Sears v. Secretary of the Com.

• Decision Date: 31 December 1975
• Citation: 341 N.E.2d 264,369 Mass. 392
• Parties: John W. SEARS et al. v. SECRETARY OF THE COMMONWEALTH (and a companion case 1 ).
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Page 264

341 N.E.2d 264

369 Mass. 392

John W. SEARS et al.

v. SECRETARY OF THE COMMONWEALTH (and a companion case

¹

).

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

Argued Dec. 4, 1975.

Decided Dec. 31, 1975.

Robert G. Stewart, Boston (John W. Sears, Boston, with him), for plaintiffs.

Thomas R. Kiley, Asst. Atty. Gen., for Secretary of the Com.

Before REARDON, QUIRICO, BRAUCHER, HENNESSEY, KAPLAN and WILKINS, JJ.

WILKINS, Justice.

The plaintiffs in each of these cases ² raise substantially the same issues challenging various aspects of St.1975, c. 600, which made changes in the procedures by which presidential primaries are to be conducted in the Commonwealth.

The plaintiffs contest the constitutionality of § 13 of c. 600 which amends G.L. c. 53, § 70B, to change the method by which delegates to national conventions of political parties are chosen. Under § 70B, as amended, delegates to national conventions of political parties at which presidential candidates are to be nominated are to be selected pursuant to a system adopted by the party's State committee, but the system may not 'include the placing of the names of delegates on the presidential primary ballot.' G.L. c. 53, § 70B, as appearing in St.1975, c. 600, § 13. Thus the previous system by which national convention delegates were elected at presidential primaries has been abandoned. Other changes effected by c. 600 concerning the method of selection and the voting of national convention delegates are challenged by the plaintiffs on constitutional grounds.

In addition, the plaintiffs argue specifically that the procedures set forth in c. 600 for the selection of State, ward, and town committee members do not apply to the 1976 presidential primary. They contend generally that c. 600, which was enacted on September 11, 1975, and purportedly made effective by an emergency declaration issued by the Governor on October 27, 1975, should be construed to be applicable first with respect to the 1980 presidential primary. The plaintiffs in the Sears case also argue that the application of c. 600 to the 1976 presidential primary denies them constitutional rights.

Each of these actions for declaratory relief was reserved and reported to the Appeals Court without decision and transferred here on joint applications for direct appellate review. The plaintiffs in each case are persons asserting an interest in the application and operation of certain portions of c. 600. ³ The Secretary of the Commonwealth is a defendant in each case. In the Levin case, other defendants were named. ⁴ Although the Levin complaint raised objections to the system for selection of national convention delegates adopted (but not yet filed) by the Democratic State Committee, no argument has been advanced to us concerning these objections.

We will consider first the plaintiff's various constitutional challenges to the new statutory provisions concerning the selection of delegates to national political conventions, and then we will consider specific challenges to the application of the changes made by c. 600 to the 1976 presidential primary.

Challenges to the Delegate Selection System.

The plaintiffs attack the constitutionality of those provisions of c. 600 which deal with the method by which delegates to national party conventions are to be selected. After analyzing the limits placed on a State's regulation of the selection of such delegates by Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477, 95 S.Ct. 541, 42 L.E.2d 595 (1975), we will discuss the extent of any Federal or State constitutional requirements concerning delegate selection systems and then will consider the plaintiffs' specific constitutional challenges to c. 600. Our conclusion is that on all issues which present an 'actual controversy' (see G.L. c. 231A, § 1) c. 600 meets constitutional requirements and that it would be premature to deal with hypothetical questions concerning the legality of delegate selection systems. No such system has yet been filed. ⁵

a. The qualifications of delegates to a national party convention are left largely to the national party's convention rules, and, under the Federal Constitution, States may not impose contrary requirements in the absence of a substantial State interest. Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477, 95 S.Ct. 541, 42 L.Ed.2d 595 (1975). The Cousins case, which concerned a dispute over the seating of delegates from Illinois to the 1976 Democratic national convention, held that State law does not have primacy over a national political party's rules in the determination of the qualifications and eligibility of delegates to a party's national convention. Id. at 483, 95 S.Ct. 541. National political parties have 'a constitutionally protected right of political association,' and a State's interference with that right of association may be justified only if the State's interest is compelling. Id. at 487--489, 95 S.Ct. at 547. 'The States themselves have no constitutionally mandated role in the great task of the selection of Presidential and Vice-Presidential candidates.' Id. at 489--190, 95 S.Ct. at 549. The court in the Cousins case said that the asserted State interest in protecting the integrity of its electoral process was not compelling in the context of the selection of delegates to the national party convention and concluded that the party guidelines for the selection of delegates prevailed over any inconsistent practices pursuant to State law. Id. at 491, 95 S.Ct. 541.

