Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Acting Com'r of Ins.
| Decision Date | 03 November 1928 |
| Parties | LIBERTY MUT. INS. CO. v. ACTING COM'R OF INSURANCE et al., and six other cases. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Case Reserved from Supreme Judicial Court, Suffolk County.
Suits by the Liberty Mutual Insurance Company and the American Employers' Insurance Company against the Acting Commissioner of Insurance and others, petitions for review by the Massachusetts Bonding & Insurance Company and others, and the American Mutual Liability Insurance Company and others, opposed by the Acting Commissioner of Insurance, and petitions for mandamus by the Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, the American Employers' Insurance Company, and the Hartford Accident & Indemnity Company, opposed by the Acting Commissioner of Insurance and others. On demurrer, and reservation to the full court. Petition of the Hartford Accident & Indemnity Company for mandamus denied, and petitions for review denied, remaining petitions for mandamus granted, and suits in equity continued.
R. Clapp, Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondents.
F. H. Chase and R. P. Baldwin, both of Boston, for American Employers' Ins. Co. and others.
J. L. Hall and M. Jenckes, both of Boston, for Liberty Mut. Ins. Co.
These cases, consisting of suits in equity, petitions for review and petitions for mandamus, are brought to determine the present situation of the classifications of risks and schedule of premium charges to be in force for the year 1929 under the compulsory automobile liability insurance law. The respondents contend that, as the commissioner of insurance did not by a written order, filed in his office on or before September 1, 1928, modify, alter or revise the rates made on September 1, 1927, primarily applicable to the year 1928, these existing rates continue to be in force for the year 1929. The contention of the petitioners is that no classification of risks or schedule of premium charges is now established for the year 1929.
The respondents demurred to the bills in equity and petitions. In the consideration of the questions involved we must assume that the allegations in all of the petitions and bills in equity are true, Granara v. Italian Catholic Cemetery Association, 218 Mass. 387, 392, 105 N. E. 1073;Perry v. Hull, 180 Mass. 547, 62 N. E. 962; that in the mandamus petitions the ground on which the respondents rely is stated in the demurrers, Finaly v. Boston, 196 Mass. 267, 82 N. E. 5. In our opinion the rights of the parties can be fully determined under the petitions for mandamus brought by the Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, American Employers' Insurance Company and the Hartford Accident & Indemnity Company against Arthur E. Linnell, rely is stated in the demurrers, Finlay v. Boston, commonwealth. We therefore consider these petitions for mandamus.
In the petition of the Liberty Mutual Insurance Company it is set out that it was the duty of the respondent to fix and establish on or before September 1, 1928, classifications of risks and premium charges; that he has neglected this duty; that he be ordered forthwith to establish these classifications of risks and premium charges to be used in the year 1929 and to file in his office a memorandum fixing such classifications and charges. The petition by the American Employers' Insurance Company is to the same effect. The petition of the Hartford Accident & Indemnity Company alleges that the then commissioner of insurance, before September 1, 1928, fixed and established classifications of risks and a schedule of premium charges to be used for the year 1929, and prepared a written memorandum of an order to that effect, but before September 1, 1928, without having filed said written memorandum, he resigned his office by a writing addressed to the Governor of the commonwealth in which the commissioner said:
This petition further states that the classifications and charges fixed by the commissioner were full and complete; that the only act remaining to be done on September 1, 1928, in order to establish the classifications and charges for the year 1929, was the ministerial act of signing and filing a memorandum of the order; that the acting commissioner has refused to file or sign such memorandum and his failure to do so is based solely on his misconception of his official duty and not upon any difference of opinion between him and the former commissioner as to the fairness of the classifications and charges in said memorandum of order. The prayer of this petition is that the acting commissioner be ordered to sign and file in his office a memorandum establishing the classifications and charges as fixed by the former commissioner.
So far as material to this discussion, St. 1925, c. 345, § 2, required the insurance commissioner to examine the classifications and premium charges submitted by the insurance companies, and to determine whether the classifications were fair and reasonable and the premium charges adequate, just, reasonable and nondiscriminatory, and after a hearing to establish such classifications and charges ‘in connection with the registration of motor vehicles * * * for the first year to which section one A of said chapter ninety shall apply.’ This was to be done on or before September 1, 1926. Duly certified copies of the classifications and charges were to be furnished the insurance companies, ‘and one copy of each shall be filed by said commissioner in his office as a public record.’ Under this section the effective date was September 1, 1926, and was to apply to the first year; that is, the year 1927. By St. 1925, c. 346, § 4 (), the commissioner was given authority to ‘modify, alter or revise’ the classifications or any part thereof or to ‘increase or decrease any such premium charge, whenever he deems it proper, expedient or necessary.’ But such order shall apply only to classifications or charges ‘in respect to such policies' to be issued ‘in connection with the registration of motor vehicles' for the subsequent year and ‘shall be filed in the office of the commissioner on or before September first year of the year...
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