Liberty v. J. A. Tobin Const. Co., Inc.
Decision Date | 05 August 1974 |
Docket Number | No. KCD,KCD |
Citation | 512 S.W.2d 886 |
Parties | Vern D. LIBERTY et al., Appellants, v. J. A. TOBIN CONSTRUCTION CO., INC., Respondent. 26483. |
Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
Sloan R. Wilson, Hill, McMullin & Wilson, Kansas City, for appellants.
Cecil L. Caulkins, Reggie C. Giffin, Rogers, Field, Gentry, Benjamin & Robertson, Kansas City, for respondent.
Before PRITCHARD, P.J., and WASSERSTROM and SOMERVILLE, JJ.
This is an appeal from a summary judgment entered in the court below, pursuant to Rule 74.04, V.A.M.R., upon defendant's motion in an action for damages for personal injuries. The motion was submitted to the court below upon the pleadings, requests for admissions, responses thereto, other documentary evidence, and the legal suggestions of the parties. The facts are not in dispute and although the court below made no specific findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is clear from the record that the summary judgment was entered because, as a matter of law, plaintiffs' claims were barred because of previously executed releases. We affirm.
Certain background facts in this case must be briefly outlined.
On April 28, 1969, the defendant was engaged in a highway construction project in connection with Interstate Highway No. 29 in Platte County, Missouri. In connection with this project the defendant had established a detour for north and southbound traffic in the vicinity of 5800 N. 71 Highway in order to route such traffic around certain of its work. On that date at about 9:24 o'clock p.m., the plaintiff, Vern D. Liberty, was operating his 1963 Chevrolet in a southerly direction upon the detour. Riding in his car were Ervin and Mary Ruth, husband and wife and coplaintiffs here. At that time and place, one Aaron C. Butler was operating his 1968 Ford automobile in a northerly direction on said detour. Riding with him were his wife Katherine and his son Bracken. None of the Butlers are parties to this action.
The Liberty and Butler cars came into collision and as a result Liberty and the Ruths sustained personal injuries, as did the driver and occupants of the Butler automobile.
Sometime prior to June 13, 1969, a suit for damages was filed in Platte County, Missouri 1 wherein Aaron, Katherine and Bracken Butler were plaintiffs, and Vern D. Liberty was defendant. In that suit, Liberty filed a counterclaim charging Butler with various acts of negligence in the operation of his automobile; setting forth in detail the personal injuries alleged to have been sustained by him in the collision of April 28, 1969; and asking for money damages.
On December 11, 1970, Vern D. Liberty, plaintiff here, executed a release whereby he released Aaron and Katherine Butler for his injuries for the sum of $300.00, and on December 14, 1970, his counterclaim in Butler v. Liberty was dismissed 'with prejudice to the further prosecution of said defendant's claims or causes of action as set out in said Counter-Claim, 2 * * *'. More specific reference to the terms of the release signed by Liberty will be discussed hereafter.
Sometime prior to June 30, 1970, a suit had been instituted by Ervin and Mary Ruth against Aaron Butler and Vern D. Liberty in Platte County, Missouri for damages for personal injuries alleged to have been sustained by the Ruths in the collision of April 28, 1969. In the Ruths first amended petition in that action, filed June 30, 1970, Butler and Liberty were charged with joint and concurrent negligence which resulted in the collision and resulting damage.
On October 30, 1970, Ervin Ruth and Mary Stella Ruth executed a joint release for the consideration of $6750.00 releasing Vern Liberty. This release is a part of the record before us and more specific reference to its terms will be discussed hereafter.
Apparently, the Ruths also compromised their claims against Butler, because on November 4, 1970, their actions against Liberty and Butler and Platte County were dismissed with prejudice.
On May 27, 1971, the present action was instituted by the Ruths and Liberty, wherein the defendant construction company was charged with various acts of negligence in the establishment and maintaining of the detour upon which the collision of the Liberty and Butler automobiles occurred, which tortious acts, it is charged, directly caused such collision, injuries and damage. In answer, the defendant pleaded the previous compromises, settlements and releases as an affirmative defense in bar of the claims.
In their response to defendant's request for admissions, the plaintiffs admitted the authenticity of the pleadings and releases but asserted that the releases were limited and not general in scope and did not constitute any bar to their claims.
