Lieber v. ITT Hartford Ins. Center, Inc.

• Citation: 2000 UT 90,15 P.3d 1030
• Decision Date: 17 November 2000
• Docket Number: No. 990134.,990134.
• Parties: Randy O. LIEBER, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. ITT HARTFORD INSURANCE CENTER, INC., a Connecticut corporation, Defendant and Appellee.
• Court: Supreme Court of Utah

15 P.3d 1030

2000 UT 90

Randy O. LIEBER, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. ITT HARTFORD INSURANCE CENTER, INC., a Connecticut corporation, Defendant and Appellee.

No. 990134.

Supreme Court of Utah.

November 17, 2000.

Rehearing Denied December 7, 2000.

Ralph L. Dewsnup, Salt Lake City, Alan W. Mortensen, Bountiful, for plaintiff.

Jaryl L. Rencher, Stephen W. Owens, Salt Lake City, for defendant.

AMENDED OPINION

DURHAM, Justice:

¶ 1 Plaintiff Randy Lieber appeals from a decision of the trial court granting summary judgment in favor of ITT Hartford Insurance Center, Inc., and denying Lieber's cross-motion for summary judgment and his request for attorney fees. We reverse and remand.

FACTS

¶ 2 This is a personal injury action brought by Lieber against several defendants for damages he sustained in a multi-vehicle accident while traveling on Interstate 15 on November 23, 1993. At the time of the accident, Lieber was employed by Kraft Food Service, was driving a vehicle owned by Kraft, and was acting within the scope of his employment. Lieber filed for and received workers' compensation benefits through Kraft's compensation insurer, Hartford. The Kraft vehicle that Lieber was driving at the time of the accident was insured through a separate business automobile policy issued by Hartford. This policy contained the following exclusionary language:

B. EXCLUSIONS

This insurance does not apply to any of the following:

...

3. WORKERS' COMPENSATION

Any obligation for which the "insured" or the "insured's" insurer may be held liable under any workers' compensation. . . law or similar law.

¶ 3 Endorsement No. 110 of Hartford's auto policy, entitled "Utah Uninsured Motorist Coverage," provided in part:

A. COVERAGE

1. We will pay all sums the "insured" is legally entitled to recover as compensatory damages from the owner or driver of an "uninsured motor vehicle." ...

...

C. EXCLUSIONS

This insurance does not apply to any of the following:

...

2. The direct or indirect benefit of any insurer or self-insurer under any workers' compensation, disability benefits or similar law.

¶ 4 Endorsement No. 26 of the policy, entitled "Auto Medical Payments Coverage," provided in part:

C. EXCLUSIONS

This insurance does not apply to any of the following:

...

4. "Bodily injury" to your employee arising out of and in the course of employment by you. However, we will cover "bodily injury" to your domestic employees if not entitled to workers [sic] compensation benefits.

¶ 5 As part of his personal injury action, Lieber brought third-party claims against two "ghost" defendants, who allegedly partially caused the accident, but who fled the scene and whose identities are unknown. Lieber named Hartford as a defendant in a representative capacity for the two unknown drivers and any underinsured drivers involved in the accident. On October 28, 1997, Hartford moved for summary judgment based on the exclusive remedy provision of the Utah Workers' Compensation Act, Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-105(1) (Supp.1999),¹ and the exclusionary language in its policy. In response, Lieber filed a motion for partial summary judgment and for attorney fees. Following oral argument, the trial court granted Hartford's motion and denied Lieber's motions. In its final order, filed on November 23, 1998, the trial court concluded that "Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-305(4)(b)(ii) bars an employee from collecting from his employer both worker's [sic] compensation benefits and uninsured motorist coverage" and that "Hartford's policy also explicitly states in several places that no insurance is provided to employees who received benefits under the worker's [sic] compensation act." This order was certified as a final order pursuant to rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

ANALYSIS

¶ 6 On appeal, Lieber argues that the trial court erred in holding that: (1) section 31A-22-305(4)(b)(ii) of the Utah Code bars an employee, injured in a car accident, from collecting both workers' compensation and uninsured motorist coverage; (2) Hartford's policy excludes uninsured coverage when an employee, injured in a car accident, receives workers' compensation benefits; and (3) he was not entitled to attorney fees. We address each argument separately.

