Life of the Land v. Land Use Commission of State of Hawaii

• Decision Date: 04 February 1981
• Docket Number: No. 6405,6405
• Citation: 623 P.2d 431,63 Haw. 166
• Court: Hawaii Supreme Court
• Parties: LIFE OF THE LAND, Charles O. Carr, on behalf of himself and on behalf of Life of the Land, Charles Kauluwehi Maxwell, Sr., William Hale, Dr. Satya Sood, and Max Kincaid, Jr., Plaintiffs-Appellees, Cross-Appellants, v. The LAND USE COMMISSION OF the STATE OF HAWAII, Eddie Tangen, individually and in his official capacity, Shelley M. Mark, individually and in his official capacity, Sunao Kido, individually and in his official capacity, Alexander J. Napier, individually and in his official capacity, Tanji Yamamura, individually and in his official capacity, Edward K. Yanai, individually and in his official capacity, James Carras, individually and in his official capacity, Mitsuo Oura, individually and in his official capacity, Christopher Cobb, in his official capacity, and Hideto Kono, in his official capacity, and Castle & Cooke, Inc., on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, Defendants-Appellants, Cross- Appellees.

Page 431

623 P.2d 431

63 Haw. 166

LIFE OF THE LAND, Charles O. Carr, on behalf of himself and on behalf of Life of the Land, Charles Kauluwehi Maxwell Sr., William Hale, Dr. Satya Sood, and Max Kincaid, Jr. Plaintiffs-Appellees, Cross-Appellants, v. The LAND USE COMMISSION OF the STATE OF HAWAII, Eddie Tangen, individually and in his official capacity, Shelley M. Mark, individually and in his official capacity, Sunao Kido, individually and in his official capacity, Alexander J. Napier, individually and in his official capacity, Tanji Yamamura, individually and in his official capacity, Edward K. Yanai, individually and in his official capacity, James Carras, individually and in his official capacity, Mitsuo Oura, individually and in his official capacity, Christopher Cobb, in his official capacity, and Hideto Kono, in his official capacity, and Castle & Cooke, Inc., on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated Defendants-Appellants, Cross- Appellees.

No. 6405.

Supreme Court of Hawai'i.

Feb. 4, 1981.

Syllabus by the Court

1. Even in the absence of constitutional restrictions, courts still carefully weigh the wisdom, efficacy, and timeliness of an exercise of their power before acting, intervening only when the dispute can be termed "justiciable." Though the courts of Hawaii are not subject to a "cases or controversies" limitation like the federal judiciary, judicial power to resolve public disputes in a system of government where there is a separation of powers should be limited to those questions capable of judicial resolution and presented in an adversary context.

2. In determining standing to sue, the crucial inquiry is "whether the plaintiff has alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to warrant his invocation of the court's jurisdiction and to justify exercise of the court's remedial powers on his behalf." This court's position is that standing requirements should not be barriers to justice.

3. One whose legitimate interest is in fact injured by illegal action of an agency or officer should have standing because justice requires that he should have a chance to show the action that hurt his interest is illegal.

4. The fact that plaintiff shares the alleged injury with others does not disentitle him to challenge results of governmental action through the judicial system.

5. As plaintiffs have pleaded interests which are personal and special, as opposed to generalized interests, they have a "stake" in the outcome of the alleged controversy adequate to invoke judicial intervention, though they are neither owners nor adjoining owners of land whose reclassifications are being challenged.

6. Plaintiffs endowed with interests that may have been adversely affected, and who were deemed "aggrieved persons" in a prior case with similar allegations, are undoubtedly "interested persons" authorized to challenge an agency rule pursuant to HRS § 91-7.

7. So long as plaintiff demonstrates adverse interests or claims against some defendants, the fact that others may also have been haled into court does not defeat plaintiff's standing.

8. The pragmatic objectives of the class action device, i. e., economies of time, effort, and expense, as well as uniformity of decision for persons similarly situated, are not procurable at the expense of procedural fairness to absentees.

9. Rule 23, H.R.C.P., an exactly worded counterpart of Rule 23, Fed.R.Civ.P., clearly authorizes defendant class actions and treats them no differently from plaintiff class actions.

10. While class actions, including defendant actions, are viable and valuable procedural instruments in complex litigation where the rights of numerous parties are adjudicated, defendant class actions "demand greater attention to the due process rights of absent members."

11. A trial court is vested with broad discretion in deciding whether to certify a class, and this authority is normally undisturbed on review absent a misapprehension or misapplication of Rule 23's criteria.

12. The party who seeks to utilize a class action assumes the burden of establishing the four prerequisites for class certification delineated in Rule 23(a) and further demonstrating the presence of a suitable situation for the maintenance of a class action under the criteria set forth in at least one of the subdivisions of Rule 23(b).

