LG Chem, Ltd. v. Goulding
| Citation | 167 Ohio St.3d 488,194 N.E.3d 355 |
| Decision Date | 22 June 2022 |
| Docket Number | 2021-0804 |
| Parties | LG CHEM, LTD. v. GOULDING, Judge. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Ohio |
Lewis, Brisbois, Bisgaard & Smith, L.L.P., and Daniel A. Leister, Cleveland, for relator.
Julia R. Bates, Lucas County Prosecuting Attorney, and Evy M. Jarrett and Kevin A. Pituch, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for respondent.
{¶ 1} Relator, LG Chem, Ltd., is a defendant in a products-liability action pending before respondent, Judge Michael R. Goulding, in the Lucas County Court of Common Pleas. Claiming a lack of personal jurisdiction in the trial court, LG Chem asks this court to issue a writ of prohibition to prevent Judge Goulding from exercising jurisdiction over the products-liability action. Because LG Chem has not demonstrated a patent and unambiguous lack of personal jurisdiction in the trial court, we deny the writ.
{¶ 2} Jeremy M. Darrow and Dale J. Mocek (collectively, "the Darrow plaintiffs") are the plaintiffs in Darrow v. LG Chem, Ltd. , Lucas C.P. No. G-4801-CI-202003553-000, which is pending before Judge Goulding. Each plaintiff has alleged that he was seriously injured in March 2016 when an "LG Lithium ion 18650 battery" exploded while he was carrying the battery in his pants pocket. Darrow allegedly purchased two LG 18650 lithium-ion batteries from Vape Super Center in Toledo in August 2015. Mocek's wife allegedly purchased two LG 18650 lithium-ion batteries for him at Vapors Electronic Smoke Shop in Toledo in November or December 2015. Each plaintiff used the batteries in electronic-cigarette devices.
{¶ 3} LG Chem is a Korean company with its headquarters and principal place of business located in Seoul, South Korea. The Darrow plaintiffs alleged "upon * * * information and belief" that "all defendants were present or transacted, solicited, and engaged in business in Lucas County, Ohio through their employees, agents, or sales representatives, and derived substantial revenue from such business conducted in Lucas County, Ohio." The Darrow plaintiffs also alleged that LG Chem had "designed, manufactured, assembled, distributed, placed into the stream of commerce, and sold" the batteries that injured them. The products-liability complaint does not allege that LG Chem had sold the batteries to Vape Super Center or Vapors Electronic Smoke Shop, nor does it contain specific allegations regarding LG Chem's activities in Ohio relating to the marketing, sale, or distribution of the batteries for consumer use.
{¶ 4} LG Chem avers that it manufactured LG 18650 lithium-ion batteries "for use by sophisticated companies in specific applications, such as power tools, where the cells are encased in a battery pack with protective circuitry." It states that it never designed, manufactured, distributed, advertised, or sold the batteries for sale or use as standalone, replaceable batteries. It acknowledges that it shipped 1,160 "sample 18650 cells" to Ohio to fulfill the orders of an original-equipment manufacturer during the three-year period preceding the Darrow plaintiffs’ injuries allegedly caused by the cells. But LG Chem contends that it "did not market or advertise" the batteries in Ohio, "did not have any licensed dealers or retailers" of the batteries in Ohio, and "did not authorize or advertise consumer repair or replacement services" for the batteries in Ohio. LG Chem also says that it has never conducted business with either Vape Super Center or Vapors Electronic Smoke Shop and that it has never authorized anyone or any entity to advertise, sell, or distribute the LG lithium-ion batteries for individual-consumer use as standalone, replaceable batteries in electronic-cigarette devices or for any other purpose.
{¶ 5} LG Chem filed a motion to dismiss the products-liability action for lack of personal jurisdiction under Civ.R. 12(B)(2), which the Darrow plaintiffs opposed. Judge Goulding denied LG Chem's motion without a hearing.
{¶ 6} LG Chem filed this prohibition action on June 24, 2021, seeking a writ of prohibition to prevent Judge Goulding from exercising jurisdiction over the products-liability action and directing him to dismiss the action for lack of personal jurisdiction. Judge Goulding filed a motion to dismiss, which LG Chem opposed. We denied Judge Goulding's motion to dismiss, granted an alternative writ, and set a schedule for the submission of evidence and briefing on the merits. 165 Ohio St.3d 1402, 2021-Ohio-3631, 175 N.E.3d 551. The case is now ripe for decision.
{¶ 7} A writ of prohibition "is granted in limited circumstances with great caution and restraint." State ex rel. Corn v. Russo , 90 Ohio St.3d 551, 554, 740 N.E.2d 265 (2001). To obtain the writ, LG Chem must show (1) that Judge Goulding is about to or has exercised judicial power, (2) that Judge Goulding's exercise of that power is not authorized by law, and (3) the lack of an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law. See State ex rel. Elder v. Camplese , 144 Ohio St.3d 89, 2015-Ohio-3628, 40 N.E.3d 1138, ¶ 13. LG Chem must show its entitlement to the writ by clear and convincing evidence. See State ex rel. Evans v. McGrath , 153 Ohio St.3d 287, 2018-Ohio-3018, 104 N.E.3d 779, ¶ 4.
