Leydon v. Greenwich

• Decision Date: 16 May 2000
• Docket Number: (AC 18628)
• Citation: 750 A.2d 1122,57 Conn. App. 712
• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals
• Parties: BRENDEN P. LEYDON v. TOWN OF GREENWICH ET AL.

57 Conn. App. 712

750 A.2d 1122

BRENDEN P. LEYDON v. TOWN OF GREENWICH ET AL.

(AC 18628)

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued November 29, 1999.

Officially released May 16, 2000.

O'Connell, C. J., and Lavery and Mihalakos, Js.¹ Brenden P. Leydon, pro se, the appellant (plaintiff).

Ralph G. Elliot, for the appellees (named defendant et al.).

Mark R. Kravitz, with whom was Suzanne E. Wachsstock, for the appellee (defendant The Lucas Point Association, Inc.).

Philip D. Tegeler, Jody L. Yetzer and Martin B. Margulies filed a brief for the Connecticut Civil Liberties Union as amicus curiae.

Opinion

O'CONNELL, C. J.

The plaintiff, Brenden P. Leydon, appeals from the judgment of the trial court denying his request for declaratory and injunctive relief from an ordinance of the named defendant, the town of Greenwich (town),² which he contends discriminates against noninhabitants of the town as to access to its public parks and public beaches. The plaintiff claims that the court improperly determined that the ordinance does not violate public policy or the public trust doctrine.³ We reverse the judgment of the trial court.

The following facts and procedural history are relevant to our resolution of this appeal. The town owns and operates a 147 acre park known as Greenwich Point Park (park), which includes a beach area (beach) on Long Island Sound.⁴ The town's authority to maintain the park is derived from 18 Spec. Acts 103, No. 124 (1919), as amended by 27 Spec. Acts 60, No. 71, § 9 (1955) (we will refer to the 1919 special act, as amended by the 1955 special act, as the act).⁵ The only road access to the park is over land owned by the defendant The Lucas Point Association, Inc. (association), which in 1945 granted an easement to the town that allowed public access to the park.

The plaintiff, who is not a resident of the town, sought access to the park, but he was denied entry because he could not satisfy a town ordinance that allows only residents or their duly authorized guests to enter the park. The ordinance, contained in the Greenwich municipal code, creates residency restrictions for all of the town's public parks and public beaches.⁶

Thereafter, the plaintiff filed this action requesting injunctive and declaratory relief. His amended complaint alleged that the town "holds the [p]ark in trust for the use of the general public.... [and the ordinance is] void as violative of the public trust" and "void as violative of the public policy of ... Connecticut as set forth in its ... common law, which guarantees access to municipally held parks and beaches for all citizens."

After an evidentiary hearing, the court ruled that "[t]he plaintiff ... has not provided the court with any authority which even remotely suggests that Connecticut applies the New Jersey public trust doctrine⁷ to its common law.... [T]he court [therefore] rejects, as applicable to the present case, the plaintiffs public trust arguments....

"The public policy that was violated by the town, according to the plaintiff, is a well known public policy in ... Connecticut ... that all public parks are open to the public at large. The plaintiff, however, [has] not provide[d] the court with any binding authority which suggests that such a public policy exists as applied to the present case....

"[T]he court finds that the plaintiff has not met his burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the Greenwich ordinance [is] invalid." (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.)

I

The plaintiff claims that the court improperly declined to apply the public trust doctrine to the facts of this case and improperly determined that there was insufficient evidence to establish that the ordinance violates the public trust doctrine or the public policy of this state. The town counters that the ordinance violates neither public policy nor the public trust doctrine, and that the public trust doctrine is inapplicable here because it does not exist in Connecticut.⁸ The town further asserts, alternatively, that the legislature abolished the doctrine, as to the town, through the act. We agree with the plaintiff and reverse the judgment of the trial court.

Our analysis begins with a discussion of our standard of review. Whether the public trust doctrine should have been applied to the facts of this case is an issue of law subject to de novo review. As to the claim of sufficiency of evidence, we review the proceedings of the trial court and "reverse or modify the decision of the trial court . . . if we determine that . . . its decision is ... erroneous in law." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Ormsby v. Frankel, 54 Conn. App. 98, 109-10, 734 A.2d 575, cert. granted on other grounds, 250 Conn. 926, 738 A.2d 658 (1999). To resolve the plaintiffs claim, we address three questions of law. We must determine whether (1) the public trust doctrine exists in this state to the extent propounded by the plaintiff, (2) the court improperly declined to apply the doctrine to the facts of this case and (3) the court improperly concluded that the plaintiff failed to produce evidence sufficient to establish that the ordinance violates public policy or the public trust doctrine.

