Crosby v. Great Northern Ry. Co.
| Decision Date | 04 November 1932 |
| Docket Number | No. 29040.,No. 29039.,29039.,29040. |
| Parties | CROSBY et al. v. GREAT NORTHERN RY. CO. |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Appeal from District Court, Swift County; Harold Baker, Judge.
Separate actions by W. D. Crosby, as father of Emmett Crosby, a minor, and by Dale Crosby, against the Great Northern Railway Company. From a judgment in each case for the defendant notwithstanding a disagreement of the jury, the plaintiffs appeal.
Judgments affirmed.
John I. Davis, of Benson, and Frank J. Zima, of Glenwood, for appellants.
Frank E. Wright, of Appleton, A. L. Janes, of St. Paul, and Cobb, Hoke, Benson, Krause & Faegre, Paul J. McGough and Bradshaw Mintener, all of Minneapolis, for respondent.
Each plaintiff appealed from a judgment entered pursuant to defendant's motion in each case for judgment notwithstanding a disagreement of the jury.
On August 28, 1930, at about 9:45 p. m., Dale Crosby drove an automobile from the north on state highway No. 66 going toward and near the village of Appleton. He was twenty-one years old. His fifteen year old brother Emmett was riding with him. Just north of the village defendant's track intersects this highway. There is a grade crossing. In a collision with one of defendant's trains at this crossing, the Crosby boys were injured. Dale Crosby seeks to recover damages for his injuries. Emmett Crosby being a minor, his father seeks to recover damages for him. There are separate actions.
This highway leads to the crossing straight from the north. It is practically level and graveled to a width of 24 feet. The crossing is protected by the usual statutory signs. An electric street light 24 feet above the ground, 4 feet east of the highway, and 65 feet south of the center of the railroad track was burning.
The crossing is planked to a width of 40 feet. As well as the large crossing sign at the crossing, there is a warning sign 300 feet to the north. These two young men were familiar with the crossing. They had lived on a farm about two miles to the northwest. They had traveled over this crossing in the daytime on the day of the accident. As they approached the crossing at the time here involved, a freight train was slowly moving upon the crossing. It consisted of an engine, one box car, and ten gondola cars. It was moving in a westerly direction at the rate of three or four miles per hour. Just previously it had been standing for three or four minutes and had moved but 25 to 30 feet when the accident happened. The engine was headed east and had a 250 candle-power light facing east. It was moving backward, its front end was coupled to the box car, and east of the box car were the gondola cars. In making the movement the engine was going backward.
The crossing has a fairly open view as one comes from the north on the highway. Dale Crosby drove his automobile into the eighth car from the engine, resulting in injury to himself and his brother.
1. Subject to legislative restriction, which is not here violated, it is not negligence in itself for a railroad company to allow a train of cars to stand on a highway crossing, or to move thereon. Wood v. Northern Alabama Ry. Co., 22 Ala. App. 513, 117 So. 495; Cleveland, C. C. & St. L. Ry. v. Gillespie (Ind. App.) 173 N. E. 708, 713; Philadelphia & R. Ry. Co. v. Dillon, 1 W. W. Harr. (Del.) 247, 114 A. 62, 15 A. L. R. 894; St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co. v. Guthrie, 216 Ala. 613, 114 So. 215, 56 A. L. R. 1110; Gulf, M. & N. R. Co. v. Holifield, 152 Miss. 674, 120 So. 750; Hendley v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., 198 Wis. 569, 225 N. W. 205; Jacobson v. New York, S. & W. R. Co., 87 N. J. Law, 378, 94 A. 577; Gage v. Boston & M. R. R. Co., 77 N. H. 289, 90 A. 855, L. R. A 1915A, 363; Orton v. Pa. Ry. Co. (C. C. A.) 7 F.(2d) 36; Morris v. Atlantic City R., 100 N. J. Law, 328, 126 A. 295; Jones v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry., 129 Kan. 314, 282 P. 593; Gilman v. Cent. Vt. Ry., 93 Vt. 340, 107 A. 122, 16 A. L. R. 1102; Trask v. Boston & M. R., 219 Mass. 410, 106 N. E. 1022; Witherly v. Bangor & A. R. Co., 131 Me. 4, 158 A. 362.
Defendant was carrying on a legitimate business in a lawful manner. Reasonable operation of its business does not require lights on the side of each or any of the cars of a standing or moving train. Neither is it reasonable to expect or require a railroad company to have men with lanterns on the ground when trains pass in the night.
2. Statutory signals for trains approaching a highway crossing are solely for the benefit of travelers on the highway so as to warn them of approaching trains. Minn. St. 1927, § 10263. They are immaterial when and where, as here, the train is actually upon and occupying the crossing when the traveler arrives. Schmidt v. C. & N. W. Ry., 191 Wis. 184, 210 N. W. 370; McGlauflin v. B. & M. Ry., 230 Mass. 431, 119 N. E. 955, L. R. A. 1918E, 790; Nadasky v. Public Service Ry., 97 N. J. Law, 400, 117 A. 478; Keel v. S. A. L. Ry., 122 S. C. 17, 114 S. E. 761; Southern Ry. v. Simpson, 149 Tenn. 458, 261 S. W. 677; Yardley v. Rutland R. Co., 103 Vt. 182, 153 A. 195; Jones v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 129 Kan. 314, 282 P. 593; Gulf, M. & N. R. Co. v. Holifield, 152 Miss. 674, 120 So. 750. Such being the rule, the argument that, since the two young men were rendered unconscious for three or four days and cannot now remember anything about the accident, there is a presumption that they used due care and there is an inference that no signal or warning was given, is not convincing, logical, or sound.
The requirement for signals and warnings as to such crossings is not for the purpose of preventing automobile drivers from running into the side of trains. Nadasky v. Public Service R....
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