13. The typicality requirement of Rule 23(a)(3) was designed to be read in conjunction with the fair representation requirement that follows; it can be equated with absence of conflict of interests. Where claims or defenses among class members and representative are coextensive, there is a probability of fair and adequate representation; where they are potentially conflicting, absentees are unlikely to be afforded representation consistent with notions of fairness and justice.

14. Where colorable defenses may derive from particular circumstances, rather than from those common to the putative defendant class, or where there is indication that the representative may be particularly interested in a claim or defense unique to him or a subclass, a court is justified in denying the class action certification on the grounds of inadequate representation.

15. Where plaintiffs have not established an absence of conflict between the interests of the representative and those of the other members of the putative defendant class and the representative's capacity and propensity to litigate the defenses of other class members in the manner it would litigate its own, a class certification is improper. Benjamin M. Matsubara, Sp. Deputy Atty. Gen., Honolulu (Gary B. K. T. Lee, Honolulu, with him on opening brief), for defendants-appellants cross-appellees Land Use Commission et al.

Dickson C. H. Lee, Honolulu (Ton Seek Pai and Robert M. Ehrhorn, Jr., Honolulu, with him on the briefs; Okumura, Takushi, Funaki & Wee, Honolulu, of counsel), for defendant-appellant, cross-appellee Castle & Cooke, Inc.

Edward Cooper Brown, Honolulu, for plaintiffs-appellees, cross-appellants.

Before RICHARDSON, C. J., and OGATA, MENOR, LUM and NAKAMURA, JJ.

NAKAMURA, Justice.

Once again, we are called upon to decide procedural questions related to a judicial examination of the "comprehensive review of the classification and districting of all lands" in the State of Hawaii conducted by the Land Use Commission in 1974. In Life of the Land v. Land Use Commission, 58 Haw. 292, 568 P.2d 1189 (1977), our narrow ruling was that service of a copy of a notice of appeal was not a jurisdictional prerequisite for judicial review of a Land Use Commission order pursuant to HRS § 91-14. In Life of the Land, Inc. v. Land Use Commission, 61 Haw. 3, 594 P.2d 1079 (1979), we held Life of the Land had standing to seek review under § 91-14 as a "person aggrieved" by decisions of the Land Use Commission issued in furtherance of the "comprehensive review" conducted in 1974. In this Life of the Land case, a class action, ¹ the issues are (1) whether the organization and several of its members who are neither owners of reclassified land nor owners of land adjoining reclassified land have standing to invoke judicial scrutiny of the procedures followed by the commission, as well as its determinations, by way of a declaratory action and (2) whether a class action involving a defendant class composed of all landowners whose lands were specifically reviewed for possible reclassification and redistricting may be maintained. Although we conclude the record and relevant principles of law support plaintiffs-appellees' standing to sue, we do not find the facts and the law sustain the circuit court's certification of the defendant class. We therefore reverse the order certifying the defendant class and remand the case for further proceedings.

I.

Prior to its repeal in 1975, HRS § 205-11 ² mandated a comprehensive review, commonly referred to as a boundary review, of the classification and districting of all lands in the state at the close of each five-year period subsequent to the adoption of the Land Use Law. In compliance therewith, the Land Use Commission conducted a review in 1974. The prodigious task entailed a survey of all the lands in Hawaii, as well as a specific review of the lands proposed for reclassification and redistricting. Proposals to reclassify a total of 133,438 acres of land were received and considered. For administrative convenience the commission categorized the proposals as 157 separate cases and dockets, primarily on the basis of ownership. And hearings on the proposed reclassifications, conducted on a "contested" basis, were held on each of the major inhabited islands.

The final determinations following the commission's boundary review were announced in December of 1974. Some of the lands reviewed were placed in "higher" classifications, other lands were placed in "lower" classifications, and the status of about half of the lands proposed for reclassification was undisturbed. ³ Approximately 66,670 acres were reclassified.

Life of the Land and several of its members filed the instant action against the Land Use Commission of the State of Hawaii, its members, and Castle & Cooke, Inc., an affected landowner, on April 24, 1975, seeking a judicial declaration that all of the commission's determinations announced at the conclusion of its comprehensive boundary review were void for sundry reasons. ⁴ Plaintiffs-appellees alleged, inter alia, that violations of HRS Chapter 91 (the Administrative Procedure Act), HRS Chapter 205 (the Land Use Law), and HRS Chapter 343 (environmental impact statements) had vitiated the entire boundary reviews; they also alleged breaches of federal and state constitutional provisions by the commission. Plaintiffs-appellees further averred the determinations were arbitrary and capricious. The ultimate relief sought is a restoration of the status quo ante in land use classifications and district designations for all of the...