A

The plaintiff claims that because he is a resident of this state he is entitled to access to the park, including the beach area, regardless of the fact that he is not a resident of the town. We agree.

For almost two centuries, our Supreme Court has discussed the concept that land held by a municipality as a public park or public beach is held for the use of the general public and not solely for use by the residents of the municipality. See Hayden v. Noyes, 5 Conn. 391, 397 (1824) (invalidating town bylaw restricting use of common fishery to town inhabitants); Merwin v. Wheeler, 41 Conn. 14, 24 (1874) (public beach open to common use of public); Hartford v. Maslen, 76 Conn. 599, 611, 57 A. 740 (1904) (authority of municipality to control public parks derived from legislature and municipality holds public parks for use by general public); Dawson v. Orange, 78 Conn. 96, 119, 61 A. 101 (1905) (public beach held for use by general public); Orange v. Resnick, 94 Conn. 573, 581, 109 A. 864 (1920) (general public has right to access waterfront by crossing public park); Conners v. New Haven, 101 Conn. 191, 194, 125 A. 375 (1924) (land held by municipality as public park inures to benefit of general public); Epstein v. New Haven, 104 Conn. 283, 284, 132 A. 467 (1926) (control of public parks belongs to state and municipalities managing them act as agencies exercising authority delegated by state); Winchester v. Cox, 129 Conn. 106, 111, 26 A.2d 592 (1942) (land given to municipality for use as park held in trust by municipality as trustee for public); Fenwick v. Old Saybrook, 133 Conn. 22, 29-30, 47 A.2d 849 (1946) (park held for use by general public); Hiland v. Ives, 154 Conn. 683, 690, 228 A.2d 502 (1967) (legislative authority necessary for municipality to own, maintain park for benefit of public as whole, and municipality may not devote park to inconsistent use); Torrington v. Coles, 155 Conn. 199, 201, 230 A.2d 550 (1967) (municipality holds land used for public park not for sole use of inhabitants of municipality but for use of general public); Stradmore Development Corp. v. Commissioners, 164 Conn. 548, 551, 324 A.2d 919 (1973) (lands held by municipality as park are for benefit of people of Connecticut at large); Luce v. West Haven, 238 Conn. 687, 691, 680 A.2d 259 (1996) (Berdon, J., concurring) (municipal property within public domain). These cases clearly reflect that land held by a municipality as a public park or public beach is for the benefit of all residents of this state. We refer to this right as the public trust doctrine,⁹ and hold that it does not allow a municipality to discriminate between its residents and nonresidents with regard to access to a public park or public beach.¹⁰

B

Having determined the scope of the public trust doctrine as it exists in Connecticut, we must next decide whether the court improperly declined to apply the doctrine to the facts of this case. The plaintiff argues that it was improper for the court to decline to apply the doctrine here, whereas the defendants assert that the doctrine is inapplicable in this case because the legislature abolished the doctrine, as to the town, through the act. We agree with the plaintiff.

Although the town contends that the act is beyond our scope of review because the plaintiff has not challenged its validity, we are compelled nevertheless to review the scope of the act because the town has made it an issue.¹¹ Because the plaintiff has not challenged the validity of the act, we will assume, without deciding, that the act is constitutionally valid. United Illuminating Co. v. New Haven, 179 Conn. 627, 641, 427 A.2d 830 ("a presumption of constitutionality ... attaches to a statutory enactment"), appeal dismissed, 449 U.S. 801, 101 S. Ct. 45, 66 L. Ed. 2d 5 (1980). Thus, we need determine only whether the town's reading of the act— i.e., that the legislature abrogated the common lawpublic trust doctrine through its passage—is correct.¹² We begin our analysis of the act by noting that statutory construction is a question of law, and our review, therefore, is plenary. Davis v. Norwich, 232 Conn. 311, 317, 654 A.2d 1221 (1995). Although the legislature may eliminate a common-law right by statute, the courts will not lightly impute such an intent to the legislature. Munroe v. Great American Ins. Co., 234 Conn. 182, 187, 661 A.2d 581 (1995). We do not read statutes to depart from the common law without a clear indication of legislative intent to do so. Elliot v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 229 Conn. 500, 515, 642 A.2d 709 (1994). A statute should not be construed as altering the common law unless the intent to do so is fairly expressed in the statute. Gore v. People's Savings Bank, 235 Conn. 360, 382, 665 A.2d 1341 (199...