While the Cousins case makes clear the limited authority of the States in mandating delegate selection procedures and practices, we are not presented with a clash between statutory delegate selection requirements and national party rules. In the cases now before this court, we are not confronted with a conflict between State law and the rules of either national party. Neither national party mandates the election of national convention delegates at a party primary. Each authorizes the selection of such delegates according to a system adopted by a State committee. The Cousins opinion aids in describing the consitutional context in which the issues argued to us arise, but it does not provide a direct answer to any of them.

b. Neither the Constitution of the United States nor the Consituation of the Commonwealth requires the direct election of delegates to a national party convention. Each group of plaintiffs contends that the elimination of direct election of delegates denies them (a) effective participation in the nomination process and (b) their constitutional right to equal protection of the laws.

Granting that political party nominating processes are an important part of the procedure by which the ultimate office holder is chosen (see Newberry v. United States, 256 U.S. 232, 286, 41 S.Ct. 469, 65 L.Ed. 913 (1921) (Pitney, J., concurring in part)), we are not aware of any authority in support of the proposition that each voter has a constitutional right to vote for national convention delegates. See Cousins v. Wigoda, supra, 483 n. 4, 95 S.Ct. 541. ⁶ Of course, neither the Federal nor the State Constitution alludes to presidential nominating processes or to the right of a voter to express his views on possible candidates or delegates to a party convention. Many States do not select their delegates to national party conventions by direct election. ⁷ The holding in the Cousins case had the effect of permitting a group of delegates who were not elected by direct vote to take the place of a group which was elected, but the Cousins case did not deal directly with the question of a citizen's right to vote for delegates to a national party convention. In this Commonwealth, we have selected national convention delegates since 1912 by direct vote in primaries, but we have not always done so. ⁸

Although arguments against a change from direct election of delegates may be advanced forcefully, as the plaintiffs have done, these arguments bear on the merits of the legislative judgment in adopting c. 600 and no not rise to an effective constitutional challenge. Provisions of the Constitution of the Commonwealth protecting a citizen's precious personal right to vote for his elected representatives (Attorney Gen. v. Suffolk County Apportionment Comm'rs, 224 Mass. 598, 604, 113 N.E. 581 (1916)) have not been applied to require the selection at primaries of candidates for election to public office or the election of delegates to national party conventions. See Opinion of Justices, 359 Mass. 775, 777, 268 N.E.2d 159 (1971). A member of a committee of a political party is not a public officer (see Opinion of Justices, 347 Mass. 797, 799--800, 197 N.E.2d 691 (1964); Attorney Gen. v. Drohan, 169 Mass. 534, 536, 48 N.E. 279 (1897)), nor is a delegate to a national political party convention.

The plaintiffs' equal protection of the laws argument is that c. 600 discriminates against independents, 'disfavored' voters, and 'splinter groups.' They argue that the selection of delegates pursuant to plans adopted by the central party organizations will favor party regulars and will dilute the influence of persons such as the plaintiffs. Of course until those plans are adopted and filed, one cannot be certain that the plaintiffs' fears will be fulfilled. In any event, the concept of equal protection of the laws does not compel the selection of convention delegates so that every point of view is represented. Our republican form of government may involve the selection of representatives by a majority, or sometimes a plurality, of the votes cast and can often result in the underrepresentation of various ideologies. The statutory pattern does not deny the plaintiffs the opportunity to influence (a) the selection of State committee members, (b) the formulation of the system for delegate selection, or (c) the selection of persons as delegates pursuant to that system. We see no invidious discrimination against the plaintiffs. Cf. American Party...