the death of a person, neither the decedent's estate, the personal representative, if any, nor the beneficiaries shall be liable for any claim or cause of action against the decedent, whether or not letters of administration have been issued, except as provided in this section.
§ 733.710(1), Fla. Stat. (2013) (emphasis supplied).
"[S]ection 733.710 is a jurisdictional statute of nonclaim1 that automatically bars untimely claims and is not subject to waiver or extension in the probate proceedings." May v. Illinois Nat'l Ins. Co. , 771 So. 2d 1143, 1157 (Fla. 2000) ; see also Brooks v. Fed. Land Bank of Columbia , 106 Fla. 412, 143 So. 749, 753 (1932) ( ).
Under the plain language of the statute, the estate, the personal representative, and the beneficiaries of the estate are not liable for any claim or cause of action against the tortfeasor decedent unless the creditor presents the claim within two years of the death of the decedent. See Comerica Bank & Trust, F.S.B. v. SDI Operating Partners, L.P. , 673 So. 2d 163, 168 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996) ( ). The purpose of section 733.710 aligns with the Probate Code's central purpose of fostering the expeditious settlement of the estate of decedents. This goal of expediency explains why plaintiffs have four years to bring tort actions against living tortfeasors but only two years to bring the same claim against decedent tortfeasors. Compare § 95.11(3)(a), Fla. Stat. (2013), with § 733.710, Fla. Stat. (2013). Thus, to hold Morton's estate liable for his negligence, Appellants had to file their cause of action within two years of Morton's death.
Even so, Appellants contend that while the nonclaim statute, section 733.710, bars untimely claims against the estate, the personal representative, and the beneficiaries of the estate, the statute does not bar claims against a decedent's casualty insurer—even when filed beyond the statute's two-year limitations period. Appellants argue that if the Legislature intended to limit claims against a decedent's casualty insurer, it could have included insurers among the parties not liable for claims filed beyond the two-year limit in section 733.710. We disagree. Although section 733.710(1) does not list casualty insurers among the parties who are not liable for untimely claims against an estate, an insurer cannot be liable for such claims until a creditor seeks and perfects a claim against the decedent tortfeasor through the entry of a judgment establishing the decedent's liability.
Under Florida's non-joinder statute, section 627.4136(1), Florida Statutes, a plaintiff may not file a "direct action" against a liability insurer without first obtaining a settlement or a verdict against the...
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Tsuji v. Fleet
...is too late by over a year. The First District Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment of a trial court saying as much. Tsuji v. Fleet, 326 So.3d 143, 145 (Fla. 1st DCA 2021). It did so notwithstanding a contrary decision of the Fourth District Court of Appeal that had found in another law, s......