I. STATUTORY ANALYSIS

¶ 7 Lieber challenges the trial court's interpretation of section 31A-22-305(4)(b)(ii).² "In matters of pure statutory interpretation, an appellate court reviews a trial court's ruling for correctness and gives no deference to its legal conclusions." Stephens v. Bonneville Travel, Inc., 935 P.2d 518, 519 (Utah 1997) (citing State v. Vigil, 842 P.2d 843, 844 (Utah 1992)). Moreover, when called upon to interpret a statute, "our primary goal is to give effect to the legislature's intent in light of the purpose the statute was meant to achieve." Evans v. State, 963 P.2d 177, 184 (Utah 1998). The best evidence of the true intent and purpose of the legislature in enacting a statute is the plain language of the statute. See State v. Hunt, 906 P.2d 311, 312 (Utah 1995)

. "We therefore look first to the statute's plain language." Evans, 963 P.2d at 184. To resolve Lieber's challenge, we must consider the language of three different statutes.

¶ 8 Initially, we examine section 31A-22-305(3) which states, in relevant part:

Uninsured motorist coverage ... provides coverage for covered persons who are legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles because of bodily injury, sickness, disease, or death....

Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-305(3) (Supp. 1999).³ The operative phrase in this subsection for purposes of this appeal is "legally entitled to recover." This phrase has previously been interpreted to mean that a claimant must have "a viable claim that is able to be reduced to judgment in a court of law." Peterson v. Utah Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 927 P.2d 192, 195 (Utah Ct.App.1996) (drawing upon cases interpreting "legally entitled to recover" in uninsured context to determine meaning of same phrase in underinsured context). Applying a plain language analysis to this phrase in the instant case, we believe this interpretation is correct and hereby adopt it.

¶ 9 Next, we move to the following subsection, Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-305(4), the statute Lieber argues the trial court misinterpreted. The relevant portion of this subsection states:

This [uninsured motorist] coverage does not apply to an employee, who is injured by an uninsured motorist, whose exclusive remedy is provided by Title 34A, Chapter 2, Workers' Compensation Act ["WCA"].

Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-305(4)(b)(ii) (Supp.1999).⁴ In interpreting this statute, our first question concerns its relationship to the previous subsection, section 31A-22-305(3). To answer this question, we look to the principle that "a statute should be construed as a whole, with all of its provisions construed to be harmonious with each other." Nixon v. Salt Lake City Corp., 898 P.2d 265, 268 (Utah 1995); see also Utah State Road Comm'n v. Friberg, 687 P.2d 821, 831 (Utah 1984)

. Based on this principle, we conclude that an employee whose exclusive remedy is provided by the WCA is someone who has no viable claim that can be reduced to a judgment in a court of law. In other words, subsection (4)(b)(ii) further clarifies who is or is not someone legally entitled to recover under subsection (3).

¶ 10 This conclusion leads to the next question in interpreting this subsection, namely, who is an employee "whose exclusive remedy is provided by [the WCA?]" Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-305(4)(b)(ii). Based on our analysis so far, we know that such employees are those who have no viable claim they can reduce to judgment. For further guidance as to the meaning of this language, we turn to the third statute necessary to our analysis, the exclusive remedy provision of the WCA. This statute states in relevant part:

The right to recover compensation pursuant to this chapter for injuries sustained by an employee ... shall be the exclusive remedy against the employer and shall be the exclusive remedy against any officer, agent, or employee of the employer . . . .

Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-105(1) (emphasis added). Interpreting this statute according to its plain language, it is clear that the WCA provides the sole, or exclusive, mechanism for recovery when injured employees, or their family members or heirs, attempt to recover compensation for the employees' work-related injuries from their employer, or from an officer, agent, or employee of their employer. See Peterson, 927 P.2d at 194-97

(holding that exclusive remedy provision of WCA precludes recovery of underinsured benefits by employee injured by co-employee because employee was not "legally entitled to recover" from co-employee). Thus, an injured employee has no viable claim against these entities/persons. However, because the statute does not list any other entities or persons against whom the WCA provides the exclusive remedy to injured employees, we conclude that the WCA is not the exclusive remedy for injured employees who seek to recover from someone who is not their employer, or an officer, agent, or employee of the employer, and that such employees do have viable claims against such third parties. See Biddle v. Washington Terrace City, 1999 UT 110, ¶ 14, 993 P.2d 875 (stating that "omissions in statutory language should be taken note of and given effect." (internal quotation marks omitted)).

¶ 11 With this clarification, we return to section 31A-22-305(4)(b)(ii). Again, according to its plain language, uninsured coverage "does not apply to an employee, who is injured by an uninsured motorist, whose exclusive remedy is provided by [the WCA]." Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-305(4)(b)(ii). From the foregoing analysis of the exclusive remedy provision of the WCA, it is clear that uninsured coverage is not available when the uninsured driver is the employer, or an officer, agent, or employee of the employer because the WCA...