On September 15, 1972, defendant filed a motion for summary judgment under Rule 74.04 upon the basis that the releases were general in nature and satisfied and extinguished all claims arising out of the April 28, 1969 collision.
One further fact in the record requires mention. On October 30, 1972, 3 the plaintiffs executed documents entitled 'AMENDED CONTRACT OF RELEASE' wherein their claims against J. A. Tobin Construction Company were specifically reserved and excluded as a subject of the compromise and settlement of the claims asserted in the Platte County suits.
The plaintiffs assert that the court below erred in entering summary judgment for the defendant, not upon the basis that any genuine issue of material fact exists, but for the reasons that, 1) the original Liberty release of December 11, 1970 and the Ruth release of October 30, 1970 were not in full settlement of all claims against all persons but were only partial releases limited only to the parties to those contracts, and 2) the amended contracts of release executed by the plaintiffs on October 30, 1972 made the question of the scope or effect of the prior release moot.
It is clear from this record that the various claims and counterclaims in this case were based upon the theory that Liberty, Butler and Tobin were joint tortfeasors whose combined negligence brought about the collision of April 28, 1969 between the Liberty and Butler automobiles. Based upon this premise certain fundamental principles of tort law controlled the decision of the court below as well as ours upon this appeal.
One damaged by the negligence of two or more joint tortfeasors may, at his option, proceed against one or more of them individually or collectively to recover his damages, but he can recover only one satisfaction for his loss or damage. At common law a settlement with one joint tortfeasor operated as a discharge of the other joint tortfeasors.
In 1855, a statute was adopted in Missouri (R.S.1855, p. 649, § 8) which provided that joint tortfeasors who were named as defendants and against whom a joint judgment was rendered could enforce contribution. This statute was amended in 1915 by an addition to the contribution provision to permit an injured party to effect a settlement with one joint tortfeasor and to proceed against other joint tortfeasors for the balance of his damages. This statute is now Section 537.060 RSMo 1969, V.A.M.S. This 1915 amendment was intended to abrogate the common law rule above referred to, but did not affect the rule that there could be only one satisfaction for the injury and damage. Abbott v. City of Senath, 243 S.W. 641, 642 (Mo.1922). This rule is based upon the sound principle that an injured person's right to recover for his injuries, whether caused by one or more wrongdoers, is basically single, '* * * and if he receives satisfaction for same once, whether in court or out of court, from one wrongdoer, he cannot recover any further amount from another wrongdoer * * *.' Neal v. Curtis & Co. Mfg. Co., 328 Mo. 389, 41 S.W.2d 543, 556(26, 27) (1931). It has been repeatedly stated and is the respected law in Missouri that once such a full settlement and satisfaction is made then the cause of action is extinguished and cannot be revived. New Amsterdam Casualty Co. v. O'Brien, 330 S.W.2d 859 (Mo.1960); Booker v. Kansas City Gas Co., 231 Mo.App. 214, 96 S.W.2d 919, 923(3) (1936); Abbott v. City of Senath, supra; Berry v. Kansas City Public Service Co., 343 Mo. 474, 121 S.W.2d 825, 833 (1938); Roberts v. Atlas Life Insurance Co., 236 Mo.App. 1162, 163 S.W.2d 369, 374 (1942); McEwen v. Kansas City Public Service Co., 225 Mo.App. 194, 19 S.W.2d 557, 559 (1929); Hails v. Systems Constructors, Inc., 407 S.W.2d 583 (Mo.App.1966).
In the light of this statute and the definitive decisional rules above referred to, the courts have clearly pointed the way whereby an injured or damaged party may reach a partial satisfaction with one joint tortfeasor without destruction of his right to pursue other joint tortfeasors. This result may be accomplished only by specific and clear limitation of the intended scope of the settlement where such consideration is described as partial, rights reserved as to remaining tortfeasors, or other appropriate language. Black v. Sanders, 414 S.W.2d 241 (Mo.1967); Birmingham v. Kansas City Public Service Co., 235 S.W.2d 322 (Mo.1950). In modern practice, such documents are sometimes termed 'Covenants Not to Sue'.
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