{¶ 8} The first requirement for obtaining the writ is not in dispute; Judge Goulding has exercised and is exercising judicial power in the Darrow plaintiffs’ products-liability action. As to the third requirement, absent the trial court's patent and unambiguous lack of personal jurisdiction over LG Chem, a postjudgment appeal of Judge Goulding's decision on the personal-jurisdiction question is an adequate legal remedy. See State ex rel. Toma v. Corrigan , 92 Ohio St.3d 589, 591-592, 752 N.E.2d 281 (2001). LG Chem argues that the availability of a remedy by way of appeal is immaterial here because, in its view, personal jurisdiction is patently and unambiguously lacking in the trial court. See State ex rel. Sapp v. Franklin Cty. Court of Appeals , 118 Ohio St.3d 368, 2008-Ohio-2637, 889 N.E.2d 500, ¶ 15.
{¶ 9} This court's "issuance of a writ of prohibition based on the alleged lack of personal jurisdiction is, even more than a claimed lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, an ‘extremely rare occurrence.’ " State ex rel. Suburban Constr. Co. v. Skok , 85 Ohio St.3d 645, 647, 710 N.E.2d 710 (1999), quoting Clark v. Connor , 82 Ohio St.3d 309, 315, 695 N.E.2d 751 (1998). In the "extremely rare cases" in which this court has issued the writ, "the lack of jurisdiction was ‘premised on a complete failure to comply with constitutional due process.’ " Id. , quoting Fraiberg v. Cuyahoga Cty. Court of Common Pleas , 76 Ohio St.3d 374, 378, 667 N.E.2d 1189 (1996).
{¶ 10} An Ohio trial court has personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant when (1) the long-arm statute, R.C. 2307.382, and the Rules of Civil Procedure confer jurisdiction and (2) the exercise of jurisdiction comports with due process under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Kauffman Racing Equip., L.L.C. v. Roberts , 126 Ohio St.3d 81, 2010-Ohio-2551, 930 N.E.2d 784, ¶ 28. LG Chem's argument focuses on the constitutional due-process requirement.
{¶ 11} The Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause "limits the power of a state court to render a valid personal judgment against a nonresident defendant." World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson , 444 U.S. 286, 291, 100 S.Ct. 559, 62 L.Ed.2d 490 (1980). For a court's exercise of jurisdiction to comport with due process, the defendant must have "minimum contacts" with the forum state such that "the maintenance of the suit" is reasonable and "does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’ " Internatl. Shoe Co. v. Washington , 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945), quoting Milliken v. Meyer , 311 U.S. 457, 463, 61 S.Ct. 339, 85 L.Ed. 278 (1940).
{¶ 12} The United States Supreme Court has recognized two types of personal jurisdiction: "general" and "specific." Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of California, San Francisco Cty. , ––– U.S. ––––, ––––, 137 S.Ct. 1773, 1779-1780, 198 L.Ed.2d 395 (2017). The "paradigm forum" for the exercise of general jurisdiction over a corporation is a state "in which the corporation is fairly regarded as at home." Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown , 564 U.S. 915, 924, 131 S.Ct. 2846, 180 L.Ed.2d 796 (2011). The Darrow plaintiffs conceded in the trial court that LG Chem is not subject to general jurisdiction in Ohio. Thus, the issue before us is whether the trial court has specific jurisdiction over LG Chem.
{¶ 13} Specific jurisdiction exists when the matter before the court arises out of or relates to the defendant's contacts with the forum state. Bristol-Myers Squibb at ––––, 137 S.Ct. at 1780. For a court to lawfully exercise specific jurisdiction over a defendant, the defendant must have taken "some act[ion] by which the defendant purposefully avail[ed] itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state." Hanson v. Denckla , 357 U.S. 235, 253, 78 S.Ct. 1228, 2 L.Ed.2d 1283 (1958). Purposeful availment occurs when "the defendant deliberately ‘reache[s] out beyond’ its home—by, for example, ‘exploit[ing] a market’ in the forum state or entering a contractual relationship centered there." (Second brackets added in Ford Motor Co. ) Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial Dist. Court , ––– U.S. ––––, ––––, 141 S.Ct. 1017, 1025, 209 L.Ed.2d 225 (2021), quoting Walden v. Fiore , 571 U.S. 277, 285, 134 S.Ct. 1115, 188 L.Ed.2d 12 (2014). Even when purposeful availment has occurred, personal jurisdiction extends only to certain cases: the plaintiff's claims must " ‘aris[e] out of or relat[e] to the defendant's contacts’ " with the forum state. Daimler AG v. Bauman , 571 U.S. 117, 127, 134 S.Ct. 746, 187 L.Ed.2d 624 (2014), quoting Helicopteros Nacionales de...
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