Licha v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co.
| Decision Date | 24 December 1937 |
| Docket Number | No. 31170.,31170. |
| Citation | 201 Minn. 427,276 N.W. 813 |
| Parties | LICHA v. NORTHERN PAC. RY. CO. et al. |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Appeal from District Court, Ramsey County; Hugo O. Hanft, Judge.
Action by Agnes Licha against the Northern Pacific Railway Company and others. From a judgment denying plaintiff's motion for new trial after defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings had been granted, the plaintiff appeals.
Judgment reversed.
Newman & Bowman, of St. Paul, for appellant.
D. F. Lyons, Frederic D. McCarthy, and Conrad Olson, all of St. Paul, for respondents.
Action for personal injuries in which the court granted defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings and plaintiff's opening statement. Plaintiff moved for a new trial, which was denied, and appeals.
It appears that plaintiff was a passenger in an automobile driven by another, which was traveling in an easterly direction on Maryland street in the city of St. Paul at about 3:15 o'clock a. m. on the morning of December 15, 1935. There were six people in the car. The defendant's tracks lie in a rather deep valley, into which Maryland street descends from an elevation on the west, first crossing the tracks of the Soo Line Railroad and proceeding thence downhill. Just before the street crosses defendant's tracks, there is a slight rise so that defendant's tracks are situated in such a position that the lights of an automobile do not shine on a train if there be one on the crossing. The night in question was dark and exceptionally foggy. The city of St. Paul maintains an electric light at the intersection, which was extinguished at about 2: 30 o'clock a. m. On the driver's right-hand side of the road at a point about 30 feet west from the nearest rail and about 19 feet to the right from the center of the road was located a post on which were placed two crossboards to indicate a railroad crossing and a reflector type signal which read `Stop." The post and sign complied with the requirements of the Railroad and Warehouse Commission. The driver could not see the post by reason of its location and the darkness and fog with which it was surrounded, nor the train and tracks by reason of the grade of Maryland street descending to within a short distance of the tracks, the rise just before reaching the tracks, and the intense darkness and fog. The fog was of such density that the light from the lamps on the automobile was unable to pierce the same. The automobile was proceeding at between 15 and 25 miles per hour. Maryland street is one of the principal thoroughfares of the city of St. Paul, rather heavily traveled. Other than the post and train on the tracks, there was no warning to approaching travelers. By reason of the conditions there prevailing, plaintiff claims that the crossing was extrahazardous and that it was the duty of the defendant to exercise care commensurate with the conditions there then existing, and to give some additional warning to those approaching the crossing. Defendant's contention is that (1) by the installation of the post and sign in compliance with the regulations of the Railroad and Warehouse Commission it was relieved of the duty to give any other warning at the crossing, and (2) that the proximate cause of the accident was not any act or omission of the defendant.
1. The question in this case is whether or not a railroad may be required to take precautions in the management and operation of the road with respect to the public safety in addition to those required by statute or order of the Railroad and Warehouse Commission. Defendant contends that this case is ruled by Olson v. Chicago Great Western Railway Co., 193 Minn. 533, 259 N.W. 70, 72, which was decided by a divided court, Mr. Justice Loring writing a dissenting opinion in which Mr. Chief Justice Devaney and Mr. Justice Hilton concurred. If that decision stands, defendant's contention must be sustained. Before examining that decision, it is well to know what the rule in cases of this kind is, without regard to it. The dissenting opinion in the Olson Case adequately deals with the question. This question has been discussed in so many cases that it is impossible to review all of them without unduly extending this opinion. The rule was well settled in Minnesota prior to Olson v. Chicago Great Western Railway Co., supra, that a railroad is bound to take such precautions in the management and operation of the railroad as the public safety requires, though they may be in addition to those required by statute or order of the Railroad and Warehouse Commission or though there be no statute or order upon the subject. 