Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Thunderbird Bank

• Decision Date: 07 September 1976
• Docket Number: No. 12432--PR,12432--PR
• Citation: 555 P.2d 333,113 Ariz. 375
• Parties: LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, a corporation, Appellant, v. THUNDERBIRD BANK, Appellee.
• Court: Arizona Supreme Court

Page 333

555 P.2d 333

113 Ariz. 375

LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, a corporation, Appellant, v. THUNDERBIRD BANK, Appellee.

No. 12432--PR.

Supreme Court of Arizona, In Banc.

Sept. 7, 1976.

Gust, Rosenfeld, Divelbess & Henderson by Harold H. Swenson, Phoenix, for appellant.

Jennings, Strouss & Salmon by Thomas J. Trimble and I. Douglas Dunipace, Phoenix, for appellee.

CAMERON, Chief Justice.

This is a petition for review by plaintiff Liberty Mutual Insurance Company ('Liberty') of an opinion of the Court of Appeals, Division One, 25 Ariz.App. 201, 542 P.2d 39, affirming an order of the trial court denying Liberty's motion for summary judgment and granting the motion of the defendant Thunderbird Bank ('Thunderbird') for summary judgment.

The following questions are presented on appeal:

1. May Liberty, as the assignee of the Charles Bruning Company, maintain an action against Thunderbird, and is the 'compensated surety defense' available to Thunderbird?

2. Assuming that it is otherwise entitled to relief, is Liberty boudn by the election of remedies taken by its insured and thus precluded from recovery against Thunderbird?

The facts necessary for a determination of this matter are as follows. From 1 June 1964 through 24 March 1967, defendant James L. Coffelt was Branch Manager of the Phoenix office of the Charles Bruning Company ('Bruning'). Over an eleven month period between April 1966 and March 1967, Coffelt intercepted some 200 checks drawn by customers of and made payable to Bruning. Each of the intercepted checks, endorsed 'Charles Bruning Company by J. L. Coffelt,' was cashed by Coffelt at Gene's Modern Market in Glendale, Arizona. At the time of the transactions, the owner and operator of Gene's Modern Market was defendant Arnold Ong. The checks, bearing the further stamped endorsement 'Deposit to the account of Gene's Modern Market,' were deposited by Ong to the account of Gene's Modern Market at the Thunderbird Bank. The checks were credited to that account and were submitted by Thunderbird for collection through normal banking channels. All of the checks were paid in due course.

Coffelt, who appropriated the proceeds of the checks to his own use, in fact had no authority to endorse checks on behalf of Bruning. Thunderbird, during the time it paid the checks, made no effort to determine through Bruning whether Coffelt had such authority.

At the time the checks were negotiated, there was in effect between Bruning and Liberty a surety contract under the terms of which Liberty insured Bruning against any pecuniary loss due to the fraud, dishonesty, forgery, theft or embezzlement of Bruning's employees. Upon discovering the loss in this case, Bruning recovered from Liberty the sum of $175,197.13, and assigned to Liberty all of its rights against the various defendants, including Thunderbird. The contract also provided that Liberty became subrogated to the rights of Bruning upon payment of its claim.

Liberty thereupon filed a complaint for the amount paid under the contract naming as defendants Coffelt, Ong and Thunderbird, and, except as to Coffelt, relied solely upon the assignment from Bruning as the basis of its right to recovery. Additional pleadings, in the form of cross-claims by Thunderbird against Ong and by Ong against Coffelt, and third party complaints by Thunderbird and Ong against Bruning were subsequently filed.

On 22 March 1973, Liberty filed a motion for summary judgment against Thunderbird only. Thunderbird filed a response as well as a motion for summary judgment in its favor. The trial court, after a hearing, granted Thunderbird's motion and entered judgment in favor of Thunderbird and against Liberty. Liberty moved for rehearing which motion was denied and Liberty then appealed.

LIBERTY'S RIGHTS AS ASSIGNEE

The transactions out of which Bruning's (and Liberty's) claims arose occurred prior to the adoption in Arizona of the Uniform Commercial Code. Consequently, A.R.S. § 44--423 (1956), § 23 of the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Act, is applicable and there is no question under the law as it then existed that Thunderbird was liable to Bruning. The liability of the collecting bank in such a situation was almost universally recognized prior to the adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code, cf. Merchants & Manufacturers Association v. First National Bank of Mesa, 40 Ariz. 531, 14 P.2d 717 (1932).

Liberty sued Thunderbird based solely on the assignment of Bruning's claim after Liberty had paid to Bruning the amount of the loss. Thunderbird argues that Liaberty has no rights over and above those which it has under the doctrine of subrogation. This is important to Thunderbird because if the matter is to be considered under the equitable doctrine of subrogation, there are certain equitable defenses such as the 'compensated surety defense' which would not be available to Thunderbird if the suit is one in law on the contract which has been assigned to Liberty by Bruning.

Under appropriate circumstances, the right of a party to be subrogated to the claim of another will arise independent of any contract. D. W. Jaquays & Co. v. First Security Bank, 101 Ariz. 301, 419 P.2d 85 (1966). We have said:

'* * * Subrogation is the substitution of another person in the place of a creditor, so that the person in whose favor it is exercised succeeds to the rights of the creditor in relation to the debt. It is a creature of equity, and was adopted from the Roman and not from the common law. Its purpose is the prevention of injustice and is the mode which equity adopts to compel the ultimate payment of a debt by one who in justice, equity, and good conscience ought to pay it. It rests upon the principle that substantial justice should be attained, regardless of form. * * * The general rule of equity which is probably most often invoked in cases of subrogation is that he who seeks equity must do equity, and subrogation can only be granted when an equitable result will be reached. * * *' Mosher v. Conway, 45 Ariz. 463, 468, 46 P.2d 110, 112 (1935).

A number of courts have gone further than our court and have held that a party seeking to assert a claim an an assignee must demonstrate that it would have been entitled to recover in the absence of an assignment as a subrogee. In the case most heavily relied upon by Thunderbird, the California Supreme Court stated the rule as follows:

'* * * (A)t the outset, it should be noted that assignment of an assignable cause of action is but one of the recognized forms of subrogation, and that when entitled to substitution in the place of one entitled to institute and to maintain an action, neither a written nor an oral contract is necessary to effect a transfer of such right; consequently, with reference thereto repeatedly it has been ruled not only that a formal, written assignment of a claim of the nature of that here involved adds nothing to the enforceability by the assignee of the cause of action, but also that it is subject to the same defenses as though no assignment thereof of any sort had been made. * * *

'* * * (O)ne who asserts a right of subrogation, whether by virtue of an assignment or otherwise, must first show a Right in equity to be entitled to such subrogation, or substitution, and that where such right is clearly shown by the application of equitable principles, an assignment adds nothing to his right thereto. Otherwise stated, where by the application of equitable principles, a surety has been found not to be entitled to subrogation an assignment will not confer upon him the right to be so substituted in an action at law upon the assignment. His rights must be measured by the application of equitable principles in the first instance, his recovery being dependable upon a right in equity, and not by virtue of an asserted legal right under an assignment. * * *' Meyers v. Bank of America Nat. Trust & Savings Ass'n, 11 Cal.2d 92, 94--97, 77 P.2d 1084, 1085--1086 (1938).

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