5 Dunnell, Minn.Dig., 2d Ed. & Supps.1932, 1934, 1937, § 8174, cases cited in note 56. This is the universal rule. Note, 71 A.L.R. 369 et seq., where it is said: "It is generally held that the statutory requirements for safety devices at crossings merely prescribe the minimum of care, and, when the crossing is dangerous and prudence demands it, additional safety devices must be provided to the extent necessary to meet the situation." The United States Supreme Court firmly established the rule by taking the lead in Grand Trunk R. Co. v. Ives, 144 U.S. 408, 12 S.Ct. 679, 684, 36 L.Ed. 485, and the courts of Alabama, District of Columbia, Illinois, Iowa, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, and Connecticut have followed the rule. Connecticut was out of line in Dyson v. New York & N. E. R. Co., 57 Conn. 9, 17 A. 137, 14 Am.St. Rep. 82, but, because its rule was erroneous, it was abandoned and that state adopted the majority rule in Pratt, Read & Co. v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 102 Conn. 735, 130 A. 102. See Elukowich v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co. (D.C.) 291 F. 574. Minnesota, since the decision in the Olson Case, is now out of line with the current of authority. In Grand Trunk R. Co. v. Ives, supra, the court said:
"It is also held in many of the states (in fact the rule is well-nigh if not quite, universal), that a railroad company, under certain circumstances, will not be held free from negligence, even though it may have complied literally with the terms of a statute prescribing certain signals to be given, and other precautions to be taken by it, for the safety of the traveling public at crossings." The authorities are uniform in support of the rule: 22 R.C. L. 998, § 226; 52 C.J. 178, § 1773; note, 60 A.L.R. 1110; 2 Thompson on Negligence § 1555; 2 Shearman & Redfield on Negligence, 6th Ed. § 463a; Wharton, Law of Negligence, 2d Ed. § 799. The reason for the rule is plain. In the absence of statute, a railroad is bound to exercise due care in the management and operation of the road. Shaber v. St. Paul, Minneapolis & Manitoba Ry. Co., 28 Minn. 103, 9 N.W. 575; Zenner v. Great Northern Railway Company, 135 Minn. 37, 159 N.W. 1087; Gowan v. McAdoo, 143 Minn. 227, 173 N.W. 440, 442; Crosby v. Great Northern Ry. Co. 187 Minn. 263, 245 N.W. 31. Statutes have been enacted requiring railroads to perform specific acts or take specific precautions for the public safety. One statute after another has been enacted, adding to the number of specific requirements. The purpose of these statutes is to increase, not decrease, public safety, by additional requirements imposed upon railroads. They supplement and do not repeal existing law. They amend existing law only by the addition of specific and minimum requirements. By specific requirements for safety at crossings, which deal with the matter of safety only in particular respects, it is not the intention to do away with the exercise of due care in all other respects. In the Shaber Case, Mr. Chief Justice Gilfillan well said, 28 Minn. 103, at page 107, 9 N.W. 575, 577:
In Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Perkins, 125 Ill. 127, 17 N.E. 1, the Shaber Case was cited, approved, and followed. In Grippen v. New York Central R. Co., 40 N.Y. 34, 42, the court said: In speaking of the effect of such statutes in Gowan v. McAdoo, supra, we said: "it must be remembered that the statutes only prescribe the minimum of care required."
If anything more were to be said upon this phase of the subject, it would be to remember that our primary concern is to do justice. In 2 Thompson, Negligence, § 1555, the footnote criticizes the few authorities to the contrary, which happily at that time did not include Minnesota, and expresses the thought exactly: "If these decisions, taken in the aggregate, mean that a compliance with the requirement of the statute is sufficient for ordinary purposes, they are well enough; but if they mean that, under all circumstances, no matter what the nature of the public peril at the crossing, the railway company is to be released from taking other precautions which ordinary social duty and common prudence may suggest, then they are to be condemned as careless of justice, opposed to the dictates of humanity, and inconsistent with the great weight of judicial authority."
2. The rule as stated still applies unless it has been changed by chapter 336, L. 1925 (Mason's Minn.St.1927, §§ 4743-1 to 4743-17). The question is whether that statute was intended to make a complete code regulating the conduct of railroads and exonerating them from taking...
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